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The New Zealand financial markets experienced a horrific loss over a three year period (from 
2006 through to 2009). This was due to the non-bank deposit taking sector, which resulted in the 
failure of over 45 finance companies. This categorical failure resulted in losses over NZ$3 billion, 
impacting between 150,000 and 200,000 depositors (in a country where total share market 
capitalisation is approximately NZ$75 billion). This event inevitably raised concern over the 
quality of financial reports, audits and the role of trustees in the New Zealand financial system.  
While several scholars have examined the internal and external factors which caused this financial 
crisis in an attempt to attribute blame or responsibility, this study investigates the underlining 
variables that contributed to the financial companies’ failure, from three years ahead, to achieve 
the best prediction model.  
The study uses a sample of 35 failed finance companies and covers the period of 2005 – 2009. It 
compares these companies with the same number of non-failed companies, matched based on 
asset size. In particular, it studies their financial and non-financial variables for three consecutive 
years before failure. Logit and hazard models are used in order to identify a suitable model for 
prediction. The models were developed based on three different variable categories. The first 
model incorporates only CAMELS financial variables. While the second model uses only Agency-
related variables, the third model is expanded to amalgamate both CAMELS financial and non-
financial variables. 
The study examines the accuracy of the models by testing through out-of-sample data that has 
been collected from failed financial institutions after 2010, a period characterised by the 
implementation of new regulations. Error table, AUC, Gini, KS and H measures are used to assess 
the performance of the models. 
The overall results of this study suggest that there is sufficient evidence to support the claim that 
both financial and non-financial indicators are inferior among failed finance companies when 
compared to non-failed companies, for three years before failure. The results strongly support 
the argument that the integration of both groups of variables increases the performance of the 
model in predicting failure in both the logit model and the hazard model. Therefore, the 




The study also verifies that the overall accuracy of combined models is more than 85%, with the 
highest accuracy of 89.70% at three years before failure, in the logit model. Furthermore, the 
lowest level of false negative and false positive, and the AUC, Gini, KS and H statistics, which 
measures the discriminant power of the models, show the combined model at three years before 
failure has the best discriminative power. 




Chapter 1                   
                                               Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Historically, the financial sector in New Zealand has been subject to a notable degree of 
regulation, especially over the period of the 1930s to the 1980s (Quigley and Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand, 1992). After the great depression of the 1930s, the New Zealand government took 
control over a large proportion of economic activity. This included the purchase of several key 
industries and resources and increased monitoring and restrictions on importing and exporting. 
Exporters were obliged to sell foreign funds to the Reserve Bank at an exchange rate set by the 
Minister of Finance; the funds were then sold mainly to domestic producers to pay for imported 
raw materials. During this time, the government attempted to control the inflation rate through 
interest rate ceilings, credit guidelines and price controls. However, this approach became less 
effective over time. The New Zealand economy grew at a respectable rate through government 
intervention up until 1967. In that time, nearly a third of New Zealand’s exports (by value) were 
concentrated in wool. In June of 1966, wool prices globally dropped by 20 percent; this was 
followed by further reductions in 1968. These events highlighted serious weaknesses in the New 
Zealand economy. In addition, the Bretton Wood Agreement, which was anchored by the United 
States’ willingness to convert dollars into gold at the fixed price, came to an end in 1971. This end 
of the relationship meant that major currencies had to find their values. This event also marked 
the beginning of rising inflationary pressures in New Zealand that were to persist for the next two 
decades.  
On the 1st of January 1973, the United Kingdom formally entered the European Economic 
Community. This marked the end of New Zealand’s forty years of preferential access to the British 
agricultural product market under the 1932 Ottawa Agreement. Up until this point, Britain was 
New Zealand’s main export market. This and the creation of Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) in the 70s created the desire to establish an independent New Zealand 
economy.  
During the 70s and 80s, the government focused on manipulating the market through interest 
rate controls, exchange rate controls, subsidies, tariffs and, at times, even freezing market prices, 
wages and interest rates. In the mid-1980s, public opinion changed. The government was 
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criticised for relying on market manipulations to conquer symptoms of New Zealand’s economic 
disorder, rather than using more general instruments of economic management, to address the 
underlying causes. This change of opinion saw a change of government. This, in turn, resulted in 
the implementation of new reforms between 1984 and 1994. These reforms were designed to 
reduce government interventions in the economy and allowed more freedom for competitive 
markets to allocate economic resources as they saw fit. Therefore, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
attention turned toward market methods of sustaining monetary discipline. The Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand was given independent control of the official cash rate to maintain inflation and 
new policies prohibited the government from using monetary issues for short-term political gain. 
Instead, the government was tasked with employing price stability measures that would ensure 
long-term gain (Dalziel, 2004). These regulations revealed citizen’s preferences; to conduct the 
economy in a way that achieved broader growth, improved economic perspectives and the 
perception that finance should assist in this process. This reduction in regulations allowed 
financial institutes more freedom; the interest rate was set by financial institutes in relation to 
risk factors and banks were able to offer new products (Tripe, 2012). 
In July 1984, new measures were instituted to discontinue the interest rate controls forced on 
various industries as part of the income and price freezes. The credit growth guidelines were 
removed in August 1984 and the minimum public sector security and mandatory liquid assets 
holdings (through the reserve asset ratio system), were terminated in February 1985. The result 
of this freedom was the development of new institutions which provided innovative services 
which existing institutions were unwilling/ unable to provide. However, this was not all positive; 
the rapid growth of new institutions meant that regulatory bodies were overwhelmed and 
struggled to keep up with the changing face of financial services in New Zealand. 
Banking system regulations were outlined in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s May 1987 
Bulletin. However, it viewed that the failure of individual institutions should not panic the Reserve 
Bank unless, in the situation of a general financial crisis which could contribute to the failure of 
several institutions, this would have a negative impact on the economy as a whole (Tripe, 2012). 
The other key objective was failure management, as opposed to failure prevention. This was 
intended to control disturbances caused by failures. This policy was based on the understanding 
that failure spreads a negative message about market discipline (Doughty, 1986). However, the 
scope of regulation was largely conservative: in other words, it was believed that the market was 
the main source of regulation for the New Zealand financial system (Grimes, 1998). This was, 
however, complemented with a broader legislative framework, which included the Companies 
Act and Financial Reporting Standards (Tripe, 2012). 
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Following the introduction of the Securities Act of 1978, banking sector regulations have 
developed through time. A key development was the bank-specific disclosure regime which came 
into effect in 1996. This obliges banks to publish a quarterly balance sheet and a year-to-date 
income statement, along with non-financial information. These disclosures result that the bank’s 
board of directors are individually responsible for signing off the reports. This makes them liable 
for any misleading or untrue reports. 
Although regulations for the banking system have undoubtedly improved since the 
implementation of the Securities Act in 1978, finance companies have been largely ignored. 
Regulations for these institutions were still based on the Securities Act 1978 up to 2013. These 
regulations focused more on form than substance. Finance companies were legally authorised to 
raise funds from the public as long as they had a trust deed with one of the corporate trustees, 
and their prospectuses were published every six months, to meet market transparency 
requirements (Tripe, 2012).  
In 2008, New Zealand had nearly 200 non-bank deposit takers (NBDTs) that had NZ$8 billion in 
retail deposits (RBNZ Staff, 2008b). Significantly, at this time, there was not an official executive 
body in charge of monitoring these NBDTs. The inefficiency of the regulatory framework for 
financial institutions was foregrounded by the first wave of NBDTs failures in 2006. The 
government commenced a review of regulations in the finance sector in September 2005. Some 
regulatory aspects have not been scrutinised for many years, and many had not been updated in 
respect of corporate governance codes or international standards. In December 2005, Cabinet 
formally appointed the Reserve Bank as the single prudential supervision of the NBDTs. 
In September 2006, the Reserve Bank published the Discussion Document which highlighted that 
the existing regulatory framework for NBDTs was insufficient in several aspects. These 
deficiencies included inconsistencies in regulatory requirements and supervision across different 
NBDTs, an absence of minimum entry requirements for NBDTs, a lack of governance 
requirements and insufficient information to enable depositors to assess and compare the risks of 
depositing with NBDTs. 
Although the Reserve Bank was clear about all of the deficiencies, they did not set any specific 
requirement for financial institution until 2009, after a large number of failures had negatively 
affected the financial market. 
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1.2  Statement of Problem  
It is the nature of finance companies to fill the gap between the banks and the borrowers when 
banks cannot, or will not, lend. In New Zealand, finance company clients are higher-risk 
borrowers and include individuals or unlisted private companies who typically need more credit 
or more flexibility than what banks can provide them with (often due to their credit history). The 
number of finance companies, especially non-bank deposit takers, developed rapidly, particularly 
in the property sector in New Zealand between 2000 and 2007 (Commerce Committee, 2011). 
Property developers relied on finance companies to cover the gap between what banks could 
lend them and their funding. As finance institutions tend to lend for riskier projects, and by lower 
credit security than banks, they charge borrowers higher interest rates. They appeal to investors 
by offering higher returns on their deposits. 
Finance companies’ coverage moved to the riskier territory, like financing second-hand cars and 
consumer purchases, after 2004 when the banks expanded their credit lending into the property 
sector. Many institutions did not reveal increasing risk levels to investors and tried instead to 
appeal to investors by offering them higher interest rates. In short, investors did not fully 
understand the risks that they were taking, by investing money into finance companies. The 
Reserve Bank confirmed that investment in finance companies rose from $5.1 billion to $7.1 
billion during the period of  2004 to 2007 (Commerce Committee, 2011). 
As a result of not having an efficient regulatory framework and prudential supervision, the New 
Zealand market experienced a great loss in the non-bank deposit taking sector, with the failure of 
over 50 finance companies during the 2006-2009 periods. The first few failures were attributed to 
a lack of efficient management, as numbers rose, concern was raised about the quality of 
financial reports, audits and trustees in these finance companies (Allison, 2012). The New Zealand 
Parliament (Commerce Committee, 2011) inquiry estimated a loss of more than NZ$3 billion, in a 
country with a total share market capitalisation of only NZ$75 billion. Over 150,000 investors 
were believed to be affected (Douglas, Lont, and Scott, 2014). 
Academic interest has been high in the years following the collapse of the New Zealand financial 
companies. Several articles have examined both the internal and external factors which are 
believed to have contributed to this financial crisis, with some seeking to attribute blame (Kabir 
and Laswad, 2014; Yahanpath and Cavanagh, 2011). Some of the literature questions whether 
banking regulations in New Zealand are strong and effective enough to protect investors from 
funds being syphon out of financial institutions by related parties (Tripe, 2012; Wilson, 2009). 
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There is, however, a lack of studies on how investors could have determined investment risk 
levels from the disclosed information before bankruptcy occurred. 
There is an extensive body of literature on predicting bankruptcy within manufacturing 
companies (Ak, Dechow, Sun and Wang, 2013; Platt and Platt, 1991) and within financial 
institutions in countries like Thailand (Jaikengkit, 2004), United States bank holding companies 
(Avkiran and Cai, 2012) and Turkish commercial banks (Canbas, Cabuk, and Kilic, 2005). Douglas et 
al. (2014) provide the only study which predicts failure among New Zealand finance companies a 
year before it happened by using a logistic model. It is important to establish an effective early 
warning system for predicting bankruptcy, to create better corporate governance and investor 
confidence (Geng, Bose, and Chen, 2015).  
Due to the huge loss that the market experienced from 2005 to 2009, this study’s primary aim is 
to examine a wide range of financial and non-financial variables and highlights the contributed 
variables in predicting failure, three years before it occurs. This study uses two known logit and 
hazard models to ascertain which model gives more accurate results for prediction. It will be 
useful as an effective early warning system for depositors who plan to invest their money in these 
financial institutions. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
This study aims to determine the underlining variables that contribute to the failure of financial 
companies, three years ahead, to assist in the prediction of failure. This study processes all 
objectives through logit model and hazard model to achieve a better prediction model. The 
study’s objectives are outlined below: 
1. To examine whether CAMELS-based ratios can predict failure  
2. To examine whether Agency-related information can predict failure 
3. To examine whether both CAMELS-based ratios and Agency-related information can 
predict failure 
1.4 Research Questions 
The first objective leads us to the first research question. 
1. Do failed finance companies have inferior CAMELS-based ratios compare to non-failed 
companies? 
As the Agency-related information is very broad, this study examines specific aspects of that, 
which are, the board of director composition, related party transaction, audit, trustee 
6 
 
characteristics and media. Therefore, the second objective gives rise to the following research 
questions: 
2. Do failed finance companies have adequately different board composition, as opposed to 
non-failed ones? 
3. Do failed finance companies have adequately different related party lending, as opposed 
to non-failed ones? 
4. Do failed finance companies have lower quality audits, as opposed to non-failed ones? 
5. Do failed finance companies have adequately different trustee characteristics, as opposed 
to non-failed ones? 
6. Do failed finance companies have adequately different citations in the media, as opposed 
to non-failed ones? 
7. Do failed finance companies have adequately different firm age, as opposed to non-failed 
one? 
8. Do failed finance companies have adequately different Agency-related information, as 
opposed to non-failed ones? 
The last research question covers the third objective: 
          9.  Do failed finance companies have adequately different Agency-related information that 
improves the ability to predict the probability of failure relative to CAMELS ratio alone? 
1.5 Contribution of the Study 
This study makes several contributions to knowledge. First, the model by including Size as one of 
the CAMELS variables and Media as one of the Agency-related indicators, is the most 
comprehensive and thorough study to date. Second, this study represents the first 
comprehensive sample observations by using three consecutive year data from the failed finance 
companies in New Zealand. Third, this study is innovative in its use of the hazard model, a survival 
model, which provides a robust method to predict the failure of New Zealand finance companies. 
Fourth, this study expands discriminative power statistics, especially the H measure for model 
accuracy in failure prediction models in New Zealand. Lastly, by incorporating macroeconomic 
variables, this study establishes statistical relationships that are robust across different 
macroeconomic conditions. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
In contrast to the banking sector, which operates under strict and clear legislation, New Zealand 
NBDTs operate under separate unclear legislation. Numerous failures which occurred from 2006 
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onwards, sent a clear message about the failure of legislation to keep pace with these 
institutions. These failures were the result of numerous factors; NBDTs disclosure requirements 
were inadequate, management had the freedom to set their own rules, and there was no 
government body charged with their oversight. This study should be of immediate benefit to 
those New Zealand agencies charged with designing a new regulatory framework for this 
important sector of the New Zealand financial market. Although the New Zealand government 
has since introduced a prudential regime, there are still some gaps in the current regulatory 
system that need to be addressed (Yahanpath and Islam, 2014). In addition, this study’s results 
will be useful for auditors engaged in the prediction of bankruptcy. In fact, emerging companies 
can carefully monitor financial statements and take necessary precautions when interpreting 
information related to long-term advantages in the competitive market. Further, it will be useful 
for investors who plan to deposit their money in these finance companies. The results are of 
potential interest to investors, analysts, lenders, managers and trustees who are concerned with 
the going concern status of finance companies.  
1.7 Chapter Organisation  
This study comprises of six chapters. The first chapter, the introduction, has provided an outline 
of the research to be undertaken, including the background of the study, a statement of the 
problem, research objectives, research questions and information about the study’s significance. 
Chapter Two reviews the financial companies and the worldwide regulatory environment, before 
focusing specifically on New Zealand. Chapter Three provides a review of the literature and 
findings of prior research, as well as an overview of theories used in this study. 
Chapter Four covers the study’s research design. It provides specific details on the study’s 
methodology and includes information about the sampling process, data collection methods and 
measurement of the variables. 
Chapter Five reports the findings and analysis of the empirical results. Chapter 6 provides a 





                          Financial Institution and Regulatory Environment 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Having identified the study’s primary goals in Chapter One, this chapter provides an overview of 
the financial institution, focusing on issues of definition and explanation of the various types of 
financial institutions in different countries. It offers a summary of the global regulation of 
financial companies. In particular, it focuses on the financial regulatory environment and in 
particular, the Basel frameworks (I, II and III). It provides a brief discussion about the 
implementation of each of the Basel requirements, as well as a critical analysis of them. The 
chapter also reviews the non-bank deposit taker regime in New Zealand. The final section 
summarises the most relevant points of the literature review for the current study.  
2.2 Financial Institutions 
There are many definitions of non-financial banking institutions worldwide. The Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs of Europe defines non-bank financial institutions 
(NBFI) as: 
“All financial institutions and quasi-institutions which are principally engaged in financial 
intermediation by incurring liabilities in forms other than currency, deposits and/or close 
substitutes for deposits from institutional units other than monetary financial institutions or 
insurance technical services” (European Union, 2012, P.4) 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand defines “deposit-takers” as organisations which are not 
registered as a bank or any other specified group whose main business is lending money or 
presenting other financial services, like debt securities to the public (The Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2006) 
Non-bank financial intermediation involves the flow of capital from depositors to borrowers. 
These institutions accept deposits from investors and extend loans and advances to customers 
and businesses. Borrowers are required to pay interest and the principle which is then used to 
pay investors (interest and the principal). Therefore, finance companies’ main assets include 
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loans, advances and receivables, and interest is the main source of revenue for them (Kabir and 
Laswad, 2014).  
The nature of financial institutions is providing loans in an environment with a higher tolerance 
for risk than traditional banks. This willingness has allowed them to integrate into New Zealand’s 
financial system by filling a gap where banks are unwilling, or unable to lend (Commerce 
Committee, 2011). Sometimes the number of parties involved in the process of lending and 
borrowing may only be a few, like banks, but sometimes a series of institutions are involved. For 
example, non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) like investment funds (for example, managed 
funds) invest deposits in other NBFIs (for example, hedge funds) that offer a range of risk-return 
profiles. Through this chain, borrowers access loans, leases and mortgages, but often through 
other NBFIs who are involved in lending, rather than banks. As such, non-bank financial institution 
split the functions of traditional banks across multiple NBFIs. 
The majority of NBFIs clients are individuals and small to medium-sized enterprises who are 
looking for more flexibility or more credit than is traditionally available from the banks. As the 
nature of finance companies is to lend to riskier clients (due to lower credit security requirements 
than banks), their interest rates are higher than banks and in turn, they are able to offer investors 
higher interest rates than traditional banks deposits (Commerce Committee, 2011). 
2.3 Types of Financial Institutions  
Initially, the banking industry, directly or indirectly, handled all financial services (for example, 
commercial banking, investment banking, stock investing services, and insurance providers). 
Collapses in economic and industries in the early 1930s, due to the Great Depression, resulted in 
the separation of some of these services. The emergence of new financial services, like mutual 
funds and brokerage funds, during the 1970s and 1980s, resulted in the separation of financial 
services functions even further (Saunders and Cornett, 2006). By the beginning of the 21st 
century, regulatory barriers, technology, and financial innovation modifications paved the way for 
financial institutions to offer a full set of financial services individually. Despite the fact that the 
financial sector is relatively new, in comparison to other industries, it has grown exponentially 
(both vertically and horizontally) since the 20th century. This can be seen in the sheer number of 
the products it offers (Sabri, 2009).  
Financial institutions (FIs) serve primarily as financial intermediaries between primary saving and 
borrowing sectors (Kumar, 2014). Financial institutions like banks, insurance companies, and 
mutual funds, accomplish the primary function of channelling funds from those with surplus 
funds (depositors) to those with a shortage of funds (borrowers) (Pilbeam, 2005). For instance, in 
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2007, although the United States’ FIs held over $37.46 trillion worth of assets, their motor vehicle 
and parts industry, like General Motors and Ford Motor Corporation, held just $0.47 trillion worth 
of assets (Saunders and Cornett, 2006).  
Modern financial systems characterised are made up of a diverse range of financial institutions 
that offer a variety of financial products. The types of financial institutions differ from one 
country to another. This study is looking into the financial systems of the three big markets in the 
world. The financial systems of the United States, Australia and Europe are explained briefly. 
2.3.1 The Financial System in the United States  
The United States has three major FI groups; Commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit 
unions (called depository institutions or DIs because a significant proportion of their funds comes 
from customer deposits). In the United States, commercial banks make up the largest group of 
depository institutions measured by asset size (Saunders and Cornett, 2006). They manage 
services similar to those of savings institutions and credit unions; that is, they accept deposits 
from investors and provide loans to borrowers. They are profit-seeking institutions that perform 
many functions in a capitalist economy (Kumar, 2014). However, they differ in their composition 
of assets and liabilities, which are much more varied. Commercial bank liabilities generally 
contain several forms of non-deposit sources of funds, whereas their loans are broader in range, 
including consumer, commercial, and real estate loans. Commercial banking activity is also 
regulated separately from savings institutions and credit unions. Savings institutions, known as 
thrift institutions, were first created in the early 1800s and consist of savings and loan 
associations (S&Ls) and savings banks. S&Ls have focused mainly on residential mortgages. They 
hold individual savings and invest them mainly in mortgages and other securities. The primary 
purpose of a savings bank is to accept savings deposits (Kumar, 2014). In the United States, credit 
unions were established in the early 1900s. They are non-profit organisations structured and 
possessed by their members (depositors). They typically focus on consumer loans financed with 
member deposits (Saunders and Cornett, 2006). 
In the United States, non-depository institutions consist of finance companies, insurance 
institutions, pension funds, investment banks, and investment companies. The source of funds for 
finance companies are securities sold to households and businesses, not deposits. These 
companies obtain funds in the market by issuing their securities, in the form of notes and bonds. 
They also offer loans like depository institutions. 
Insurance companies engage in the dual service of insurance protection and investment.  
Insurance offered consists of life insurance and casualty and property insurance. The primary 
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source of funds for insurance companies is policy premiums. Insurance companies compete with 
deposit-taking institutions by providing loans and, with investment companies, in providing 
investment products. The major use of funds for insurance companies is the purchase of long-
term government and corporate securities. Pension funds collect pension contributions from 
employees and invest the funds in government and corporate securities. Pension funds are 
normally invested in long-term saving or long-term assets. 
Investment banks offer a number of services that include underwriting, leveraged buyouts, 
treasury funding, venture capital, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), merchant banking, and 
investment management. 
Investment companies are those that pool funds and invest in various types of investments. They 
are classified as open-ended and close-ended mutual funds. Open-end funds acquire new 
investments and repay all investments. Close-end funds accept funds only at one time. 
2.3.2 The Australian Financial System 
The Australian financial system has different types of financial institutions, including building 
societies, credit unions, money market corporations and finance companies. Building societies 
initially specialised in offering consumer mortgage loans, but over time have developed into more 
diversified institutions, with a high concentration on residential mortgages. Some also hold 
commercial loans, corporate bonds and other investment securities. As building societies focus on 
long-term residential mortgages and fund them with short-term consumer savings deposits, they 
are exposed to considerable interest rate risks, which create significant management challenges. 
Australian credit unions specialise in short-term consumer loans. As in the US, they are non-profit 
organisations, and they have rules that limit membership. Money market corporations offer a 
wide range of financial products, including deposit and lending services. They also provide 
specialist advice on various financial matters, such as mergers and acquisitions, fundraising and 
risk management. Additional functions include providing underwriting facilities, trade in financial 
and exchange markets and funds management. Like the United States, finance companies in 
Australia do not accept deposits from the public. Instead, they rely on short-term and long term 
funding from the sale of commercial papers, notes, bonds and stocks and provide loans to both 
consumers and businesses. Australia has three basic types of finance companies; consumer 
finance companies which specialise in instalment loans for households, business finance 
companies which specialise in loans and leases for businesses and sales finance companies who 
finance the products sold by retail dealers (Kidwell, Brimble, Basu, and Lenten, 2013). In addition 
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to banks and non-bank financial institutions, Australia has insurance companies, superannuation 
funds and managed funds. 
2.3.3 The Euro Zone’s Financial System 
In the Euro zone, the financial system is divided into a monetary financial institution, like banks, 
and non-bank financial institutions. The term shadow banking is used for the non-bank financial 
institution within the Euro zone. In broad term, shadow banking refers to activities related to 
credit intermediation, and liquidity and maturity transformations that take place outside the 
regulated banking system (Bakk-Simon et al., 2012) 
Non-bank financial institutions in the Euro zone include insurance providers, pension funds and 
other financial intermediaries. The last group comprises of financial institutions involved in the 
securitisation of assets, securities and derivatives dealers and specialised financial institutions. 
Other financial intermediaries include money market funds, private equity firms, hedge funds, 
and central clearing counterparties. Money market funds (MMFs) are open-ended mutual funds 
that invest in diversified portfolios of money market instruments, using for a short duration. 
There are three types of money market funds; ‘prime MMF’ which invest in money market 
instruments issued by prime creditors, notably bank deposits and commercial paper. A ‘treasury 
MMF’ invests in money market instruments issued by governments. ‘Government MMFs’ invest 
in money market instruments issued by government agencies (Bakk-Simon et al., 2012). Private 
equity firms tend to invest indirectly in companies through private capital markets and companies 
looking for external finance. 
Hedge funds are active investment vehicles that are lightly regulated with great trading flexibility 
(Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai, 2008). A hedge fund is a fund that can take both long and 
short positions, use arbitrage, buy and sell undervalued securities, trade options or bonds, and 
invest in almost any opportunity in any market. The role of central counterparties (CCPs) in 
financial intermediation is to reduce counterparty risks arising from bilateral transactions over the 
counter derivatives markets and, in turn, to reduce risks to financial stability stemming from 
these counterparty risks. CCPs carry out this function by acting as a counterparty to every trade 
among clearing members, performing multilateral netting and undertaking risk management 
activities to ensure that the failure of a clearing member does not affect other members (Duffie 
and Zhu, 2011).  
As can be seen by the discussion above, the level of financial development varies from one 
country to another. It depends mainly on major institutions (banks), and financial market (stock 
market) developments and practices. Significant differences include the number of banks, the 
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value of deposits granted credit, and owners’ equity values. Growth in the financial sector can be 
seen as a result of the emergence of the non-banking financial institutions, currency systems, 
financial and monetary policies, a move towards more economic openness, and economic growth 
itself (Sabri, 2009). 
As Sabri notes, each of these financial sectors is regulated by national legal frameworks, which 
reflects the diversity of the legal bodies and financial mechanisms which exist in the world’s 
economy. It also reflects the degree of maturity in this sector. The types, credits, and mechanisms 
of any financial sector are generally based on country-specific laws and regulations which 
organise and consolidate financial activities. For instance, some products and services that belong 
to the financial sector may be allowed in one economy and not approved in another. 
2.4 A Review of the Regulatory Environment for Financial Companies 
The rapid growth of the finance sector worldwide has created a need for global regulation. There 
are few global regulations that govern financial institutions around the world. This section 
provides a critical discussion of those with most coverage and their impact on host countries’ 
financial environments. 
2.4.1  International Regulation 
Financial markets and financial institutions play a vital role in today’s economies. They function in 
an environment in which asymmetric information flow is the rule rather than the exception. 
Financial institutions are responsible for enormous amounts of money. They also run the 
payments system upon which modern economies depends. The financial sector is also charged 
with the essential role of allocating financial capital and ensuring it is used productively. In the 
past, governments have consistently intervened, established regulations and overseen the 
activities of financial institutions. Financial regulation aims to maintain confidence and promote 
financial stability (Kumar, 2014). Another motivation is to provide protection for investors against 
fraud or the dissemination of misleading or inadequate information.  
Although there may be benefits in having regulation, it is important to remember there are also 
significant costs involved in establishing effective regulation. Ideally, from a societal point of view, 
the marginal benefits from additional regulation should equal or exceed the marginal costs 
imposed by the regulation. Regulation is not a costless exercise; authorities must devote time and 
resources to design regulation and ensure compliance as well as costs imposed on firms in 
meeting the regulations. Further, regulations may distort the conduct of financial business by 
encouraging financial activities in areas that are favoured by the regulators, rather than those 
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favoured by clients. Regulations may also mean that financial innovation is reduced or presented 
in a limited form to overcome restrictions imposed by the regulations. A further danger is that 
overregulation by one financial centre will merely drive business away to less-regulated foreign 
centres. The degree of regulation and control varies greatly between countries due to different 
historical, cultural, economic and political factors. 
Not only does regulation have a major impact on the operation and development of financial 
markets, but regulations itself is also often revised and adjusted in response to changing market 
structures, financial market developments, new financial instruments and the occasional financial 
scandal or crisis. Unfortunately, because of the uncertainty due to limited information, banks and 
other depository institutions in the past have been subjected to bank runs, and the financial 
system as a whole has encountered ‘panics’ (Kidwell et al., 2013). Government intervention in the 
financial market is usually rationalised on the grounds of ‘market failure’. For instance, during the 
economic crisis of 2007, liquidity dried up as financial systems failed to recognise specific shocks 
which generated contagion and other externalities. 
2.4.2 Global Regulation of Financial Institutions  
The growing internationalisation of finance has meant that international finance is inevitable. 
Banks and other financial institutions gradually interact with their counterparts in other countries. 
The failure of the Bankhaus Herstaatt and the Franklin National Bank in 1974 led to an increased 
interest in prudential supervision at an international level. Many banks have foreign subsidiaries 
which raise the question of whether a financial institution should follow the home country’s or 
host country’s regulations has become increasingly important. The following section explains the 
international financial regulations that are currently in place. 
Basel I Framework 
In 1988 central bankers from around the world met in Basel, Switzerland. This group of regulators 
became known as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The focus of this initial 
meeting was on minimum capital requirements for banks which subsequently became known as 
Basel I, or the 1988 Basel Accord. Basel I was ratified during the 1988 G10 summit and later 
adopted by over 100 countries. Basel I’s objective was to provide a fair and consistent 
international banking system that does not rely solely on the regulations of the financial 
institution’s home or host country as this can provide an inconsistent approach and lead to 
manipulation. This decreases competitive inequality among international banks and strengthens 
and stabilises the international banking system, reducing the risk of future shocks.  
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More specifically, Basel I’s aims were to; 
1) Create consistency surrounding capital adequacy regulations between banks operating in 
multiple countries. 
2) Allow for capital adequacy standards to be adapted to the risk profile of different banks to 
ensure stability through the market. 
Through the Basel I guidelines a two-tier system has been created to define capital:  
The first tier, “Tier I”, is known as Core Capital and consists mainly of share or stock issues 
(shareholders’ equity) and requires reserves to be set aside to protect against future losses, for 
example “loan loss reserves”. This also acts to smooth out income variations and, for the banks, 
minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries.  
The second tier, “Tier II”, is known as Supplementary Capital and is compiled through all other 
capital, which includes, but is not limited to, gains on investment assets, long-term debt (where 
the maturity date exceeds five years), gains on investments and hidden reserves (over estimates 
for bad debts on loans and leases).  
Basel I uses the Risk Weighted Asset (RWA) to measure bank risk levels. RWA provides a bank 
assets weighting, in respect to the relative risk associated with the particular class of asset. This 
ensures that the bank retains stability as assets are written off during the normal course of 
business. Basel I states that a minimum of 8% regulatory capital reserve must be held by each 
bank (defined in relation to the bank’s RWA).  
Basel I divides credit risk into three distinct categories: 
1. On-balance sheet risk 
2. Trading off-balance sheet risk which comprises of derivatives, including, but not limited 
to, currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives, commodities, and equity derivatives 
3. Non-trading off-balance sheet risks, which is comprised of general guarantees; these 
include forward purchase contracts and transaction-related debt assets  
The Basel Accord was the first attempt to create a uniform system of global regulations. While it 
represented a massive step forward, it was not without issues. As outlined below, multiple 
aspects of the Basel I framework have been criticised: 
 Differentiation within the credit risk is not wide enough to prevent failure. The 
establishment of a minimum capital ratio of 8% is insufficient to prevent the failure of 
large banks. This also does not account for changes in the nature of default risk.  
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 Credit Risk for the bank changes depending on the terms of the credit exposure (the 
maturity date). Basel I failed to take this into consideration. Therefore, the capital 
requirements were unaffected by the maturity of the credit exposure. 
 Different countries experience different levels of risk in relation to their exchange rates 
and their economies, not to mention political factors. However, this has not been 
considered in the Basel I Accord. 
 While the Basel I accord has addressed capital adequacy issues within the international 
banking system, it has however failed to consider the liquidity of this capital. A lack of 
liquidity within these capital reserves allows for potential exposure to failure within the 
international banking system.  
Through Basel I, banks were able to manipulate the Capital Adequacy requirements. Major banks 
began to sell off certain assets that were considered high risk under Basel I. This would allow 
them to improve their capital adequacy ratios (for example, credit card book). This process was 
known as “regulatory arbitrage”. This resulted in the banks within three countries (the UK, the 
USA and Germany) artificially increasing their capital ratios well above the 8% required under 
Basel I (12-13% during 2003).  
The Basel II Framework 
The limitations of Basel I, as expressed above, prompted action. The Basel II accord maintained 
the minimum requirement of 8% capital based on RWA. The focus was on establishing a minimum 
level of capital reserves for internationally active banks. This was emphasised as the minimum 
level of capital required internationally by banks. However, governments retained the ability to 
set higher capital requirements within their borders. A major step forward in the Basel II 
framework was the addition of a supervisory review process and market disciplines. The Basel II 
framework is divided into three distinct sections, known as the three pillars;  
- Minimum capital requirements 
- Supervisory review process 
- Market discipline  
Figure 2.1 provides a summary of Basel II’s pillars. The first pillar deals with the calculation of 
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 Figure ‎2-1 Summary of Basel ll Pillars 
First Pillar: Minimum Capital Requirements 
Under the first pillar, there are two methods of calculating capital requirements based on credit 
risk. These methods are known as the standardised approach for credit risk and the internal rates-
based (IRB) approach. 
Under the standardised based approach credit risk is weighed in terms of the types of claims, 
external credit assessment institutes (for example, Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, 
approved by the RBNZ), and implementation considerations. Under the Standardised approach 
lending to a company with an AAA credit rating would carry lower credit risk, compared to 
lending to a company with a lower risk. 
Under the internal rating-based (IRB) approach banks are able to implement their internal review 
of the risks associated with different categories of capital requirements, based on their exposure. 
This is subject to approval from the regulatory supervisor (the RBNZ for New Zealand), as well as 
other minimum disclosure requirements and other conditions suggested by the Basel Committee. 
The IRB approach is further divided into the “Foundation IRB” and the “Advanced IRB”, with 
banks were given the option of selecting either approach. To ensure consistency and allow for 
comparisons and audits by regulators, banks using the IRB approaches are still required to 
complete the standardised approach, thus allowing for further scrutiny. 
The Market Risk component of the first pillar is concerned with changes to external market 
conditions, such as exchange rate variances, interest rate variances and changes to commodity 
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prices. Market risk can also be associated with the external market based financial risks. Again, 
there are two approaches used to determine the Market Risk. These two methods are known as 
the standardised approach and the internal model. 
Under the standard approach determining market risk involves equity positions, derivatives and 
interest rate risks. Two separately calculated charges are used to express the minimum capital 
requirement. The first capital charge relates to modelling specific risks; this seeks to protect 
against movements in individual security prices due to factors relating to a specific issuer. The 
second capital charge relates to general market risk. This identifies changes in the market that 
result in increased risks of loss. 
Operational risk, in relation to the first pillar of Basel II, is the risk of loss resulting from physical 
damage, people, systems, legal risks, inadequate or failed internal processes and from external 
events. However reputational and strategic risk was excluded from this definition. Basel II banks 
choose between three distinct methodologies to calculate their capital requirements under 
operational risk. 
1. The Basic indicator approach is based on an individual bank’s average revenue from the 
three previous years. 
2. The Alternative standardised approach is based on the annual revenue of each line of 
business within the financial institute. 
3. The Advanced measurement approach is based on an internally developed empirical 
model to calculate the capital requirement for operational risk.  
Second Pillar: Supervisory Review Process 
The second pillar is focused on the supervisory review process or the key principals which revolve 
around, risk management, transparency and accountability around banking risks. On an 
operational level, guidance is provided in relation to operation risk, securitisation, credit risk, 
interest rate risk and cross-border communication and cooperation. Basel II’s supervisory review 
process ensures that banks must retain adequate capital reserves to meet the risks associated 
with their business. 
The supervisory review process ensures banks develop better risk management techniques and 
enables them to better manage and monitor their risks. This process also recognises that banks’ 
management teams have a responsibility to develop internal assessment processes to ensure that 
their capital targets correlate with their individual bank’s risk profile.  
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This supervisory review process can be categorised into four key principals, which encompass 
business risk, strategic risk, systematic risk, interest rate risk, and external factors. The four key 
principles developed under the supervisory review process are outlined below:  
 Principle 1: An internal process needs to be developed by the bank to assess their overall 
capital adequacy based on the bank’s risk profile. A strategy needs to be developed to 
maintain capital adequacy levels. This process needs to be rigorously stress tested to 
ensure that it can identify changes in market conditions and or possible events in the 
future that could impact on the bank. 
 Principle 2: Supervising authorities need to regularly check in with banks to review their 
internal capital adequacy assessments, and ensure that are complying with Basel 
regulations and capital ratios 
 Principle 3: Banks are expected to operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios. 
Supervising authorities must have the ability to force banks to hold excess levels of 
capital, over and above the minimum required. 
 Principle 4: Supervisors need to act immediately to prevent banks from allowing capital to 
fall below minimum levels. Supervisors need to be willing and able to act immediately to 
ensure that any situation is remedied and action is taken if the bank continues to operate 
outside regulations. 
Above all, the supervisory review process needs to ensure transparency and accountability, to 
guarantee accurate monitoring of capital ratios and cross-border communication. The Basel 
committee has also identified specific issues related to credit risk, lending book risk, operational 
market risk and interest rate risk to be addressed by supervisors. 
Third Pillar: Market Disclosure 
Market Discipline is an integral part of the banking system as it allows shareholders and 
stakeholders to make informed decisions about the bank’s risk position. Market Discipline is the 
process whereby stakeholders access information to effectively monitor banks’ decisions to 
ensure that they are acting in the best interest of their stakeholders. Basel II promotes market 
discipline by developing detailed disclosure requirements to allow stakeholders to obtain 
information on risk exposure, risk assessments, capital, and scope of application and the capital 
adequacy of the organisation. For market discipline to operate efficiently, it is important that 
stakeholders receive information in a timely fashion. It also needs to be accurate and meaningful 
information. This allows stakeholders to make informed decisions about the bank’s operations 
and risk exposure. Basel II requires mandatory disclosure.  
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Basel II Failures 
Like Basel I, Basel II was characterised by numerous shortcomings. The implementation of Basel II 
was not successful by any stretch of the imagination as it coincided with the global financial crisis 
which began in the last quarter of 2007. In the European Union, Basel II regulations were 
implemented in 2007. In the United States, the implementation of Basel II regulations was only 
required for the largest banks; this was because the United States government determined that 
the Basel II accord was designed for internationally active banks. However, under the European 
Union, Basel II was implemented across all EU banks, regardless of their size or whether were 
considered internationally active or not. China and India opted not to implement Basel II 
requirements as they felt that Basel II did not address the risks that were uniquely associated with 
their markets.  
Another major failing of the Basel II framework was the internal rating based approach, which 
allowed banks to use their risk models to set minimum capital levels. This feature limited Basel II’s 
effectiveness. Banks underestimated their risk exposure by using the internal rating based 
approach, leading to a reassessment of their credit risk. Basel II also failed to address 
undercapitalisation within the banking system. This lead to insolvency in several banks, as the 
extent of losses within the subprime mortgage market began to materialise. Under Basel II banks 
used their own forms of risk assessment and were able to determine the level of risk their off-
balance sheet vehicles carried or not. This meant that banks were allowed to determine which 
risks they should be accountable for. 
Basel II’s approach to risk management was not comprehensive and did not fully detail market 
risk, securitisation or trading book. Under Basel II, banks tended to calculate their capital 
requirements through market risk models. Examples include the Value-at-Risk model, which 
contributed to the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, through systematically 
underestimating the market risk. Banks took excessive risks while not fully realising that they had 
insufficient capital in place to cover their exposure. As previously mentioned, the Basel II 
framework also failed to address liquidity and leverage risks within the banking sector.  
For all banks, there are costs associated with holding capital aside to meet regulatory 
requirements. This capital is unavailable, meaning it cannot be invested in assets which would 
generate a higher rate of return for the bank (for example, lending facilities). As a result, large 
banks often manipulated their position to meet Basel II regulations. Basel II failed to put adequate 
regulations in place to prevent banks from manipulating capital positions in this way. 
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Due to the pro-cyclical nature of Basel II, a common suggestion is that banks should be required 
to hold higher capital reserves. During an economic boom, market risk models are perceived to 
hold a lower risk to banks; therefore banks are able to reduce levels of regulatory capital. Banks 
are then able to invest this capital into assets that generate a higher rate of return, such as 
lending products. However, when the cycle turns downward, banks are exposed, with lower 
levels of regulatory capital. This prompts banks to freeze lending facilities in an attempt to 
increase their capital reserves, causing a ripple effect in the wider economy. 
The Basel III Framework 
Basel III builds on the framework established by the Basel I and Basel II accords. Basel III was 
developed by the Basel Committee in 2010 in response to the 2007/8 global financial crisis and 
the limitations of Basel II. Basel III was meant to be implemented by 2015. However, amendments 
made by the Basel committee in 2013, extended full implementation until 2019. Amendments 
included broader definitions of liquid assets. The Basel committee’s primary goal was to 
strengthen the banking sectors’ resilience by building on the Basel I and II frameworks. This would 
create a disincentive for banks to generate excessive leverage on and off balance sheet, which 
was a major contributing factor to the severity of the global financial crisis.  
The basic summary of the proposed changes under Basel III (2010) are as follows:  
(First) Increase the quality, consistency, transparency and the level of the capital 
base. Basel III’s first recommendation is to focus on increasing the quality 
of capital. This will be achieved by using a two-tier capital system, with 
common shares and retained earnings forming Tier 1 capital and 
supplementary capital and other categorises forming Tier 2 capital. 
Increasing the level of regulatory capital to be held by the banks will 
improve the banking sector’s loss-absorption capacity.  
(Second) Introduction of a leverage ratio. The leverage ratio will be introduced 
under Basel III, to provide a backstop. The leverage tool is designed to 
ensure that banking institutes do not build up an excessive amount of 
leverage, as this contributed to the global financial crisis. The leverage will 
be non-risk-sensitive to reduce the procyclical flaw in Base II. 
(Third) Short term liquidity to be increased. An increase in short liquidity coverage 
ratios will be supported by longer term liquidity ratios. 
(Fourth) Develop balance sheet funding from stable long term sources. As noted 
above, short term liquidity is important. However, this needs to be 
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reinforced by longer term equity (known as the net stable funding ratio). 
This will encourage banks to seek stable sources of long term funding and 
move away from short term funding models. 
(Fifth) Risk cover ratio to be strengthened. Counterparty Credit Risk exposure was 
a major flaw in the Basel II framework. Basel III aims to adjust financial 
institutes and counterparty influence arising from banks’ derivatives and 
secure financing. 
Basel III has effectively tripled the regulatory capital reserves that international banks need to 
hold. Under Basel III, core capital has increased to 4.5% of RWA’s (up from 2%), with a 
concomitant increase in liquidity ratios (up 2.5%). National regulators have been provided with a 
discretionary counter-cyclical buffer of 0% to 2.5% which can be applied in times of high credit 
growth. 
The cyclical nature of the market has been an issue for previous Basel models. The changes to 
capital requirements, liquidity and leverage ratios, are designed to increase regulatory capital 
buffers to minimise and eliminate adverse shocks. 
The Impact of Basel III Implementation 
Under the new Basel III capital requirements, more focus is given to tier 1 capital, which is 
predominantly made up of common shares and retained earnings. Banks will be unable to rely as 
heavily on loss-absorbing assets, such as investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, minority 
interest and goodwill. Hence, the more rigid treatment of underlying capital makes up the capital 
requirements. It is believed that this will have a positive effect by providing a 3-4 times increase 
to the market risk capital requirements for large, internationally active banks. 
Basel Reforms: A Critical Analysis 
Like the previous frameworks, Basel III has not escaped criticism. Firstly, the requirements for 
banks to change how regulatory capital reserves are calculated, and the increased minimum 
levels, have a real economic cost. Although this may reduce bank risk-taking behaviour, it also 
represents capital that must be held in reserves and is therefore not available to be used for 
investment in assets generating a higher rate or return, to be paid as a dividend to shareholders, 
or to finance a new project.  
Although the classification of capital has been tightened under the Basel III framework, banks still 
retain the ability to determine their credit risk using internal based models. Currently 
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independent standard does not exist which allow banks to review their risk assumptions or 
assertions. This inevitably impacts regulators’ abilities to review bank risk assumptions. 
2.5 New Zealand Financial Companies 
In New Zealand, non-bank financial institutions are generally known as non-bank deposit takers 
(NBDTs). 
NBDTs are vital to New Zealand because of their large contribution to the economy, both in terms 
of funding and employment. Although non-bank financial institutions in New Zealand hold only 
4.9% of the total financial system’s assets, they lend on the property, agriculture, non-residential 
and consumer sector, residential mortgage and other businesses (RBNZ, May 2010). Thus, 
problems in this sector could affect other sectors and potentially New Zealand’s economy. 
The New Zealand’s property sector has rapidly expanded over a ten-year period (1997 – 2007). 
This has occurred alongside the rise of various finance companies  (KPMG, 2007). Many of the 
property developments during this period relied on finance companies for “mezzanine” funding 
to bridge the gap between what banks would lend with the security of a first mortgage, and the 
developer’s own funding from equity or pre-sales. As a finance company’s security usually ranks 
below that of the bank, it generally carries higher lending risks.  
Another important trend over this period was the expansion of banks’ own lending in the 
property sector. As banks’ appetites for credit expanded, finance companies were forced to 
collaborate with riskier lenders. In addition, finance companies were involved in an enormous 
expansion of credit, financing second-hand cars and other consumer purchases, with little 
oversight on the capacity of individual borrowers to repay their loans. While the increased risk 
should have meant a corresponding increase in the returns finance companies offered investors, 
they did not always do so. Some of them sought to minimise the perceived risk differences 
between themselves and the banks by offering only slightly higher interest rates to depositors. At 
the same time, they actively marketed themselves among retail investors, like households. 
According to Reserve Bank of New Zealand data, between December 2004 and June 2007, 
household investment in finance companies rose from $5.1 billion to $7.1 billion, an increase of 
39% (Commerce Committee, 2011). 
2.6  Non-Bank Deposit Takers Regime in New Zealand 
A unique feature of the New Zealand banking system is the large portion of Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions, which, until very recently were not subject to either Reserve Bank New Zealand 
(RBNZ) or comparable disclosure requirements like registered banks (Hess and Feng, 2007). In a 
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practical sense, these firms may offer any banking activities, but they are no officially permitted 
to call themselves a “bank”. 
The Reserve Bank’s interest in NBDT was limited to the purpose of promoting the maintenance of 
a sound and efficient financial system, and avoiding significant damage to the financial system 
that could result from the failure of a NBDT (Wilson, 2009). NBDTs were not considered 
systemically important by the RBNZ; systemically important status was generally limited to the 
four largest banks – ANZ/National, ASB, BNZ and Westpac (Chetwin, 2006). A general warning 
about the vulnerability of NBDTs to a slowing economy was first highlighted in the RBNZ’s 
Financial Stability Report of October 2004 and then again in the later ones. 
In 1983 the Securities Commission outlined the requirements of the investment statement and 
prospectus. Banks and NBDT’s were required to provide information to investors which would 
allow them to make more informed decisions on their investing. Typically, the investment 
statement does not require financial statements to be produced, and as a result, most retail 
investments are made without investors reviewing the financial statements. The required 
prospectus was more detailed. It included basic provisions on the trust deed, more detailed 
financial information and notes. However, the role of the Securities Commission was limited to 
ensuring compliance with the disclosure requirements of the current act and regulations. In April 
2005, the Securities Commission stated in their report on disclosure by finance companies that 
“the commission does not have a role in relation to the prudential supervision of finance 
companies and does not comment on this” (Securities Commission Staff, 2004, p.1). After the 
failure of Bridgecorp Ltd, the Securities Commission stated that they were not responsible for the 
company nor were they able to intervene. In short, they can intervene only if a finance company 
does not provide the required information to investors (Securities Commission Staff, 2007a). 
In December 2005, the New Zealand government agreed that the Reserve Bank should be the 
sole prudential regulator of the New Zealand financial system, including the NBDT sector. 
However, they did not set any specific requirements for financial institutions until 2009 (after a 
large number of financial institutions failed). The first wave of this regulation came into force in 
September 2008. The primary objectives were to maintain a sound and efficient financial system 
and to avoid significant damage that could result from the failure of a NBDT. The regulatory 
framework anticipated for NBDTs would give the Reserve Bank the role of licensing NBDTs, and 
developing and enforcing minimum prudential and governance requirements. 
The prudential requirements for NBDTs are largely the same as the prudential framework for 
registered banks. However, a key difference is that the Reserve Bank relies on trustees to monitor 
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NBDTs compliance. It requires the finance company and its trustees to ensure that the NBDT’s 
trust deed includes minimum capital ratios, quantitative liquidity requirements and related party 
exposure limits. If the trustee believes that there has been, or may have been, a material failure 
by the deposit taker to comply with these provisions, it is their responsibility to provide a report 
to Reserve Bank (Tyree et al., 2014). 
Poor risk management practices were the main reason cited for the recent failure of several 
finance companies. While some finance companies failed to diversify their loan portfolios, others 
had inadequate security for their loans (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2010). The first 
requirement came into force on September 2009 in terms of risk management programme and 
required NBDTs to outline how they manage their key risks which must be approved by the 
applicable trustee. The programme must address the credit, liquidity, market and operational 
risks of the deposit taker and describe a process for regular review of the programme (Tyree et 
al., 2014). NBDTs also became subject to further requirements in terms of credit rating 
requirements in March 2010. Deposit takers are required to have a credit rating from an 
approved rating agency to assist investors in making informed decisions about their investments. 
This provides a simple way to compare the financial strength of different financial institutions. A 
poor credit rating indicates that there is a higher risk of defaulting on investor payments. The 
establishment of risk management regulations in September 2009, heralded the arrival of more 
regulation. In December 2010 other regulations were implemented around capital adequacy, 
related party exposures, liquidity and governance. Minimum capital requirements are now a basic 
prudential requirement for banks and NBDTs. Prior to this, many financial institutions had 
inadequate capitalisation ratios relative to the risks they were taking. This made them vulnerable 
to possible future failures in the event of adverse economic conditions. The trust deed specifies 
the minimum capital ratio that the deposit taker must maintain. For deposit takers with an 
approved credit rating, the minimum capital ratio must be not less than 8%, while for those 
without a credit rating, it must not be less than 10%.  
Related party exposures have been an ongoing issue for NBDTs due to the tendency to abuse 
related party relationships. For example, related parties may be accorded preferential treatment 
or may not be subject to rigorous credit checks, as would be the case for non-related parties. 
Based on the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, related party transactions were a feature of many of 
the recent finance company collapses. The trust deed is required to establish a maximum limit, 
specified as a ratio against the institution’s capital for related party lending. The limit must not be 
more than 15%.  
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A lack of liquidity was also a key factor in some of the recent collapses. New liquidity regulations 
require that trustees and NBDTs agree on appropriate quantitative liquidity requirements to be 
included in trust deeds. In addition, it is important that NBDT directors act in the company’s best 
interests. This provides a level of assurance to security holders that their interests will not be 
prejudiced in favour of a related entity or individual. Since the 1 December 2010, NBDTs must 
have at least two independent directors and a chairman who is not an employee of either the 
NBDT or a related party. After May 2014, regulations also included the suitability of directors and 
changes of ownership. Trustee companies are responsible for supervising NBDTs’ compliance with 
the Reserve Bank’s prudential regulations. A list of the specific requirements which apply to 
NBDTs can be found in Appendix 1. Although the number of failures decreased after the 
implementation of these new regulations in 2010, there were several subsequent failures. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter has provided a detail explanation of the diverse range of financial institutions, 
globally, drawing in particular on the United States, Europe and Australia. The chapter has 
discussed the need for international regulation in the finance sector and the evolution of the 
Basel framework. It has concluded by outlining the structure of the New Zealand finance sector 
and the regulations that govern it. The following chapter reviews pre-existing literature related to 






Chapter 3                                        
                                             Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Having provided a broad overview of the global financial sector and the regulations governing it, 
this chapter offers a review of the literature on bank failure prediction models and in particular, 
focuses on CAMELS definitions. It discusses different aspects of corporate governance and their 
relationship with failure prediction, with reference to New Zealand. It also provides an overview 
of the literature on different prediction models and relevant theories such as the CAMELS theory, 
Agency theory, Stewardship theory and Agenda-setting theory. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the study’s theoretical framework and a summary of the chapter’s key findings. 
3.2 CAMELS and Failure Prediction 
In the banking sector, capital adequacy, asset quality, management competency, earning, 
liquidity and sensitivity to market risk measurements are covered by the CAMELS theory. This 
measurement strategy is based on The World Bank and International Monetary Fund handbook 
published in 2005. The CAMELS rating system was first adopted by the Federal Financial 
Institution Examination Council in 1979 and has since been recognised as an effective internal 
supervisory tool for examining a bank’s condition (Barr, 2002). 
 Each of the six financial soundness indicators plays a different role in assessing a bank’s stability. 
The first indicator, capital adequacy refers to the capital anticipated to retain a healthy balance 
between risk exposure (credit risk, market risk and operational risk) and daily operations (Dang, 
2011). It is typically used to measure a financial institution’s capacity to absorb unexpected losses 
(Narayanan, Thomas, and Abraham, 2018). The need to maintain sufficient capital ensures that an 
institution can continue to operate even if they experience losses (Pilbeam, 2005). Saif-Alyousfi, 
Saha, and Md-Rus (2017) have shown that Saudi banks with higher capital ratios have better 
performance and are ultimately more profitable.  
As the risk of solvency in financial institutions often arises from impairment of assets, asset 
quality is the second factor. Grier (2007) notes that poor asset quality is the main reason for most 
banks failure. This indicator covers loan quality and the quality of asset portfolios. Saif-Alyousfi et 
al. (2017) found that Saudi banks with a higher non-performing loan are less profitable. 
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Management quality refers to the management’s ability to evaluate corporate activities and 
ensure the business’ efficiency (Dang, 2011). Grier (2007) considers management as the most 
important aspect of the CAMELS rating system because it plays a central role in a bank’s success. 
It provides clear strategies and goals which guide business activities both domestically and 
internationally. Management is a decision mechanism to ensure the bank operates smoothly 
during any risk course (Christopoulos, Mylonakis, and Diktapanidis, 2011). Indicators of 
management efficiency are used to capture the significance of sound management in ensuring 
the health and stability of the financial institution and guarantees a bank ’s growth and survival 
(Narayanan et al., 2018). As Ongore and Kusa (2013) explain, bank performance relies on 
management’s capability to execute strategic plans and that, in their study of Kenyan banks, this 
significantly impacts bank profitability.  
Earning quality reflects not only a bank or NBDTs’ ability to generate profit, but also the elements 
which may influence earning sustainability (Dang, 2011; Narayanan et al., 2018). Earning quality 
can be measured using a range of data from different income sources, as well as profit and 
expenses because earnings demonstrate a business’ ability to absorb losses without drawing on 
capital (International Monetary Bank, 2005). Earning quality has a strong relationship with an 
institution’s financial performance(Fredrick, 2012). Grier (2007) believes that a stable profit can 
build public confidence. However, when the earnings or profits grow rapidly, it can be a sign of 
excessive risk-taking. 
Since financial institutions have liquid liabilities (deposits) and relatively illiquid assets (loans), 
liquidity measurement shows a banking system’s ability to tolerate cash flow shocks. Rudolf 
(2009) contends that the liquidity reveals the level of the bank’s capability to fulfil its obligations. 
It measures an institution’s availability of liquid assets in times of crisis (loss of market funding or 
an outflow of deposits). Chen (2014) states that liquidity is one of the factors that can improve a 
bank’s competitiveness in the market.  
This study considered Size as the “S” instead of “sensitivity to market risk.” Much of the pre-
existing literature has ignored sensitivity to market risk (see, for example, Distinguin, Rous, and 
Tarazi, 2006; Douglas et al., 2014; Oshinsky and Olin, 2006). Boyacioglu, Kara, and  Baykan (2009) 
are one of the few to consider “sensitivity to market risk.” It examines the ratio of trading 
securities to total assets, foreign assets to foreign liabilities, and net interest incomes to average 
assets. In a similar vein, Betz, Oprica, Peltonen, and Sarlin (2014) used a share of trading income 
as a proxy for “sensitivity to market risk.” This study could not consider those variables in the 
CAMELS model due to either variable redundancy or unavailability. This study, like others (Avkiran 
and Cai, 2012; Kato and Hagendorff, 2010; Lanine and Vennet, 2006) uses size instead. The 
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relation between company size and failure has been confirmed, probably because larger 
companies have access to bigger assets through leveraging and issuing shares when experience 
trouble (Cormier, Magnan and Morard, 1995; Lennox, 1999). Alkhatib and Harsheh (2012) found a 
positive relationship between bank size and bank performance. However, Saif-Alyousfi et al. 
(2017) declare that larger banks are less profitable and an increase in size decreases bank 
performance (Karim and Alam, 2013). In the case of New Zealand, there is evidence which 
suggests that ‘large’ companies are considered ‘small’ internationally (Van Peursem and Wells, 
2001) due to their significantly small market size. This study compares each company’s total asset 
to the others to measure and incorporate their relative size (Van Peursem and Pratt, 2002). 
Prior studies have shown that company failures can be predicted using financial ratio analysis (Ak 
et al., 2013; Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966; Keasey and Watson, 1991; Ohlson, 1980; Wu, Gaunt, 
and Gray, 2010). These ratios can also be used to assess companies undergoing financial distress. 
For the first time, in 1968, Altman combined several ratios into a single predictive score known as 
the Z-score, which is a function of profitability, turnover, leverage and liquidity ratios (Douglas et 
al., 2014). Since the development of Z-scores, O-scores and Zeta, there has been considerable 
debate about the best set of predictor variables (Kumar and Ravi, 2007; Wu et al., 2010). Grice 
and Ingram (2001) contend that bankruptcy models do not retain their predictive accuracy when 
generalised across industries, countries or time periods. However, Van Peursem and Pratt (2012) 
classified 91.7% of failure among New Zealand listed companies by selecting Return on Asset 
(ROA), Sales to Assets, Leverages and Total Assets variables. 
Kumar and Ravi (2007) reviewed several studies on banking failure prediction, using a variety of 
statistical tests. They addressed different financial ratios that typically fall within the CAMELS 
framework. Betz, Oprică, Peltonen, and Sarlin (2014) claim that the CAMELS rating system is also 
an internal supervisory tool for assessing the soundness of financial institutions on a uniform 
basis and is useful for recognising whether institutions need extra attention. Jordan, Rice, 
Sanchez, Walker, and Wort (2010) and López-Iturriaga, López-de-Foronda, and Pastor-Sanz (2010) 
used CAMELS’ proxies and different analysis methods to predict the United States bank failures 
during the global financial crisis. They found a high degree of predictability of the United States 
bank failure during this time.  
In New Zealand, financial companies are unlisted (Wu et al., 2010), therefore we cannot use 
market data which increases the accuracy of bankruptcy prediction models. The criminal 
prosecutions that followed the finance companies’ bankruptcies suggest that financial disclosure 
would be unrepresentative of reality and there could be no difference in the financial ratios 
between failed and non-failed companies. Douglas et al. (2014) used disclosed information from 
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failed New Zealand finance companies one year before failure and demonstrated that they had 
inferior CAMELS-based ratios than healthy companies.  
3.3 Agency-related Information and Failure Prediction 
There are two approaches to predicting failure; in the first method, one must study the 
accounting numbers, while in the second, one must also study additional company features 
(Argenti, 1976). Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) state that it may be inadvisable to rely just on financial 
information, as ‘creative accounting’ is more likely in times of financial distress. Non-financial 
information is less vulnerable to manipulation, which can be a significant signal of failure than 
variables based on financial information (Keasey and Watson, 1987). However, considering 
additional factors is in line with industry best practices (Douglas et al., 2014).  
The concept of corporate governance can be concisely defined as the procedures and processes 
which conduct and control an institution (OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms). Governance is 
concerned with the systems, practices and procedures that govern institutions (Chenuos, 
Mohamed, and Bitok, 2014). Corporate governance has the potential to identify problem spots, 
where incentives are mismatched in a way that could lead to undesired firm behaviour or even 
system wide instability (Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012). It is associated with the corporation’s 
internal performance and includes a set of regulated principles which link the institution’s board 
of director, managers, its shareholders and stakeholders (OECD, 2004) to ensure the organisation 
achieves its goal (BBVA Microfinance Foundation, 2011). Vishwakarma (2015) explains that weak 
corporate governance and the absence of an integrated code of conduct can result in a critical 
situation, especially in the finance sector, because of the nature of their business. An integrated 
code of conduct plays an important role in the finance sector in restoring public confidence 
(Kansiime, 2009), creating trust among investors and attracting capital (Vishwakarma, 2015). It 
may reduce incidences of fraud and mismanagement. Odera (2012) studies the quality of 
corporate governance among Kenyan microfinance institutions and highlights their poor 
governance; there were no clearly defined roles and responsibilities in the system and a lack of 
management trust. Tadele and Rao (2014) declare that poor corporate governance forced Indian 
finance companies (Andhra Pradesh) to close down because of unethical loan practices. A lack of 
strong and efficient corporate governance policies is one of the main obstacles for the healthy 
growth of the finance sector. Good corporate governance rules are required to lessen information 
asymmetry and advanced performance in the finance sector (BBVA Microfinance Foundation, 
2011). In New Zealand also, a lack of proper Agency-related information was also cited as one of 
the main factors for finance company failures (Douglas et al., 2014). Recently banking regulators 
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and the Reserve Bank have stressed the need for effective governance practices in the banking 
system because failures and weaknesses in financial institutional governance contribute to the 
development of financial crises (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2010, 2010a; 
Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
Many studies have noted the close relationship between corporate governance and financial 
institution performance (Bassem, 2009; Mersland and Strøm, 2009). Hartarska (2005) examines 
this relationship using rated and unrated microfinance institutions in Central and Eastern Europe 
from 1998 through 2002. He uses management remuneration, board independence and diversity 
as corporate governance variables and finds that independent directors result in better 
performance. Kansiime (2009) finds that the Ugandan finance sector lost their investors due to 
lack of public trust. She contends that poor corporate governance results in failure among finance 
companies.  
This study works on some aspects of Agency-related (or governance-related) information, such as 
board characteristics, related party transactions, audit quality, trusteeship, media coverage and 
firm maturity.  
3.3.1 Board Composition 
Many scholars recommend firstly investigating board of director characteristics, as weak 
corporate governance, in terms of management oversight and the board of directors, who drives 
excessive risk-taking and ultimately lead to the failure of financial institutions. As this 
demonstrates many failed companies have poor governance (Harris, 2007). The relationship 
between board size and firm performance is still an essential question for scholars. Some studies 
recommend having a large board to ensure better performance, while others argue that a small 
board has the same effect. Board of directors have two key responsibilities; these are advising 
and monitoring (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Raheja, 2005). The advisory role involves expert 
advice, especially in critical circumstances. The advantage of a larger board size is that greater 
collective knowledge leads to better performance (Dalton, Daily, and Ellstrand, 1999; Dalton and 
Dalton, 2005). In addition to providing access to more resources and networking opportunities, 
larger boards also have the added benefit of expanding the number of individuals on whom the 
CEO and other executives can rely on for advice (Dalton and Dalton, 2005). The board of 
director’s second responsibility is monitoring. In short, they need to ensure that management 
teams work efficiently and pursue shareholders’ interest. They also need to remove ineffective 
management team members when needed (Guest, 2009). While a larger board size results in 
more efficient monitoring, due to assessing CEO performance from different perspectives, they 
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may suffer from communication issues. It can be difficult to arrange board meetings and reach 
consensus. This may ultimately results in slow and inefficient decision making (Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak, 2007; Jensen, 1993). It may also mean that directors are less likely to share a common 
purpose, thus director free-riding increases. Keasey and Watson (1987) contend that there is a 
negative relationship between the number of directors and firm failure, arguing that a higher 
number of directors provides more alternative leadership (Kyereboah‐Coleman and Osei, 2008) 
and lessens the probability of CEO authority (Bassem, 2009). In contrast, writing specifically about 
finance companies in Sri Lanka and India, Thrikawala (2016) suggests that larger boards, with 
more client representation, improves performance and reduces the possibility of failure. Adams 
and Mehran (2003) note that finance companies usually have a larger board than non-financial 
companies and their empirical findings demonstrate that larger boards improve firm 
performance. 
In contrast, Pathan, Skully, and Wickramanayake (2007) argue that smaller boards of directors are 
more effective in monitoring managers and increasing firm profitability when measured using 
ROE and ROA. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) recommend that an effective board size includes 
10 to 12 members, whereas Mak and Kusnadi (2005) contend that five members are the 
maximum number needed for a valuable board. These different results prove that one board size 
is not ideal for all countries and all industries. Thrikawala (2016) contends that the optimal board 
size depends on the individual board’s responsibilities, strategic direction and its funding needs. 
Chin, Vos, and Casey (2004) examine 426 annual observations of New Zealand firms across a five-
year period and found that board size did not have any significant relationship with firm 
performance. Several others though (Hossain, Prevost, and Rao, 2001; Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour, 
and Gunasekarage, 2008) have shown that the relationship between board size and firm 
performance is negative among New Zealand listed companies. Prevost, Rao, and Hossain (2002) 
find that board size has a significant negative relationship with Tobin’s Q at the 1% level in New 
Zealand companies. Alternatively, Fauzi and Locke (2012) declare that board size has a significant 
impact on firm performance and note that in New Zealand the median board size is six members, 
which is smaller than the United States firms. Board size has a strong negative association with 
Tobin’s Q which is significant at the 1% level. This demonstrates that a size affect is present in 
New Zealand as has been well documented in the United States and elsewhere. However, the 
smaller board size fits with New Zealand’s smaller market characteristics.  
This study, therefore, includes the number of BOD, any changes in directors, the number of 
appointed directors, and the number of resigned board members during the year as key elements 
of board composition.  
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3.3.2 Related-Party Transactions 
Non-disclosure or incorrect disclosure of related party transactions in financial reporting can 
mislead investors about the true financial position and performance of a company. ISA (NZ) 550 
related parties and other audit standards state that misstatement of related party transaction is a 
form of management fraud, and it is less likely to be detected as managers can easily dominate 
auditing procedures (Wu and Malthus, 2012). Therefore, related party transactions are one of the 
key aspects of corporate governance which may have a direct impact on firm performance and 
corporate failure. 
Prior literature suggests that a significant amount of financial institutions lending occurs between 
related parties, which includes shareholders of the institution, their associates, family members 
and the corporations they control (La Porta, Lopes-De-Silanes, and Zamarripa, 2003). There are 
two different views about related parties lending. The optimistic assessment or information view 
(Gerschenkron, 1962) contends that related lending may improve credit efficiency in several 
ways. Lenders have close ties with their borrowers, and thus they are represented on the board 
of directors and can share their management information. This means that the lender may be 
better able to assess the borrower’s risk profile. In addition, both parties may reject policies that 
benefit one of them at the other’s expense. Therefore, related lending may be better because 
more information is shared and incentives are improved.  
The pessimistic assessment or looting view (Akerlof and Romer, 1993) states that close ties 
between financial institutions and borrowers allow insiders to divert resources away from 
depositors or minor shareholders to themselves. If the banking system is protected by deposit 
insurance, a bank’s management can make loans to their own companies using nonmarket terms 
(in the cost of government). Even without deposit insurance, as long as the controller’s share of 
profits in their private company is more than their share of profits in the bank, they have enough 
incentives to divert funds. 
Henry, Gordon, Reed, and Louwers (2006) study 48 American cases and found that company 
failure is directly related to related party loans. Louwers, Henry, Reed, and Gordon, (2008) come 
to the same result after examining 43 fraudulent cases in the United States. La Porta et al. (2003) 
examine 17 Mexican Banks in 1995 and find that money lent to related-parties had better 
conditions than that lent to unrelated parties. Related party transactions had a higher chance of 
default (a 33–35% probability). Having a diverse loan portfolio is also essential in order to lessen 
over-reliance on a specific industry or borrower (Altman and Saunders, 1998; Basel Committee, 
1999). Kabir and Laswad (2014) state that the ability of a finance company to continue as going 
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concern depends on the quality of assets (loans and advances). In 2009, the registrar of 
companies, Neville Harris, notes that a higher concentration of loans in the speculative property 
market results in poor asset quality. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2013), KPMG (2007) and 
Barker and Javier (2010) all find that failed New Zealand finance companies had higher-than-
normal levels of related party lending and had a poor variety of assets. Wu and Malthus (2012) 
examine the related party transactions of 13 New Zealand finance companies and discovered four 
common characteristics; namely excessive lending without satisfactory securities, management 
fraud, deliberate non-disclosure of significant lending, and breaches of statutory requirements 
and agreements. 
3.3.3 Auditing  
Auditing plays a key role in protecting investors and maintaining market confidence. When 
company failure happens, the audit profession is brought into attention. It is not unexpected, as 
audited financial statements are important in ensuring the financial statements’ credibility, 
including the issuing of going-concern opinions. Auditors evaluate the entity’s ability to continue 
as going-concern, based on gathered information from audit procedures and obtained 
information about the management’s plans. Although ISA (NZ) 550 related parties and other 
auditing standards note that it is less likely for auditors to detect fraud at a management level 
(rather than at an employee one) because managers can easily dominate control processes. 
However, receivers note that if financial failed companies had been thoroughly audited, it is less 
likely many of them would have continued in business for as long as they did. An audit failure 
occurs in two situations; when the auditors have not followed the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP); and when the auditor does not publish a modified or qualified audit report 
where it is needed (audit report failure) (Francis, 2004). If auditors have issued a qualified, rather 
than unqualified opinions, there would have been a stronger imperative for trustees to step in 
earlier, before New Zealand experienced huge failures among finance companies (Vaughan, 
2009). Mong and Roebuck (2005) state that a modified (but not qualified) audit report effectively 
works as a ‘red flag’ and (Carson et al., 2013; Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2007) summarise that 
firms which receive a going-concern opinion have a higher chance of failure. This opinion can act 
as an early warning of financial problems. The Registrar of Companies wrote that finance 
company audits ‘‘lacked the rigour and analytical depth one would expect for entities managing 
substantial public investments’’ (Harris, 2009, 11). Louwers et al. (2008) examine 43 United States 
companies where the auditors failed to recognise fraudulent related party transactions and 
established that these were the result of an absence of professional scepticism and lack of 
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professional care. Carson et al. (2013) note that more than 60% of bankruptcies are followed by 
reported going-concern uncertainties. 
Audit fees can be a proxy for the audit quality (Francis, 2004). When a firm has complex business 
operations, and the risk of financial misstatement is high, the demand for detailed monitoring 
audit is high. This requires spending more time and effort to understand the firm’s financial 
reporting processes. Therefore, higher audit fees indicates higher audit quality; the higher fee 
either relates to more time allocated to the audit or provides an indication of an auditor’s 
proficiency. High audit costs can be justified as a result of more time involved negotiating with 
the client. It is not easy to compare audit remunerations as the Big 4, on average, charge a 20% 
premium more than the other audit companies (DeFond, Francis, and Wong, 2000; Ferguson, 
Francis, and Stokes, 2003). Francis (2004) review empirical research, mainly from the United 
States over 25 years and found that audit failure rate is less than 1% annually, while audit fees are 
quite small, or less than 1% of aggregate client sales. He notes that the acceptable level of audit 
quality is achievable at a reasonably low cost. Carcello and Neal (2000) examine distressed firms 
during 1994 and did not find any evidence that audit remuneration has any relationship with 
company failure. 
DeAngelo (1981) and Francis (2004) argue that audit quality is dependent on audit firm size, given 
that larger audit firms suffer a higher reputational loss from inaccurate reporting. The large Big 4 
accounting firms have established brand name reputations, and they prefer to protect their 
reputations by providing high quality audits. After examining a sample of 6,568 United States 
firm-year observations for the period of 2003-2005, Francis and Yu (2009) declare that large 
auditors like the Big 4 are more likely to issue going-concern reports. Khurana and Raman (2004) 
note that litigation penalties are a motivation for the Big 4 auditors in the United States to 
provide high quality audits. 
Furthermore, a longer lag between the end of the financial year and the auditor sign-off date 
could suggest greater negotiation between the auditor and company, or more work done to 
uncover financial irregularities (DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam, 2002; McKeown, 
Mutchler, and Hopwood, 1991). Geiger, Raghunandan, and Rama (2005) study 226 financially 
stressed companies that entered bankruptcy from 2000 to 2003, while  Li (2009) examine  1681 
companies in 2001 and 1780 companies in 2003. Both studies proved that there is a relationship 
between going-concern opinion and audit lag; higher audit lags increased the possibility of going-




The New Zealand Reserve Bank delegated the supervision of NBDTs to trustee companies. 
Trustees play an important oversight role; they have a fiduciary duty to ensure that payments are 
met, funds are received, and debt covenants are not breached. They need to ensure that 
prudential requirements are included in trust deeds and an issuer’s operation complies with the 
trust deed (Wu and Malthus, 2013). A trust deed is an agreement between the trustee and 
deposit taker and consists of covenants to assure that the financial institution manages the 
business prudently. A trust deed may be issued to reflect the requirement in the regulation or 
affect individual circumstances such as the requirement to hold a higher capital ratio which is 
more conservative than the regulatory minimum. If the financial institution and trustees cannot 
agree on regulations or amendments, the trustee has the authority to include it in the trust deed 
without the permission of the other party (Javier, 2008). The Reserve Bank relies on trustees to 
report any actual or possible forms of non-compliance, including any breaches of the terms and 
conditions of the trust deeds. As an assessment of the New Zealand financial sector in 2003 
shows, regulatory functions have relied on private supervisors, such as corporate trustees (The 
International Monetary Fund, 2014). The report noted that supervisors were not performing their 
role adequately. In addition, the Commerce Committee (2011) argues that some trustees did not 
have experienced staff that understood the loan risk profiles. When a trustee has a supervisory 
role, they need to be an expert in the field so that they understand the nature of the business and 
understand the risks. The 2006 NBDT failures may demonstrate that the directors of these 
financial institutions had not received enough comment from their trustees and as a result, they 
managed the business according to their own interest (Wilson, 2009). Wilson, Rose and Pinfold 
(2013) reveal that even if the trustee were aware of any breach, they agreed to amend the 
definitions in the trust deed (like changing the definition of related party transaction). The 
probability of trust deed amendment is higher close to failure. These collapses highlight trustees’ 
weak performances in areas including, poor trust deeds, a lack of transparency in relation to their 
roles and a lack of independence and accountability (Wu and Malthus, 2013).  
3.3.5 Media  
Media, and the press, in particular play a critical role in shaping public opinion  (Cohen, Ding, 
Lesage, and Stolowy, 2017) about companies. Thus, it operates as a monitor on behalf of the 
general public. Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) find that fail prediction relies not only on 
corporate governance actors like auditors and trustees but also on several non-traditional players 
(like media). Different access to information, as well as reputational inducements, can justify this 
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pattern. Miller (2006) explains that the business press, in particular, was instrumental in bringing 
many of the financial frauds into the public arena. For example, Fortune magazine published the 
first negative report on Enron and wrote reports on Healthsouth and Worldcom. McCarthy and 
Dolfsma (2014) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) suggest that by choosing what events to report 
upon, how much and how frequently to report on an event, and by choosing the framing and 
tune of story, media influence public opinion. Van Peursem and Hauriasi (1999) analyse the 
professional reputation of auditors within New Zealand by examining the content of articles in 
the press which reference auditors. They discovered that press coverage in New Zealand, of the 
auditing profession appears to be widely influenced by news production necessities and by the 
desire to entertain. As a result, the auditor is portrayed as either elite expert, or 
incompetent/unethical player in major news events. 
Media can affect not only a company’s reputation (Vogel, 2006) but also individual executives and 
directors (Dyck et al., 2010; Zingales, 2000). This causes them to be vulnerable to negative shocks 
related to their reputations. For example, bankrupt-ridden directors may lose their current job 
and find it hard to find future employment. As Dann (2008) and Parker (2010) explain, media 
suggested that some financial company accounts were unreliable and contained errors of 
judgement. In response to the threat of journalistic evaluations of corporate misbehaviour, 
directors are more likely to advise their companies to act in socially responsible ways (El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, Nash, and Patel, 2016). Several studies have shown that extra-legal institutions like 
media play a critical role in shaping corporate decisions (Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004; Haw, Hu, Hwang, and Wu, 2004). The Press’ influence on public opinion is greater 
when it reports bad news rather than when it reports good news; media shaming is a particularly 
effective tool  (Borden, 2007). Dyck et al. (2010) describe media as a “smoking gun” indicator 
when they are directly discovering the failure. Although we cannot expect the media to act as an 
effective monitor in the case of small companies, he noted that media is responsible for more 
than 13% of failure detection rates. Therefore, studying press coverage of company failure sheds 
lights on the public view.  
3.3.6 Firm Maturity 
A corporation’s maturity is defined by the number of years the company has been in the market 
(Hartarska, 2005; Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy, 2009; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Microfinance 
Information Exchange, 2007). It is normally encompasses the years between a firm’s start date 
and the submission year of data (Microfinance Information Exchange, 2007). Agrawal and Gort 
(1996, 2002) suggest that mature companies have more knowledge and skills which they have 
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obtained via general day-to-day activities linked to hiring and training their staff. Caudill, Gropper, 
and Hartarska (2009) note that greater maturity provides managers and employees with more 
learning and experience opportunities in particular market environments. Firm maturity is also a 
key factor that creates a reputation and builds faiths among investors and borrowers. It indicates 
that a company is successful and will be in the market for a long time; this enhances long term 
social values which is reflected in greater firm performance (Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-
Vega, and Rodriguez-Meza, 2000).  
However, a long business life may have a negative impact on a firm’s performance. Maturity can 
bring rigidity, inactivity and a reluctance to change (Loderer and Waelchli, 2010; Tripasa and 
Gavetti, 2000) which may diminish a firm’s performance over time and ultimately lead to failure. 
For instance, Loderer and Waelchli (2010) explain that in high-tech companies, failure to adopt 
new technologies will lead to inefficiency and lower performance compare with younger firms in 
the same industry. Nurmakhanova, Kretzschmarand Fedhila (2015) note that older finance 
companies prefer to serve fewer richer clients with larger loans, which ends up with losing their 
potential borrower. This strategy can also lessen asset quality; reduce performance and increase 
the odds of failing. Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007 and Mersland and  Strøm (2009, 2010) all 
found a positive relationship between the age of a finance company and the number of active 
borrowers. Nurmakhanova et al. (2015) note that a finance company’s maturity is positively 
correlated with financial sustainability. Older companies are more efficient in monitoring costs 
and increasing profitability and ROA (Caudill et al., 2009; Kyereboah‐Coleman and Osei, 2008). 
3.4 Prediction Models 
Predicting bankruptcy in business, especially in the financial sector is an essential skill. It is widely 
studied topic in the business intelligence field (Chen, 2011; Serrano-Cinca and Gutiérrez-Nieto, 
2013; Sun, Li, Huang, and He, 2014; Yu, Miche, Séverin, and Lendasse, 2014; Zhou, 2013). In 
recent years, prediction models have become more sophisticated to account for the effects of 
financial crises or other outstanding business episodes (Mokhatab Rafiei, Manzari, and Bostanian, 
2011; Nassirtoussi, Aghabozorgi, Wah, and Ngo, 2014).  
The critical aim of failure prediction is to separate those institutions that will not be able to 
accomplish their financial obligations in the future from those that can. Obviously, there is no 
model which can predict with 100% accuracy how a company will behave in the future. However, 
scholars are increasingly looking for different algorithms to develop more accurate prediction 
models. The methods of prediction modelling have changed greatly since Beaver (1966) and  
Altman's (1968) pioneering works. 
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Beaver’s dichotomous classification test was a simplified univariate discriminant analysis that 
applied an end-point to a financial ratio. Soon after that, Altman (1968) appoints a Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis (MDA) model, now known as the Z-score model. He uses MDA on a 
classified dataset of 33 pairs (failed and non-failed manufacturing companies) to build a financial 
ratio based model for predicting corporate failure (Duda and Schmidt, 2010). The success of 
Altman’s Z-score model marked the beginning of fail prediction models. The Z-score model is 
mostly used in the studies as a base model in comparison with newer models (Altman, Marco, 
and Varetto, 1994). 
Altman’s model has been severely criticised and its weaknesses have become more noticeable. 
The first weakness relates to the multivariate normal distribution assumption of the variables; a 
sample is randomly selected from the populations of failed and non-failed companies. The 
unequal distribution matrices in linear equations make it hard to understand and interpret the 
role of explanatory variables (Eisenbeis, 1977). MDA does not help with predicting failure; it is 
only a dichotomous classification for failed and healthy companies (Dimitras, Zanakis, and 
Zopounidis, 1996). Following the revelation of MDA’s faults, its popularity declined, with a 
concomitant rise in conditional likelihood models (conditional on a vector of predictive variables) 
to describe bankruptcy (Li, 2014). 
 Meyer and Pifer (1970) established the Linear Probability Models (LPM) using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression for failure prediction. However, the problem with this method is that it 
violates failure probabilities (they can go outside the range of 0 to 1). Martin (1977) introduced 
Logistic Regression (LR) or Logit analysis to predict bank failure. Ohlson developed his LR model 
(named the O-Score model) for failure prediction in 1980. As LR has fewer variable requirements 
than MDA and its predicted probabilities are circumscribed between 0 and 1, it soon became the 
most popular failure prediction model. While LR has been used by several scholars (Dugan, 
Ingram, and Tennyson, 1990; Gilbert, Menon, and Schwartz, 1990) it has still be criticised (Kim, 
2011; Li, 2014; Lin and McClean, 2001). Zmijewski established probit regression in 1984, which is 
sometimes used in prediction studies, but considerably less than LR (Grunert, Norden, and 
Weber, 2005; Lennox, 1999).  
Although these three main statistical algorithms (MDA, LR and probit) have been implemented 
broadly in prior studies, they have also been censured. There has been some criticism of these 
models due to their determination of a dichotomous dependent variable, the volatility of the 
data, the sensitivity needed for collecting samples, variables and optimisation indicators (Balcaen 
and Ooghe, 2006). While these are common problems in all the prediction models (Li, 2014), the 
main issue in the models above, is the time dimension; data from different years pool together 
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(Altman, 1968; Zmijewski, 1984). This can lead to a bias in sample selection (Shumway, 2001) 
which makes it hard to interpret both the variables and the results (Edmister, 1972; Joy and 
Tollefson, 1978).  
Survival analysis was a statistical method originally designed to determine an organism’s time of 
death. When the time dimension is added to the parameters, covariates and regression models, 
prediction becomes dynamic. Cox (1972) established the Cox proportional hazard model, which 
was adapted by Cox and Oakes in 1984 (it became the continuous time hazard model). Lane, 
Looney, and Wansley (1986) were the first to use it for bank failure prediction. Shumway’s (2001) 
discrete time hazard model features some improvements on these earlier models, particularly in 
regards to the calculations and the nature of covariates as the financial related ratios and 
macroeconomic variables in the companies are checked periodically. Using a dataset of 300 
bankruptcies (1962-1992), he demonstrates that the static model is inappropriate for forecasting 
bankruptcy because of the nature of bankruptcy data. Static models are not capable of capturing 
the dynamic nature of a company’s financial structure, as the characteristics of firms change from 
year to year (Duda and Schmidt, 2010). Shumway explains that most forecasters choose to 
observe each bankrupt firm’s data in the year before bankruptcy. Choosing when to observe a 
firm’s characteristics (that is, a year before bankruptcy), creates an unnecessary selection bias 
effects. Shumway (2001) suggests that the time-varying hazard model is superior to the 
traditional static forecast model in that it incorporates time-varying explanatory variables and 
treats a firm’s health as a function of its latest financial condition. It produces more efficient out-
of-sample forecasts. 
Nam, Kim, Park, and Lee (2008) compare static logit with hazard models using panel data from a 
sample of 367 Korean companies, between 1999 and 2000. They show that dynamic models with 
time-varying covariates have superior performance over static models, especially when the 
market-driven variables are added to the estimation. Their results are in line with Bellotti and 
Crook (2009) who show when macro-economic indicators are included, the accuracy of the 
prediction model improves considerably. Although earlier studies such as Nam et al. (2008) and 
Männasoo and Mayes (2009) compared the accuracy of both models in predicting bankruptcy, 
more recent empirical studies (Betz, Oprică, et al., 2014; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Hong and 
Wu, 2013) apply the time-varying hazard models in bank failure prediction by using one-year 
lagged explanatory variables (Brown and Dinc, 2005; Brown and Dinç, 2011; Männasoo and 
Mayes, 2009; Molina, 2002; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). 
With the development of machine learning in the 1970s, Artificial Neural Networks (ANN or NN) 
became more common for predicting bankruptcy. The process of this system is modelling the 
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communication and information processing mechanism in the human brain. There are several 
types of artificially intelligent expert system models in terms of topology employed: Back 
Propagation NN (BPNN), Genetic Algorithm (GA), Support Vector Machines (SVM), Bayesian 
Networks (BN), etc. Artificial Intelligence systems have many derivatives due to their various 
modifications. Tam (1991) used BPNN to predict bank failure in Texas. His results show that this 
model is more precise than the DA model. Atiya (2001) and Tsai and Wu (2008) used NN to 
predict failure. Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) used GA to predict failure among 37 Finnish 
companies. They contend that GA provides better results than DA and logistic regression. Shin, 
Lee, and Kim (2005) also found that SVM is better than BPNN in predicting corporate failure. 
Paliwal and Kumar (2009) expanded two different NN models and compared their prediction 
accuracy with logit regression and MDA models. They found that general regression performed 
significantly better in comparison with their NN models (back propagation and probabilistic 
neural network). 
 Kumar and Ravi (2007) and Aziz and Dar (2004) both provide a detailed discussion on intelligent 
techniques. They contend that these methods are not as straightforward as statistical methods 
and that expert opinion is needed to establish the initial rules and interpret and/or compare 
results. Shin and Lee (2002) note that it is hard to find a proper NN model which can reflect the 
problem features; there are numbers of learning methods, parameters and network designs. 
Additionally, they point out that NNs design is like a black box; you cannot easily understand the 
ultimate rule that the model achieves. Yang, Platt, and Platt (1999) also highlight problems like 
scholars have to explain the results of the back-propagation model or describe how the results 
were obtained.  
3.5 Theories Related to this Study 
CAMELS theory explains how the soundness of financial institution can be assessed through 
financial ratio; whereas, agency theory describes how to best organise the relationship between 
the principal and the agent to minimise agency conflicts. Agency problems are the result of 
conflicting interests between managers and owners under conditions of asymmetric information. 
Stewardship theory focuses on the conditions on which managers’ strategies are based on, as 
well as institutional best interests. Stewardship theory aims to reduce the conflict by maximising 
financial performance.  
This study uses Agenda-setting theory which explains the impact of media on corporate 
governance and can be used to predict failure. In terms of theoretical background, Agenda-
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setting theory is similar to Stewardship theory. This section covers the theories which are used to 
support this study and research questions. 
3.5.1 CAMEL(S) Theory 
The unbalanced economic situation of the last few decades raises questions about how to 
measure the soundness of the banking system. While creditors, especially large size depositors, 
are inevitably interested in potential losses, regulatory agencies need to be conscious about 
situations requiring their intervention. Beaver (1966) established the theory of financial ratio 
analysis; he viewed businesses as liquid assets’ holders. Beaver showed that failure could be 
predicted using through financial ratios for at least five years before failure. However, Beaver 
focuses on companies rather than the finance sector. 
Martin highlighted the need for risk management strategies in the finance sector in 1977. He 
worked on 5700 Federal Reserve member banks in the United States between 1970 and 1976. He 
developed statistical techniques to analyse financial statements and revealed the factors one can 
use to measure bank financial condition, such as the relevance of capital (C), liquidity (L), earnings 
(E) and asset quality (A). Together with two other variables (that is, management (M) and market 
sensitivity (S)), these factors became the foundation of the Uniform Financial Rating System 
(UFRS) established in November 1979 (King, Nuxoll, and Yeager, 2005). This rating system was 
accepted by the National Credit Union Administration in October 1987 (Dang, 2011). It has 
demonstrated its usefulness as an internal supervisory tool for assessing the soundness of a 
financial institution and identifying the firms with problems (U.S. Uniform Financial Institutions 
Rating System 1997, p.1) 
The CAMELS theory attempts to put these elements together and create a structural framework 
for bank supervisors (Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan, 2002). As these authors note, banks that have 
inferior CAMELS ratings over a three year period have a much greater risk of failure. King et al. 
(2005) provide empirical indications that the features and qualities of failing banks have changed 
over the last ten years and suggest that CAMELS ratings provide an early-warning system. 
Researchers have used the CAMELS framework to check the financial health of commercial banks 
in Kenya (Ongore and Kusa, 2013), Nepal (Baral, 2005), Vietnam (Dang, 2011) and India (Sangmi 
and Tabassum, 2010). Kumar and Ravi (2007) provide an overview of 14 studies that use the 
CAMELS framework to predict failure in the banking sector. However, prior literature about 
financial failure may not apply to the private New Zealand finance sector.  
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3.5.2 Agency Theory 
Ross (1973) investigated the costs involved with a lack of goal congruence between two parties, 
whether between a principal and agent (PA) or between principal and principal (PP). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) developed the concept agency theory. They defined an agency relationship as “a 
contract under which the principal (s) engage the agent to perform a service on their behalf, 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent [P. 308].” Agency theory is 
based on two concepts; asymmetric information and party incentives. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), if both parties have a maximum utility, it is likely that the agent will not always 
act in the best interest of the principal. In contrast, they note that while principals seek to 
maximise their wealth, managers may have other interests to maximise their utility through the 
overconsumption of perquisites and empire building. A conflict of interests between managers 
and owners leads to an asymmetric information flow (Chrisman, Chua, and Litz, 2004). In 
addition, the separation of ownership and control can also lead to situations where management 
manages earnings in order to meet market expectations. It is challenging for the principal to 
monitor the agent’s behaviour due to degrees of asymmetric information flow between the 
principal and the agent. This can lead to a moral hazard. Despite these principal-agent 
relationships, each party is aware of prospective distortions and the need to realign incentives 
and design corporate governance structures (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that agency problems can be addressed firstly by addressing the 
character of the board of directors. Boards of directors play an important role in controlling 
agency problems, especially by monitoring executive management. They enhance the principal’s 
value and reduce management opportunism by providing an impartial and independent 
monitoring service. Additionally, asymmetric information and the limited capacity to process 
information and deal with complexity (Simon, 1957) often result in using external supervisors, like 
auditors and trustees, to align principal and agent’s interests. 
The second type of conflict, between the principal and principal, appears when the majority of 
shareholders of the company use the firm’s resources in a way that disadvantages minority 
shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). PP problems tend to occur when the major shareholder 
is a related party, like an individual or a family member. A related party will have incentives for 
both expropriation and monitoring, with a higher tendency for expropriation (Wellalage, 2012). 
RP transactions can be a component of overall formal or informal compensation packages, where 
RP transactions are substituted for cash-based compensation to directors, or provide more liquid 
forms of compensation to directors, especially when they have ownership in the company. In 
agency theory, RP transactions also raise concerns that managers will over consume perquisites, 
44 
 
which favours managers over principals (Hölmstrom, 1992; Hölmstrom, 1979; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
Despite the issues identified above, depositors still invest their money in such companies. In New 
Zealand, there has been rapid growth in the finance sector which has been accompanied by an 
increase in deposits, from $5.1 billion to $7.1 billion from 2004 to 2007. Thus, there is a need for 
increasing levels of regulated corporate governance. Although the New Zealand banking system 
has been regulated by The Reserve Bank for many years, a large number of NBDTs were exempt 
from Reserve Bank regulations and comparable disclosure requirements that registered banks 
must adhere to. The lack of corporate governance in this system resulted in the bankruptcy of 
several finance companies between 2006 and 2010. Some of these issues have been addressed by 
new regulation introduced in September 2009. 
3.5.3 Stewardship Theory 
A counter strategy to agency costs theory is stewardship theory. Davis, Schoorman, and 
Donaldson (1997a) developed this theory. It defines the relationship between principal and agent 
and is based on an intensive leadership philosophy adopted by an institution’s owners. 
Stewardship theory focuses on circumstances in which a steward concentrates on improving 
organisational performance so to satisfy the majority of the stakeholders; personal interests are 
aligned with the objectives of the principals (Guo, 2011; Wellalage, 2012). In the steward role, 
manager strategies are institutionally centred and reflect the best interests of the principals. 
Steward managers attempt to reduce agency conflicts by maximising the company’s financial 
performance.  
The steward must find a balance between personal interest and an institution’s objectives. S/he 
must meet his personal needs through working towards business success. As Davis, Schoorman 
and Donaldson (1997b) note: 
“The steward’s opportunity set is constrained by the perception that the utility gained from 
pro-organisational behaviour is higher than the utility that can be gained through 
individualistic, self-serving behaviour. Stewards believe their interests are aligned with that 
of the corporation and its owners. Thus, the steward’s interests and utility motivations are 
directed to organisational rather than personal objectives.” (p. 56) 
As explained earlier, prior to late 2009 non-bank deposit takers in New Zealand were not subject 
to any specific regulation (The Reserve Bank had not set any specific requirements). In short, an 
institution’s performance was dependent on the inside managers and external supervisors.  
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3.5.4 Agenda-Setting Theory 
The question of whether or not media influence human behaviour remains an interesting 
question which researchers have spent almost a century to identify. Walter Lippmann addressed 
this issue in 1922 in a chapter titled “The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Mind” 
(McCombs, 2011). Several decades later, Benard Cohen (1963) expanded this notion when he 
said, “The press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling 
readers what to think about”(p. 13). His findings became the basis for what we now call the 
agenda-setting function of mass media. In 1986 McCombs and Gilbert used a content analysis of a 
local election to illustrate how public opinion is shaped by media representations of the world. 
They argued that public opinion is shaped by the prominence journalists place on certain news 
items (Gilbert and McCombs, 1986; McCombs and Valenzuela, 2007).  
It is clear that apart from information from family and friends, media has a hugely influential role. 
Most of what we know about the world comes to us through the media. While it is not necessary 
to notify public about obvious news like inflation, as routine purchases uncover its presence, they 
need to alert about economic issues like any economic or industry crisis which the main source of 
information is the news media.  
The amount of business news in the mass media has increased significantly over the last two 
decades. The growth of business news reporting is critical to companies struggling to manage 
their issues because customers and external stakeholders rely on the news to learn more about 
the companies they invest in (Chen and Meindl, 1991; Deephouse, 2000). Media reports on 
financial disclosures and corporate governance rose dramatically after Enron times (Carroll and 
McCombs, 2003). For instance, several scholars have studied the impact of media on corporate 
governance (Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales, 2008; Dyck and Zingales, 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 
2004). Likewise, others have examined the role of the media in predicting corporate fraud in the 
United States (Dyck, Morse, and Zingales, 2007; Miller, 2006). 
There are many recorded claims of journalists failing the public by not providing enough essential 
public affairs news – a common complaint in New Zealand (Cook, 2002; Dahlberg, 2005; 
McGregor, 2002). These criticisms indicate that the public expects and believes that journalists 
play a key role in informing and educating the public (Singer, 2003).  
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3.6 Theoretical Framework 
This study’s primary aim is to examine the effect of the CAMELS-based ratio and Agency-related 
information in predicting failure among NBDTs in New Zealand. Figure 3-1 provides the 





















Figure ‎3-1 Theoretical Framework 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter has revealed gaps in knowledge about CAMELS, including aspects of corporate 
governance, which include the board of director composition, related party transaction, auditing, 
media coverage, maturity and failure prediction in New Zealand. The evolution of prediction 
models was developed afterwards. The CAMELS theory has been explained in support of the 
impact of the financial ratio in fail prediction. Agency theory, Stewardship theory and Agenda-
setting theory have been briefly outlined as all support the effect of corporate governance on 
predicting failure, especially among New Zealand financial institutions. The theoretical framework 
is provided in the last section. The next chapter presents the research design and measurements 
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4.1 Introduction 
Having provided a broad review of literature and related theories, this chapter describes the 
methodological features of this study. It contains information about the data collection methods 
and the determination of the sample size. It also outlines the method used to quantify the 
variables used in developing research questions. After presenting the variables used in this study, 
it provides an overview of the logit model and the hazard models. It also addresses issues of 
model validation and performance accuracy. The final section outlines the key points of the 
chapter. 
4.2 Sample and Data Collection 
A high rate of failure among finance companies occurred between 2006 and 2009. However, the 
definition of failure plays an important role in scrutinising failure predictions. In this study, failure 
is defined as a moratorium, receivership or liquidation. Moratorium describes a process where 
creditors are unable to enforce debts (Douglas et al., 2014). Receivership refers to the process 
where a receiver manages a business on behalf of the security holders (Receivership Act 1993). 
Liquidation describes the process where a formal appointee takes over and controls a firm’s 
assets in order to pay creditors (Companies Act 1993). This study follows Douglas et al.'s (2014) 
work and does not consider a company failed when it is reorganising or restructuring as this can 
be due to other reasons. This study concentrates on failed companies between 2006 and 2010, 
before new requirements came into force in September 2009. It must be noted that ten 
companies went into receivership between April and November 2010. As the financial data during 
the year of failure is often unavailable, the study compares the published financial data of failed 
companies over 2005/06-2009/10, for the three years prior to the year the company failed. 
Therefore, companies which failed in 2010, whether they used a March or June balance date, 
their last financial accounts (2009) compiled before implementing of new requirements in 
September 2009. The total number of failed companies between 2006 and 2010 was 61 
companies, based on the “Deep Freeze List” published by interest.co.nz. However, only firms with 
three years of consecutive data were included in this study. The sample thus consists of 35 failed 
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financial companies that are uniquely matched in terms of asset size, with 35 finance companies 
that did not fail during the same period. The control sample is matched based on asset size. It 
means that the selected healthy companies are the result of matching one-to-one with the failed 
companies. After selecting the matched healthy company, data was collected for the same year 
as the failed company. This study thus eliminates time differences and increases validity. 
After the new requirements came into force in September 2009, six more finance companies 
failed (2011 and 2012). However, data was only available for three of them. This study also used 
these three failed companies (they were also matched with three healthy companies) as an ex-
post sample to check the accuracy of the prediction model. Table 4-1 illustrates the sample 
selection process over the period from 2006 to 2012. 
The sample finance companies are not listed and not covered by traditional database source (or 
the disclosure requirements of the New Zealand Stock Exchange). Therefore, financial data was 
collected from annual reports published in the New Zealand Companies Office database. Non-
financial variables were manually collected from the New Zealand Companies Office. Media 
information was collected from two main New Zealand newspapers; the NZ Herald and Stuff 
news. 
Table ‎4-1 Number of Finance Companies Included in the Dataset Based on Failed Year 
 
Year                                     Total Number of Failed Companies                Study Sample 
 
2006                                                      4                                                               2 
2007                                                      15                                                              10 
2008                                                     29                                                              13 
2009                                                      3                                                               2 
2010                                                     10                                                               8 
2011                                                      4                                                               3 
2012                                                      2                                                               0 
 
 
4.3 Variable Measurement 
The following provides an explanation of the variable measurements as shown in Tables 4-2 and 
4-3. The tables summarise the measurements and source of data for all of the variables in this 





Table ‎4-2 CAMELS Variables 
 
Table ‎4-3 Agency-related Variables 







Total equity/total assets 
Total assets/total liabilities 
Gross loans and advances/total assets 






Impaired assets expense/total assets  
Provision for doubtful debts less bad debts 
recovered/gross loans and advances 
Annual report 





Operating expenses/operating revenue  








Net profit after tax before abnormals/total assets  
Net interest income/total assets 






Current assets/total assets 





Total asset  
Annual report 
Agency-related Variables Measurement Source of Data 






Number of the board of directors member at year-end  
No change in director/s during the year = 1, otherwise 0  
Number of directors appointed through the year  













Related party lending/total assets 









If Auditor is Big 4  = 1; otherwise 0 
Any modification to the audit report = 1; otherwise 0 
Number of days from the end of financial year to the 




TRUSTEE_X = Covenant 
TRUSTEE_Y = Perpetual 
If Trustee X is trustee = 1; otherwise 0  
If Trustee Y is trustee = 1; otherwise 0  





4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
In this study, the dependent variable is whether a finance company has failed or not. In the case 
that a company eventually fails then it is assigned dummy variable “1,” which is allocated to the 
company for the entire three-year observation period before failure. A company that has not 
failed (up to the date of data collection (2017)) is considered healthy. In this case, a dummy 
variable of “0” is assigned for the entire three year period. 
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
Financial failure indicators are assumed to be a function of CAMELS and Agency-related variables. 
There are 14 Agency-related variables of board composition, related party transactions and 
lending concentration, audits, trustees, firm maturity and media variables. A total of 27 variables 
are used in this study. The measurements and their related variables are explained below. 
CAMELS Variables 
It is common for regulators and supervisory agencies to use variables in each of the CAMELS 
classifications for monitoring bank risks, developing early warning systems, and ensuring the 
safety and soundness of a banking system (Boyacioglu et al., 2009; Cihak and Poghosyan, 2009; 
Cole and Gunther, 1995; Curry, Elmer, and Fissel, 2003; DeYoung, 1998; Kumar and Ravi, 2007; 
Oshinsky and Olin, 2006; Ravisankar and Ravi, 2010). However, as the variables used to determine 
CAMELS ratings are not publicly available (Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo, 2011), after considering 
the literature and accessibility of data, the following variables were included under each CAMELS 
category: 
Capital Adequacy (C)  
Cihak and Poghosyan (2009) provide two main reasons for not using the regulatory Tier 1 capital 
to risk-weighted assets. Firstly, this information is not available publicly, and secondly, it is 
subjective and therefore it is easy to manipulate the calculation of risk-weighted assets. Most 
scholars, like Pille and Paradi (2002), use the total equity to total asset ratio to measure capital 
adequacy. It is seen as a useful ratio for predicting if the company is at risk of the failure, Schaeck 
(2008) also note equity mitigates asset value and payments to debt holders. 
TRUSTEE_Z = Guardian 
AMENDED 
If the trust deed was amended over the year before 




The time in years from incorporation year up to the year 











In finance companies, a significant portion of assets is tied up in loans with the highest potential 
of unanticipated lost. Deposits contribute a major proportion of liabilities. Financial institutions 
with various proportions of assets to liabilities could have a funding imbalance. Hua (2006) notes 
that the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) performs off-site checking of financial 
companies’ asset-liability ratios on a regular basis. Douglas et al. (2014) used asset-liability ratio 
as a proxy for capital adequacy in predicting failure among New Zealand finance companies. The 
gross loans and advances to total assets ratio reveals the possibility of default risk if the loans 
remain unpaid. Both Swicegood and  Clark (2001) and Tam and  Kiang (1992) used this ratio and 
suggest it is a good predictor of failure among financial companies.  
The next ratio used to measure capital adequacy is total liability to total equity. In July 2009, the 
Reserve Bank of New York declared that the leverage ratio predicted bank failure as well as more 
complex risk-weighted ratios over one or two-year horizons. 
Canbas et al. (2005) argue that the greater the capital adequacy ratio, the greater the financial 
strength of a bank. In short, they have a lower default risk. Capital adequacy ratio displays a 
bank’s internal strength to tolerate losses during the crisis (Ongore and Kusa, 2013). This study 
thus uses the four ratios discussed above; total equity to total asset, total assets to total liabilities, 
gross loans and advances to total assets and total liability to total equity as proxies to account for 
capital adequacy. 
Asset Quality (A)  
Finance companies’ most risky assets are loans. Asset risk can be evaluated entirely using balance 
sheet term like loans to total assets – since loans are riskier than securities and cash assets 
(Martin, 1977). Previous studies have found a notable difference in the asset quality of healthy 
and distressed financial companies (King et al., 2005; Sinkey, 1975). Frost (2004) notes that asset 
quality determinacies focus on the proportion of non-performing loans which are the proxy for 
asset quality. Loan quality is an important variable that has been commonly evaluated by 
impairment assets (non-performing loans) to total loans or total assets, and the provision of bad 
loan to total assets or total loans. Curry et al. (2003) propose that the quality of credit loans is 
correlated with the probability of changes in CAMELS ratings, reflecting problem and non-
problem institutions. Both King et al. (2005), Swicegood and Clark (2001) contend that the 
provision of doubtful debt to gross loans results in poor asset quality and indicates a higher 
chance of failure. This ratio recognises that financial companies may have used aggressive lending 
strategies (Jaikengkit, 2004). All financial companies must reduce the amount of non-performing 
loans (Ongore and Kusa, 2013). A low impairment assets to total assets ratio shows that a bank 
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portfolio is healthy and performing well (Sangmi and Tabassum, 2010). This study uses the 
impairment asset to total asset ratio and the provision of doubtful debt to gross loans and 
advances to measure asset quality. 
Management Efficiency (M)  
Management efficiency is a key indicator of financial health. It is typically measured using non-
interest expenses to total income, personnel expenses to average assets, and cost to income ratio 
(Boyacioglu et al., 2009; Cihak and Poghosyan, 2009; Oshinsky and Olin, 2006). Management 
quality is difficult to measure. Managing operating expenses efficiently is another element which 
reflects management quality (DeYoung, 1998). The efficiency of operating cost is measured using 
the cost income ratio, defined as operating expenses to operating income (Mathuva, 2009). Hess 
and Francis (2004) note that there is a reverse relationship between the cost income ratio and 
bank profitability. Gosh, Narain, and Sahoo (2003) also declares that there is a negative relation 
between efficiency and the cost income ratio.  
The second ratio used in this study for evaluating management efficiency is used by Jaikengkit 
(2004). He uses operating expenses to total assets, as he believes this ratio captures management 
efficiency. He explains that a higher ratio reflects lower management quality and a higher risk of 
failure. The rationale here is that a well-managed bank is able to use resources more efficiently 
than poorly managed banks. Thus, the current study uses the cost income ratio and operating 
expenses to total assets to account for management efficiency.  
Earnings (E)  
Grier (2007) noted that a stable profit not only provides assurance for investors but also enables a 
bank to absorb loan losses and ensure sufficient funds are available. Constant healthy profits are 
vital to financial institutions’ sustainability. The profitability or earnings ratio evaluates an entity’s 
ability to produce profit utilising assets at their disposal (Dang, 2011; Ongore and Kusa, 2013). It is 
normally calculated by net income or interest income divided by total assets and demonstrates 
management’s ability to generate income from a company’s resources (Khrawish, 2011). These 
two ratios are frequently used to measure earnings quality and have a reverse relationship with 
failure (Avkiran and Cai, 2012). A high return on assets indicates that the entity’s efficiency is high 
and that it has a lower risk of failure (Jaikengkit, 2004). As with the prior literature (Boyacioglu et 
al., 2009; Canbas et al., 2005; Lanine and Vennet, 2006; Martin, 1977; Shumway, 2001; Wheelock 
and Wilson, 2000) this study uses net profit after tax to total assets and net interest to total 
assets as proxies for measuring earnings quality. 
Liquidity (L)  
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Financial institutions make money by borrowing short term deposits at a lower interest rate than 
they charge to long-term borrowers. The gap between interest rates and the lending time leads 
to insufficient liquidity risks. Management should ensure that the institution retains adequate 
liquidity levels to meet its financial commitments, particularly to depositors. In addition, they 
should be able to quickly convert assets to cash with minimal loss (Dang, 2011). Liquidity is thus 
another indicator for a financial companies’ performance. Rudolf (2009) notes that “the liquidity 
expresses the degree to which a bank is capable of fulfilling its respective obligations” (p.2). 
Liquidity ratios indicate the portion of liquid assets that can be converted to cash over a year 
without an undue loss. However, scholars use different ratios to measure liquidity risk. Wheelock 
and Wilson (2000) consider liquidity with net purchases of federal funds divided by total assets, 
while Canbas et al. (2005) applied liquid assets to total assets as a proxy for liquidity. Distinguin et 
al. (2006) use the liquid assets to total deposits and borrowings as a proxy for measuring liquidity, 
while Douglas et al. (2014) use net operating cash flow to total assets. Dang (2011) reveals that 
liquidity is positively related to bank profitability. However, a study of financial institutions in 
China and Malaysia found no relationship between liquidity and bank performance (Said and 
Mohd, 2011). This study uses current assets to total assets and net operating cash flow to total 
assets as proxies for liquidity. 
Size (S)  
“S” in CAMELS refers to ‘sensitivity to market risk.’ Most scholars ignore this factor (see, for 
example, Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Oshinsky and Olin, 2006;  Distinguin et al., 2006; Ajiboye 
and Ilori, 2016). Boyacioglu et al. (2009) consider sensitivity to market risk in their study and 
measure it using trading securities to total assets, foreign assets to foreign liabilities, and net 
interest income to average asset. This study could not take those variables into account due to a 
lack of data. Alternatively, this study uses size, measured by total asset. Wheelock and Wilson 
(2000), Lanine and Vennet (2006), and Kato and Hagendorff (2010) demonstrate that size is 
negatively related to the failure. This reverse relation can be explained by the ‘too big to fail’ view 
and the expansion effect (Curry et al., 2003;  Hagendorff and Kato, 2010). Thus, total assets are 
used as a proxy for size. 
Agency-related Variables 
Corporate governance plays a central role in monitoring managers’ behaviour and protecting 
shareholders. The foundation of the corporate governance system is to address the agency issues. 
The central control mechanism of corporate governance is to monitor board of directors and 
managers’ behaviours effectively and protect shareholders from any conflict of interest. Both 
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Morin and Jarrell (2001) and Monks and Minow (2001) explain that corporate governance is 
effective oversight of the directors at board level. This oversight helps to provide a structure that 
protects and controls the relevant parties in the market. Guo (2011) and Wellalage (2012) 
emphasise that corporate governance advances company accountability and transparency and 
significantly enhances financial performance. This study includes additional Agency-related 
information as this has been identified as a key factor in company failure (Douglas et al., 2014; 
Harris, 2009). 
Board Composition 
Board composition considered to be an important factor in ensuring managerial performance. 
Two crucial elements are board size and director turnover. The number of directors on the board 
can directly impact upon efficiency and consequently corporate performance. Some studies 
suggest that larger boards have a negative influence and tend to be less efficient than smaller 
boards. They believe it is difficult to arrange board meeting and reach consensus, which is 
believed to result in slow and inefficient decision making (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007). 
However, some scholars contend that larger boards have a positive effect on firm performance. A 
greater number of board members leads to strategic decisions and reduces the likelihood of CEO 
dominance. Agrawal and Mandelker (2009) argue that larger boards mean more experience.  
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) found that CEOs of firms with high debt require boards with 
greater levels of expertise. Board size is the first variable in this study for board composition. 
Institutional performance and how directors react to that is an important element. If directors 
have a self-interested character, they may consider the reputational and legal costs of being a 
director of a distressed or failing company (Fama, 1980). In this situation, they may prefer to 
resign or leave the company before their reputation is tarnished or they lose too many board 
members. Hubbard and Kosnik (1997) found that director turnover was notably higher in 
bankrupt banks during the 1980s, particularly during the Texas savings and loan crisis. Srinivasan 
(2005) studied 409 companies from 1997 to 2001 that restated their earnings and showed that 
director turnover was 14% in the three years before restating earnings and 48% after restating 
downward. This study considers the number of directors appointed or resigned as proxies for 
director turnover. 
Related Party Transactions 
In many countries, financial institutions are managed by directors or managers which are 
considerably interest in non-financial companies. This means that a notable portion of lending is 
directed toward their related parties. Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) state that in Asia, 
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shareholders (who constitute nearly 60 percent of trading companies) control a bank. This figure 
is around 28% in Europe. La Porta et al.'s (2003) study on 17 Mexican banks in 1995 found that 
related lending accounts for nearly 20% of commercial loans and have better loan conditions than 
unrelated loans, like interest rate is 4% lower than normal. They prove related party loans have 
33% more possibility of failing. Beatson (2009) notes that transactions among related parties in 
New Zealand are often extremely high and that institutional funds were used to benefit the 
shareholders (like lending them excessive amounts of money, even when there was a low 
likelihood of repayment). Bhuiyan and  Roudaki (2018) also found that almost half of the failed 
New Zealand finance companies were engaged in related party transactions. This study follows 
Douglas et al. (2014) and uses related party lending to total asset and related party lending to 
total loan and advances as proxies for related party transactions. 
Audit 
The audit plays a critical role in ensuring the quality of financial statements, including the issue of 
going-concern opinions (Douglas et al., 2014). Audit modification acts as an early warning of 
financial problems. Auditors are responsible for issuing going-concern reports if there is concern 
about a company’s ability to continue over time (not more than 12 months). They have to issue a 
going-concern report which must state that a company is under financial distress (Holder-Webb 
and Cohen, 2007). Carson et al. (2013) found that more than 60% of bankruptcies are followed by 
reported going concern uncertainties. However, Francis and Yu (2009) declare that large auditors 
like Big 4 are more likely to issue going-concern reports. As a proxy for audit modification, the 
dummy variable “1” was used to indicate annual reports with qualified audit report or where 
there was “fundamental uncertainty” or “emphasis of matter” noted in the audit report even 
though the auditor issued an unqualified audit report, otherwise “0”. 
Palmrose (1988) discusses the litigation cost of audit failures for auditors. High quality auditors try 
to avoid this cost because it represents a loss of reputation as well. Khurana and Raman (2004) 
note that litigation penalties motivate the Big 4 auditors in the United States to provide high 
quality audits. In addition, the Big 4 have a more conservative policy (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) 
regarding accepting and retaining clients (Rama and Read, 2006). In this study, a dummy variable 
“1” is used for companies that have a Big auditor. A “0” is used otherwise. The Big 4 includes Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, Deloitte, Ernst and Young and KPMG. 
Prior studies have shown that there is a relationship between going-concern opinion and audit 
lags. Higher audit lags increase the possibility of going-concern opinions (DeFond et al., 2002; 
Geiger et al., 2005; Li, 2009). This delay could be either the result of doing more work to evaluate 
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the company’s ability to continue trading or uncovering financial problems. Audit lag is calculated 
by the number of days from the end of the financial year to the audit’s sign off date.  
On average, the Big 4 charge 20% more than the other audit companies (DeFond et al., 2000; 
Ferguson et al., 2003). However, Francis (2004) declares that a higher audit fee indicates better 
quality. The high fee either relates to more time allocated to the audit process or is an 
acknowledgement of the auditor’s expertise. Although Carcello and Neal (2000) could not find 
any evidence that audit remuneration is related to company failure, we include the audit fee in 
our study to see if there is any relationship. This study uses audit modification, Big 4, audit lags 
and auditor remuneration to measure audit attitudes of failed and non-failed financial 
companies.  
Trustees 
As explain earlier corporate trustees are responsible for acting on behalf of all depositors and 
monitoring financial institutions in New Zealand. Davies (2007) explains that trustees have a 
“statutory whistle-blowing duty” and if they suspect that a financial company has breached its 
trust deed, it is their responsibility to inform the Registrar of Companies for further investigation. 
Most of the failed companies in New Zealand used three common trustee company to supervise 
them and their investors’ interests (Yahanpath and Cavanagh, 2011). This study investigates to 
see if there is any relationship between these trustees and failure among financial companies. 
Wilson et al. (2013) note that even if trustees are aware of any breach, they often agree to 
amend definitions in the trust deed, like changing the definition of related party transaction. The 
probability of trust deed amendment is higher near to the time of the failure. This study checks 
amended trust deeds and investigates whether amendment in trust deed is a predictor for failure. 
 Maturity 
Studies prove that maturity or length of operation is linked to profitability (Strøm, D’Espallier, and 
Mersland, 2014). Navajas et al. (2000) explain that maturity builds borrower and market 
confidence. Caudill et al. (2009) note that a mature firm generally controls costs more efficiently 
rather than newer firms, which results in higher profitability. However, Kyereboah‐Coleman and 
Osei (2008) conclude that older finance companies are more profitable, but that tend to focus on 
limited groups of clients. In addition, Nurmakhanova et al. (2015) declare that mature institutions 
serve fewer richer clients, with larger loans. Alternatively, (Mersland and Strøm, 2009, 2010) 
contend that the age of a firm has a direct relationship with the number of the active borrowers. 
Age or the number of years in the market is commonly used a proxy for measuring maturity 
(Hartarska, 2005; Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy, 2009; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Microfinance 
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Information Exchange, 2007). This study uses age as a proxy for maturity by considering the 
difference between the incorporation date published on the Company Office’s website and the 
year of failure. 
Media 
Media, as an extra-legal institution, plays a critical role in educating and influencing the public 
(Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Haw et al., 2004). For instance, El Ghoul et al. 
(2016) investigates the role of media in influencing corporations’ engagement in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) by using a large sample of 4,453 companies from 53 countries, from 2003 to 
2012. They declare that the media has a strong ability to encourage companies to engage more in 
CSR activities, especially in countries with more freedom. Burgess (2010) and Sobel, Dutta and  
Roy (2011) all use the Freedom of the Press index to compare media freedom among countries. 
Cahan, Chen, Chen and  Nguyen (2015) use annual scores of media favourability as a proxy for 
media. It is equal to the total number of positive news less negative news to total number of 
news items in a year. New Zealand is a small country with a limited number of media outlets, 
which cover all the news. This study uses the two of the major newspapers; the NZHerald and 
Stuff. They cover nearly 100% of the news all over the country. To collect the number of news, 
this study uses the Google search engine (www.google.com.nz), NZHerald and Stuff website 
search engine using the name of each company in quotation marks as search terms (Du et al., 
2016). The total number of published news items was not significant enough to classify them as 
positive or negative news. However, this study computes the total number of published new 
items as a proxy for media. In short, it provides an overall view of whether media has any 
influence on failed financial companies. 
External Factors/Macroeconomic Factors 
There is a series of macroeconomic indicators available for analysis and they are typical time 
varying covariates. However, unlike firm-specific covariates, macroeconomic factors are variant in 
the period but not in the case. So for all companies existing in a period, we assume 
macroeconomic conditions have the same impact on them. Some researchers (e.g. Nam et al., 
2008) use macroeconomic changes as the baseline hazard, and others (e.g. Carling et al., 2007) 
argue that macroeconomic conditions have a lagged impact on the real economy. 
With reference to literature and professional opinions, we include four macroeconomic variables 
in the model. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Inflation, Official Cash Rate (OCR) and House Price 




GDP growth positively affects the demand and supply of banking services and improves banks’ 
asset quality. Decreases in GDP, particularly during recession periods, lead to a deterioration of 
credit quality, which negatively affects bank efficiency. Adjei-Frimpong (2013) supports the 
positive impact of real GDP growth on financial companies’ efficiency. However, Delis, 
Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki, Staikouras, and Katerina's (2009) study on South East European countries 
found a negative relation. Di Patti and Hardy (2005) concluded that there was no significant 
relation between GDP and bank efficiency among Pakistani banks. 
Inflation rates increase costs and lessen cost efficiency. Kasman and Yildirim (2006) explain that 
as inflation grows, so do costs. This leads to a decrease in profits as banks tend to grow branch 
networks. However, Athanasoglou, Sophocles, and Matthaios (2005) contend that the 
relationship between inflation levels and bank profitability is not clear in the case of Greece  
(Vong and Chan, 2009). Simpasa (2010) declares that inflation rate is directly related to bank 
market power. As inflation rates grow, banks increase their product prices leading to higher 
market power. 
The last two macroeconomic variables are the Official Cash Rate (OCR) and House Price Interest 
Rate (HPI). Delis and Kouretas (2011) analysed 18000 annual observations on the Euro zone and 
found that low interest rates increase bank risk-taking behaviour. However, they explain that the 
overall impact of interest rates on bank risk-taking depends on a bank’s capital. Individual bank 
features disclose that the interest rate has less effect on risky assets for banks with higher equity 
capital and has a higher impact on banks with higher off-balance sheet items. Additionally, 
several scholars (Borio and Zhu, 2008; Dell’ Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Rajan, 2006) note that 
banks appear to increase risk-taking behaviour during the low-interest rate periods. Kanwal and 
Nadeem (2013) found a significant positive relationship between interest rates with the 
profitability of public commercial banks in Pakistan between 2001 and 2011. Significantly, the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand announces both the OCR and HPI and their changes parallel to each 
other.  
4.4 Data Analysis  
After explaining all the variable measurements, this section describes the research models used 
to test the relationship between CAMELS, Agency-related variables and financial Institution 
failure. Two methods were chosen to test the data in order to identify the most suitable model 
for prediction. These are the logistic regression model and the hazard model. 
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4.4.1 Logistic Regression 
David Cox first introduced logistic regression in 1958. He argued that a binary response of success 
“1” or failure “0” depended on the character of one or some of the preassigned independent 
variables. Since then logistic regression has been used in different areas like social sciences 
(Chuang, 1997; Tolman and Weisz, 1995) and higher educational research (Cabrera, 1994; Peng, 
So, Stage, and St. John, 2002). In 1977 Martin used logistic regression to build an early warning 
model for predicting future failures. Today, logistic regression is seen as one of the best models 
for bank failure prediction (Kim, 2011; Li, 2014; Lin and McClean, 2001). The first advantage of 
logit models, in comparison with OLS and probit models, is that it does not impose the 
assumption of normality on the independent variable. Logit models also provide probabilistic 
output meaning that results do not need to be converted into the probabilistic measure, which 
may cause further errors (Ohlson, 1980). Jagtiani, Kolari, Lemieux, and Shin (2003) argue that 
simple logit models often provide better results than some of the complex models with the same 
data. It is for these reasons that the logistic regression model is the first one used in this study. 
Logistic regression or the logit model is a classic model in failure prediction. It is capable of 
dealing with binary response variables when individuals are assigned to one of two classes (like 
good or bad or fail or not fail). Logistic models presume that for any company with a specific set 
of features, there is a chance of failure. Therefore, the probability of failure depends conditionally 
on these features. This can be indicated by the equation below: 
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Where 
                      
    
                                                                 
Where β is the vector of unknown parameters,    is a set of features used to ascertain a potential 
failure         and    denotes the error term (Duda and Schmidt, 2010).  
In logistic regression, the value of dependent variables is limited to (0, 1) compared with linear 
regression where the value can go from -  to + . A standard logistic distribution function is 
     
 
     




Figure ‎4-1 Distribution of Logistic Regression 
The normal distribution is not required in binary logistic regression. While the dependent variable 
is categorical, the independent variables can either be continuous or categorical variables. In 
failure prediction, the probability of default depends on a group of explanatory variables which 
are expressed as (Cox, 1958) : 
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 (2) 
Where        the probability of failure, β is the vector of unknown parameters,   is the 
number of explanatory variables and x is the institution characteristics. 
When    represent the probability of default for company  , the equation could be re-written as 
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Then logarithms of both sides of the equation, have (Christensen, 1997- P. 55) 
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If logit     represents the short for     
  
    
  and vectors     to represent                and 
              , we have  
               
  (5) 
When    take values from 0 to 1, 
  
    
  take values from 0 to   and            values from -  to 
+ , as linear regression (Li, 2014). 
In failure prediction studies, researchers have followed different variable classification; and the 
results have been inconsistent or even controversial, particularly regarding the issue of which 
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variables, and to what degree these variables are associated with the probability of failure (Chen, 
Wang, and Wu, 2010; Han, 2012; Lakshana and Wijekoon, 2012). Some scholars (Chen et al., 
2010; Fich and Slezak, 2008; Lee and Yeh, 2004) argue that the integration of corporate 
governance measures with financial variables improves prediction accuracy. This study predicts 
the probability of failure by using new variables. Including as many variables as possible may 
increase predictive accuracy because more information is added. However, it is not practical to do 
so, and it may lead to the problem of overfitting (Li, 2014). Therefore, although a large collection 
of variables are available, this study groups the variables into financial and non-financial variables. 
The models are based on three different variable categories. The first model incorporates only 
CAMELS financial variables. The second model uses only Agency-related variables and the third 
model integrates both CAMELS and non-financial variables. 
The first logistic regression model is as follows: 
Failurei = β0 + β1 CAi + β2 AQi + β3 MCi + β4 EARNi + β5 LIQi + β6 Sizei                                         (Model 1) 
In the case of financial institution i, failurei is represented by 1 when failure occurs and 0 
otherwise. The independent variables include capital adequacy (CAi), asset quality (AQi), 
management competency (MCi ), earnings (EARNi), liquidity (LIQi) and firm size (Sizei ) which are 
all CAMELS components. The related proxies for each variable were explained in detail in the 
previous sections. 
The next model focuses solely on Agency-related variables: 
Failurei = β0 + β1 DIRCOMPi + β2 RPi + β3 AUDi + β4 TRUSTEEi + β5 FMi + β6 MEDIAi                             (Model 2)  
Where, for sample firm i, independent variables in this model consist of director compositions 
(DIRCOMPi), related party transactions (RPi), audit characteristics (AUDi), trustee (TRUSTEEi), firm 
maturity (FMi) and media (MEDIAi). The allocated proxies for pointed variables are described 
earlier. 
The third model amalgamates CAMELS and Agency-related variables: 
Failurei = β0 + β1 CAi + β2 AQi + β3 MCi + β4 EARNi + β5 LIQi + β6 Sizei + β7 DIRCOMPi + β8 RPi + β9 AUDi 
+ β10 TRUSTEEi + β11 FMi + β12 MEDIAi                                                                                                                                                 (Model 3) 
  Where all of the variables are defined as above. 
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Each one of these three models is extended to three sub-models based on time intervention. In 
the sub-models T1, T2, and T3 are one year, two years, or three years before failure. Model 1 is 
extended as follow: 
 Model 1-1: Using CAMELS variables in time “T1” 
 Model 1-2: Using CAMELS variables in time “T2” 
 Model 1-3: Using CAMELS variables in time “T3” 
Model 2 is developed as outlined below: 
 Model 2-1: Using Agency-related variables in time “T1” 
 Model 2-2: Using Agency-related variables in time “T2” 
 Model 2-3: Using Agency-related variables in time “T3” 
The following sub-models are established based on Model 3: 
 Model 3-1: Using CAMELS and Agency-related variables in time “T1” 
 Model 3-2: Using CAMELS and Agency-related variables in time “T2” 
 Model 3-3: Using CAMELS and Agency-related variables in time “T3” 
The four macroeconomic variables of GDP, Inflation, OCR and HPI are entered in all the models as 
control variables. These variables are constant for the year, however may vary from year to year 
within the model. As explained earlier, t donates the year a company fails and t-1 is the year 
before failure. For example, if a company fails in 2009, the t-1 is 2008 and if a company fails in 
2007, the t-1 is 2006. Therefore, the t-1 varies from company to company and this may result in a 
macroeconomic value that differs for each company, as the year of failure is different. 
4.4.2 Hazard Model 
As with other static models (with the exception of multi-period models), logistic regression is a 
cross-sectional model. This model can only predict the probability of failure at a given time (like in 
this study, one, two or three years before failure). However, this model does not address the fact 
that at this given time, some ‘healthy’ institutions will ultimately fail. To address this problem, 
Shumway (2001) proposed hazard models. These models have gained popularity in credit risk 
prediction fields (see for example Bennett, Kimmel, and Thornton, 2016; Cox, Kimmel, and Wang, 
2017). 
Hazard models have three main advantages. Firstly, the models can be modified during risk 
periods by using a function of time of being financially healthy which is called survival time. 
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Shumway (2001) explains that a company has its life cycle, like a human being, and its own death 
risk, over its life time. Hazard models incorporate this risk. 
In addition, hazard models can naturally incorporate Time-Varying Covariates (TVC) which are 
defined as explanatory variables which change over time. Macroeconomic variables are another 
group of TVCs which are associated with business failure (discussed in the Basel II framework and 
addressed by  Wilson and Altanlar, 2014). Macroeconomic indicators are published quarterly or 
yearly. These can be easily included in discrete hazard models. 
Finally, hazard models result in better predictions, as models use more data. This is in contrast to 
cross-sectional models which only consider a single period of data. Hazard models can include 
data over a period of time (this is commonly referred to as panel data). This study uses three 
years of data. Observing data over an extended period of times means that the training sample is 
larger and hence, parameter estimates are more robust over time.  
It is for these reasons that this study uses a discrete-time hazard model. This model is a type of 
survival model, in which covariates are related to the time that passes before bankruptcy 
happens. The survival function and hazard model function are based on Rodríguez's (2010) work:  
The continuous time before failure of a company is recognised as survival time and is denoted as 
t. The density function of variable t is                 and its cumulative density function is 
                         where   represents a vector of parameters and   represents a 
vector of financial institution characteristic which are CAMELS variables and Agency-related 
variables and   is the duration before failure. The probability that a company survives beyond 
time t is expressed by the survival function,                : 
         ∑                      (6) 
In addition, the hazard function                 is the event rate at time   conditional on 
survival until time   or later. In other words, the hazard function is the ratio of the probability 
density function      to the survival function     : 
         
    
           |    
  
 
    
    
 
     
    
 (7) 
The hazard rate is the constant probability of failure. It means that a company can survive until 
time   and has a possibility of failing in a small period of time     . However, the hazard rate 
might be seen as the immediate risk of default (Nam et al., 2008). Therefore, the hazard rate can 
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range from 0 to  . The cumulative hazard function measures the accumulated total risk up to 
time   is: 
      ∫        ∫
     





      [    ] (8) 
Therefore: 












For a continuous hazard model, some common distributions can be used for      like exponential, 
Weibull, lognormal, log-logistic and Gomperts-Makeham distributions. Cox and Oakes (1984) 
suggest that the semi-parametric proportional regression to evaluate the   by presuming the 
proportional hazard remain the same. 
                       
    (12) 
Here    is the baseline hazard and   is the vector of parameters affecting the time-varying 
covariate     . 
In discrete time hazard models, the failure can only happen in a period of time    The survival 
equation and hazard equation are a bit different (Cox and Oakes, 1984): 
          ∏[          ]
    
 (13) 
The likelihood function of the discrete-time hazard model is:  
   ∏     
 
   
      ∏[          ]
    
  (14) 
Hence the log-likelihood function of that (Allison, 1982) is 
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 (15) 
Where      =1 if company   experiences failure in period    , 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, a discrete-time hazard model, as explained above, can be estimated using a logit 
model with proper adjustment to the test statistics (Nam et al., 2008).  
   (      |    )   (        )  
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 (16) 
In the logit model, test statistics presume that the bank-years are independent observations. 
However, in discrete-time hazard models, the firm-year observations of a particular institution 
cannot be independent because a firm cannot fail in period T if it failed in period T-1; and if an 
institution survives to period T, it cannot have failed in period T-1. Therefore, each bank’s life 
span only makes one observation for the hazard model (Cole and Wu, 2009). 
Shumway (2001) notes that the likelihood function of the multi-period logit model is equal to a 
discrete-time hazard model with a hazard rate                 , which takes the same form as 
the cumulative probability function of a logit model. Hence, hazard models can be simply 
approximated by using the logistic regression technique. Additionally, the model also allows for 
the incorporation of macroeconomic dependencies. Separating   into    and    creates the 
following form of the hazard function and assists with understanding how to incorporate 
macroeconomic dependencies. This study uses a duration model with time-varying covariates and 
macro-economic dependencies: 
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 (17) 
In this equation, the hazard rate consists of a time-dependent   , which is also known as a 
baseline hazard function and denotes a macroeconomic variable. Possible macroeconomic 
variables include the OCR, GDP, inflation and HPI in that period. The second part of the hazard 
function,      , is a function of firm specific characteristics represented by financial ratios and 
non-financial indexes, the same as those which are explained under logistic regression models. 
This model also shares similarities with the logit model in that it is built on three different variable 
categories. As noted, the first model uses only CAMELS financial variables. The second model 
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incorporates only Agency-related variables, and the third model integrates both CAMELS and 
non-financial variables. 
As explained earlier, firm-year observations of an institution are not independent, because a firm 
cannot fail in period T if it failed in period T-1. As with the logistic model, this model assesses the 
three consecutive years before failure occurs.  
The models used in this study are as follows: 
 
The Logit model  
Model 1: Using CAMELS variables  
 Model 1-1: Using CAMELS variables in time “T1” 
 Model 1-2: Using CAMELS variables in time “T2” 
 Model 1-3: Using CAMELS variables in time “T3” 
Model 2: Using Agency-related variables 
 Model 2-1: Using Agency-related variables in time “T1” 
 Model 2-2: Using Agency-related variables in time “T2” 
 Model 2-3: Using Agency-related variables in time “T3” 
Model 3: Using CAMELS and Agency-related variables 
 Model 3-1: Using CAMELS and Agency-related variables in time “T1” 
 Model 3-2: Using CAMELS and Agency-related variables in time “T2” 
 Model 3-3: Using CAMELS and Agency-related variables in time “T3” 
The Hazard model 
 Model 4: Using CAMELS variables on the combination of “T1, T2 and T3” 
 Model 5: Using Agency-related variables on the combination of “T1, T2 and T3” 
 Model 6: Using CAMELS and Agency-related variables on the combination of “T1, T2 and 
T3” 
4.5 Cut-off Score  
There are many different ways to evaluate the performance of a model. However, a model is 
typically assessed by its classification accuracy and discriminant power. In regards to classification 
accuracy, when the likelihood of a default is predicted by a model, a cut-off score is normally 
allocated to the series of probabilities. The typical cut-off score is 0.50. Following prior studies 
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(Jaikengkit, 2004; Li, 2014), this study uses 0.50 as a cut-off score. This means that financial 
institutions with possibilities above the cut-off point are categorised as ‘failed’ while those with 
possibilities below the cut-off point are seen as ‘healthy’ ones with a lower chance of default. 
4.6 Model Validation 
A prediction model must also include validation tests to ensure that the results are valid both in 
the sample and post-sample periods. Both Fuertes and Kalotychou (2006) and Rodriguez and 
Rodriguez (2006) suggest that compound models provide more accurate predictions when tested 
in-sample. Fantazzini and Figini (2009) also found superior out-of-sample predictions from simple 
logit models as opposed to more advanced models in their study of credit risk default among 
Small Medium Enterprises. Validation tests would typically be conducted using holdout samples. 
The developed model (that is built from in-sample data), is usually tested for validity using the 
out-of-sample. This technique protects against the upward bias that might occur if the sample 
used for the developing model was the same as the sample used for validating the model 
(Jaikengkit, 2004). This study examines the accuracy of the models by testing the out-of-sample 
data. The out-of-sample data was collected from failed financial institutions (after 2010), after the 
implementation of new regulations. 
4.6.1 Measuring Model Validity 
A statistically significant covariate does not mean that predictive performance is improved if the 
variable is incorporated into a model. The performance of a model can be measured by its 
classification accuracy. When measuring the classification accuracy of a model, a cut-off point is 
typically allocated to a series of probabilities. Then, institutions with probabilities above the cut-
off point are considered as ‘failed’, and those with probabilities below the cut-off point are 
considered to be ‘healthy’ with a lower chance of failure. The cut-off point is vital for evaluators; 
while one may prefer to concentrate on good classifications, someone else may consider whether 
all defaults have been discovered (Li, 2014). In this study, Type I and Type II errors are calculated 
failed and healthy classifications using a cut-off point of 0.5. The Type I error occurs when the null 
hypothesis (H0) is true but is rejected. A Type II error occurs when the null hypothesis (H0) is 
accepted when it is false (Sheskin, 2003). In this study, a Type I error occurs when a healthy 
institution is misclassified as a failed institution. A Type II error occurs when a failed institution is 
misclassified as a healthy institution. Therefore, Type I and Type II errors are usually called false 




Table ‎4-4 Classification Matrix 
 
Therefore, the cut-off point splits into four different areas: true Healthy (HH), false Healthy (FH), 
true Failed (FF) and false Failed (HF).  
 
Figure ‎4-2 Type I and Type II Errors 
More noticeably, in Figure 4-2, if curves H and F demonstrate the distribution of “Healthies” and 
“Fails” and the x axis is the predicted score, it is obvious that areas under the curves overlap in 
the middle. When the cut-off point is identified, the classification of “Healthies” and “Fails” can 
be ascertained, as CH and CF. Then,  
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Obviously it is better to have lower Type I and Type II error rates and a higher overall accuracy 
rate for good predictive performance. However, Type I and Type II errors are measured solely for 
a single cut-off point. It is a crucial weakness of the error rate that the predictive accuracy of the 
model depends on the cut-off point chosen. Therefore, evaluating the discriminant power of a 
model determines not only the group of cases but also define the distance of how good a non-
default case is and how bad a default case is (Li, 2014). Hence, Receiver Operation Curve (ROC) 
provides a summary measure for the overall performance of all possible cut-offs (Crook, Edelman, 
and Thomas, 2007). The ROC curve is a plot which shows the true positive rate against the false 
positive rate since all possible cut-off values are considered. The true positive rate is called 
sensitivity while the false positive rate is called 1-specificity, whereas specificity is the true 
negative rate.  
If the distribution of the two groups (Healthy and Failed) is totally separated by a model, all of the 
fails would be correctly classified, before any of the healthy ones are misclassified. In this 
instance, the ROC curve will lie over the edges of the square OBC in Figure 4-3. If there is no 
separation at all, the performance of a model will equal a random guess; the ROC curve will be 
the diagonal line OAC (Crook et al., 2007). The measure of overall performance in the ROC graph 
is the Area Under ROC (AUC), which is the area of OECF. Although AUC is a commonly used 
measure of performance for classification, it is a single number resulted from a classification rule 
and has a well-known weakness. The AUC can give potentially misleading results if ROC curves 
cross (Hand, 2009). When this happens, there is a chance that one cross curve has a larger AUC 
even though another model shows better performance over the entire range of values. The Gini 
(1909) coefficient is more informative than AUC since the curve may cross. The Gini coefficient is 
defined as the proportion of the area between OEC and the diagonal line in the half square, as 
outlined below:  
       
    
    
  
          
   
  
              
   
  
          
   








Therefore, the relationship between AUC and Gini is  
 




By doubling the AUC value, the Gini coefficient resolves any misleading results due to crossed 
curves (Hand, 2009). 
One more related measures of separation illustrated in Figure 4-3 is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) 
statistic, which is the maximum difference between the bad and good cumulative score 
distribution.    |   indicates the probability that a good has a score less than   and 
correspondingly for bad as    |  . The KS is the maximum difference between    |   and 
   |   at any score. KS demonstrates what is the maximum difference between the probability 
that a case is good and is rejected and the probability one is bad and is rejected. 
Figure 4-3 is the plot of    |  (  axis) against    |   (  axis). The Ks is the maximum distance 
between    |   and    |  : 
  




On the plot AD = OD, thus, 
                                                      




 KS =   |        | 
 
                                                (25) 
 KS =   |  | (26) 
KS becomes the largest vertical distance from the curve to diagonal. 
Hand (2005) declares that the main constraint of AUC, Gini and KS is that they only consider the 
number of misclassified cases but do not take into account the cost of misclassification. In reality, 
the investor has a different view of the classifications (Fail and Healthy), particularly when 
considering the costs associated with misclassification. Misclassification of a Healthy to be a Fail  
means that an investor might lose profits that could be generated by investing in that particular 
company (Bellovary, Giacomino, and Akers, 2007). Misclassification of a Fail as a Healthy might 
cause the investor to lose a huge amount of capital. Hand (2009) introduces the H measure if the 
cost distributions are known. However, if the costs are unidentified, the preference is still to 
compare the H measure of models as it is assumed that the cost weight function is the same in its 
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estimation, which makes them comparable (Li, 2014). As with other performance measures, the 
discriminative power is better when the H value is larger. 
The error table, AUC, Gini, KS and H measure are all used to assess the model’s performance.  
By running the Logit model and Hazard model for each company year, the SPSS software 
generates a probability amount as one of the model output. In the next stage, the probability 
amount (classifier score) uses as the input for measuring the discriminative power. 
The four measures of predictive accuracy (AUC, Gini, KS and H measure) are all calculated using 
Hand and Anagnostopoulos’ (2013) R code in the R environment.  
 
Figure ‎4-3 ROC, Gini and KS 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter has detailed this study’s research methods. First, it has outlined the sample and data 
collection methods as well as the sample size. The final sample was 35 failed and 35 healthy 
financial institutions. It has also provided a detailed summary of all the variable measurements 
which were used. It has explained the reasons behind choosing the two models; the logit model 
and the hazard model. The final section has described the cut-off scores and model validations 
that are used to ensure accuracy and the performance of prediction models. These include Type I, 
Type II, overall accuracy, AUC, Gini, KS and H. Having detailed the study’s methods; the following 




                                            Data Analysis and Findings 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Having provided the research methodology of this study, Chapter 5 presents the study’s main 
findings. It begins with a review of the data cleaning process and methodology around missing 
data, which is part of the data preparation process. The next section focuses on the descriptive 
and univariate analysis of all the variables. This is followed by the interpretation of the results 
obtained from the correlation matrix analysis. It then explains the logistic regression and hazard 
model results before moving on to consider model accuracy and interpretation of the results. The 
conclusion identifies key findings. 
5.2 Data Mining 
Data preparation is fundamental to data analysis. As there may be a few low-quality values in 
data sources which can significantly affect the results, data must first go through a pre-treatment 
process. Outliers and missing data are two common problems that may arise in the process of 
data collection.  
Outliers refer to values that are abnormal when compared to other values in the overall 
distribution of variables. When the value of a collected data does not fit into the normal 
distribution, it is considered to be an outlier. In a pattern of variable distribution, outliers lie far 
away from the majority of other data points. The existence of these outliers in data sample brings 
bias into statistical estimates; for example, mean values result in under or over-estimated results 
(Kwak and Kim, 2017). Therefore, dealing with outliers is necessary before one begins the data 
analysis. The process of data cleaning comprises of amending outliers or substituting values after 
identifying their source.  
In some cases, the models are run with and without outliers to see if the results are significantly 
affected. On the condition that the results are not significantly influenced, the outliers are kept in 
the sample (as the sample size is already small enough without removing companies due to one 
or two outliers). The process of data mining is explained in the next section. 
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5.3 Missing Data 
Missing data is common in social science research (Patrician, 2002; Puma, Olsen, Bell, and Price, 
2009). This study is no exception. Rubin (1976) defined three types of missing data; missing 
completely at random, missing at random, missing not at random. Missing data may affect model 
outcomes. If the possibility of missing data is not related to any other variable in the data set or 
the value of the observation, it is missing completely at random data; the data is missing at 
random if it results from missing values of another variable in the data set (Allison, 2001). The 
third type, missing not at random, is when there is no secondary variable available to explain it 
(Muthen and Muthen, 2004). There are different techniques to handle missing data depending on 
the nature of the data and missing data patterns. The most common technique is listwise 
deletion. This method deletes cases with missing data and runs the analysis using the remaining 
data. This method works well with missing completely at random data and results in unbiased 
parameter estimates (Allison, 2001). However, when the missing data is from the other two types 
or the sample size is too small, listwise deletion may lead to biased results, since the remaining 
cases may not be representative of the full sample (Von Hippel, 2004). In order to prevent losing 
cases in small samples, Rubin’s 1976 multiple imputation technique introduces a reasonable value 
for each missing cell. This method generates multiple sets of new data for imputed values, which 
are different from set to set. This repeating imputation for multiple times solves the problem of 
underestimating standard errors (Rubin, 1976). Each dataset is analysed separately, with 
outcomes pooled for ultimate inferences. The practice of several imputations and combined 
results lead to a more precise analysis. It resolves the uncertainty about the actual value of the 
missing data. 
In this study, missing data is classified as missing not at random, as the data is not included in the 
financial statements. Most of the missing data relate to not classified assets to current and non-
current assets for measuring liquidity risks and not having cash flow reports for evaluating 
management efficiency. As the missing data is type three and the sample size is small, this study 
uses the multiple imputation method to handle missing data. SPSS runs multiple imputation 
techniques automatically (five times), which results in five different sets of data for each piece of 
missing data. The average of these five figures is the output which replaces the missing figure in 
the data sheet. However, if the final calculated data for the current asset to total asset is more 




5.4 Descriptive Statistics Results 
In order to obtain a greater understanding of the data’s characteristics, this study uses descriptive 
analysis. Table 5.1 depicts all of the study’s independent variables. These are classified according 
to CAMELS and Agency-related variables. There are 14 CAMELS variables and 14 Agency-related 
variables. A Skewness score between -2 and +2 and a Kurtosis score between -4 and +4, are 
considered normal distributions of the variables. 
The descriptive analysis was run for failed and non-failed companies for each year separately, 
covering the first, second and third year before failure. As presented in Table 5-1, the mean value 
(Mean) of board size (NUMDIR) is 4.24 at t-1 and 4.40 at t-3 which is nearly the same during the 
last three years before failure. This size is significantly smaller than the average board size in 
European companies (11.8) as of 2009 (Heidrick and Struggles, 2009). The smaller board size 
could be due to New Zealand’s small market and body of corporate directors. However, it is also 
smaller than New Zealand publicly listed companies which consist of an average of six members 
(Fauzi and Locke, 2012). According to Tables 5.1, the minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) 
number of members are two and nine respectively. This is smaller than the results of the top 50 
Australia and New Zealand listed companies; 86% of them have between six and 11 board 
members (KORN/FERRY International in Association with Egan Associates, 2007). It is consistent, 
however, with the UK Companies Act (2006) which recommendations that a private company 
should have a minimum of one director and a public company must have a minimum of two. 
Table 5-1 shows that the average director turnover (DIRCHANGE) is 42% to 47%, which is nearly 
the same for all three years before failure. However, the maximum number of directors 
appointed (DIRAPPOINT) and resigned (DIRRESIG) is higher at t-3 (7 and 6 respectively), compared 
to 4 members at t-2 and t-1. Fama (1980) notes that self-interested directors prefer to resign and 
leave a company when it is struggling before their reputation is compromised. Therefore, the 
number of changes within the board of directors teams increases when the company is at risk of 
failure (Hubbard and Kosnik, 1997). 
As per Table 5.1, the mean values of related party transaction to total asset (RELAT_TA) are 
steady during the three years before failure. However, the mean value of related party 
transaction to total loan (RELAT_GLOAN) increases from 0.149 at t-3 to 0.190 at t-2 and then 
reduces to 0.169 at t-1. Although it reduces at t-1, it is still higher than t-3. It thus confirms the 
view that increasing levels of related party lending occur prior to failure. The results are also 
supported by Reserve Bank findings (2013) that New Zealand finance companies conducted a high 
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level of related party lending. However, it is still smaller than related party lending by 17 Mexican 
banks, which in 1995 lent 20% to related parties (La Porta et al., 2003). 
The next variable recruited is the independent external auditors (BIGN). A dummy variable “one” 
was assigned to companies that were audited by one of the Big 4 (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
Deloitte, Ernst and Young and KPMG), otherwise “zero”. As shown in Table 5-1, the mean value of 
the auditor is nearly 0.58 for all of the three years before failure, indicating that about 58% of the 
sample companies used a Big 4 auditor. However, in their study of 31 New Zealand finance 
companies, Douglas et al., (2014) reported a much lower figure (35.5%). In addition, the mean 
value of audit modification (MODIFIED) reveals a sudden growth from 0.014 at t-3 and t-2 to 
0.157 at t-1, an increase of 50%. The finding is consistent with Douglas et al., (2014) who 
explained that 17.70% of sampled companies received modified audit report in the year prior to 
failure. This result is very small in comparison to the United States firms. Carson et al., (2013) 
undertook a study on 396 bankrupt firms from 2000 to 2010 and concluded that 60.10% of 
bankruptcies were followed by going-concern uncertainties in their final reports before failure. It 
is relatively consistent with distressed Chinese companies; 18.1% companies received a prior-year 
modified report, in a sample of 5,131 companies throughout 2001 to 2010 (Mo, Rui, and Wu, 
2015). 
The audit lag (AUDITLAG) has a maximum value of 270 days at t-2, rather than the maximum 194 
days at t-3 and 232 at t-1. It has a mean value of 114 days in t-2 and 105 in t-1. These findings are 
higher than Douglas et al.'s (2014). They found a maximum lag of 175 days and a mean value of 
95.5 days. However, it is smaller than stressed U.K. companies, which had a mean value of 129.5 
days a year, prior to failure, in a sample of 58 companies in 2003 (Basioudis, Papakonstantinou, 
and Geiger, 2008). It is higher than the United States financially distressed firms. Geiger et al.'s 
(2005) study of 226 companies over the period of 2000 to 2003 found a mean value of audit lag of 
83.3 days in 2001 and 75.3 in 2003. 
The results included in Table 5-1 indicate that the mean value of audit remuneration natural log 
(LG.AUDREM) increases from 4.06 and 4.05 at t-3 and t-2, respectively, to 4.27 at t-1. The 
maximum value also increased by 0.34 (from 5.37 in t-2 to 5.71 in t-1). In the other word, the 
maximum audit remuneration increases from 234,000 in t-2 to 511,000 in t-1. The findings are 
relatively similar with the mean value of 5 for 58 U.K. stressed companies (Basioudis et al., 2008). 
Li's (2009) study of 1681 distressed companies during pre-SOX (2001) and 1780 distressed 
companies during post-SOX (2003) found the increasing mean value of audit log fees; 5.20 in 2001 
and 7.50 in 2003. 
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The mean value shows 95% (t-3 and t-2) and 97% (t-1) of New Zealand finance companies 
delegate supervision to one of the three known trustee companies (TRUSTEE). It is higher than 
the mean value of 86% noted by Douglas et al. (2014). However, their sample size is smaller than 
this study’s sample size. Additionally, the trust deed amendment (AMENDED) increases from 
0.071 at t-2 to 0.257 at t-1. This is similar to Wilson et al.'s (2013) finding that although trustees 
were aware of breaches in the terms and conditions of the trust deeds, they agreed to amend the 
definitions. In short, there are typically more amendments made to trust deeds closer to the time 
of failure. 
The age of finance companies (AGE) ranges from one to 84 years. The result shows that the mean 
value for age is 14.64 years at t-1. This is comparable with Douglas et al. ’s (2014) finding of 16.22 
noted in a sample of 31 New Zealand finance companies. 
The last Agency-related variable is media (MEDIA). The maximum value of media has a significant 
increase from 10 at t-3 and 6 at t-2 to 52 at t-1. The mean value also rose from 0.543 at t-2 to 
3.671 at t-1. The finding is supported by Dyck et al. (2010) whose study reported on fraud cases 
among the United States companies between 1996 and 2004. This study shows that media 
reported 10 of the 11 fraud cases in New Zealand. 
Table 5-1 shows that total equity to total asset (TE_TA), the first capital adequacy ratio, has a 
significant reduction in minimum value from -0.021 at t-3 to -307.52 at t-1, indicating the mean 
value for this variable also decreases from 0.201 at t-3 to -5.07 at t-1. It shows that total liability, 
which is outstanding loans to depositors, has a sudden increase and the company is in debt, 
resulting in a decrease in capital adequacy. Canbas et al. (2005) proved that a decrease in capital 
adequacy has a negative impact on the financial strength of the finance company and leads to a 
higher chance of default risk. Meanwhile, the minimum value for total asset to total liquidity 
(TA_TL) also drops from 0.979 at t-3 to -0.003 at t-1. In other word, the company’s total liability is 
about 300 times more than its total assets in the year prior to failure. As the company does not 
maintain any capital for risk exposure, the risk of insolvency is definite in the case of any losses on 
the company’s assets (Pilbeam, 2005).  
It is supported by the maximum value of gross loan and advances to total asset (GLOAN_TA) of 
0.992, which clearly explains that finance companies’ main assets consist of funds lend to third 
parties which makes up nearly 100% of finance companies’ asset base. Table 5-1 shows that the 
mean value of gross loans and advances to total assets is 0.718 for an average of three years, 
which is less than Kabir and Laswad’s (2014) figure of 0.83. They obtained this figure by analysing 




































In addition, the maximum value of impairment of assets to total assets (IMPAIR_TA) and doubtful 
debt to gross loans and advances (DOUBT_GLOAN) has a substantial increase from 0.086 and 
0.039 at t-3 to 0.253 and 0.121 at t-2 and 0.854 and 0.850 at t-1, respectively. As shown in Table 
5-1, the mean value of impairment of assets to total asset is 4.51 at t-1, and doubtful debts to 
gross loans and advances is 3.35 at t-1. It is lower than Kenyan banks. Ongore and Kusa (2013) 
studied 35 commercial banks from 2001 to 2010 and calculated 15.52 as the mean value of asset 
quality. The rise in impairment of assets and doubtful debts indicates poor asset loan quality and 
a heightened risk of insolvency.  
The range of operating expenses to operating revenue (OE_OR) is presented in Table 5-1. It 
ranges from zero to 59 at t-3, 0.174 to 39.44 at t-2 and 0.106 to 276.73 at t-1, indicating mean 
values of 1.99, 1.45 and 7.26 for the three years prior to failure, respectively. Although it has a 
small decrease of 20 at t-2, rather than t-3, it rises to 276.73 at t-1. Whereas, the trend of 
maximum value for operating expenses to total assets (OE_TA) has a gradual increase from 12.35 
at t-3 to 40.21 at t-2 and then to 67.52 at t-1. As these two ratios are representative of 
management quality, the trend demonstrates a backward efficiency among distressed finance 
companies.  
Net profit to total equity (NPAT_TE) is in the range of -2.107 to 1.685 at t-3 and expands to -2.890 
to 10.850 at t-1, indicating mean values of 0.22 and 0.45 at t-3 and t-1, respectively. Meanwhile, 
the range of net profit to total asset (NPAT_TA) is -0.055 to 0.482 at t-3 and enlarges to -309.35 
and 0.644 at t-1 with mean values of 0.034 and -6.44. In addition, net interest income to total 
assets (NETINT_TA) follows the same trend and expands from -0.098 and 12.35 at t-3 to -11.199 
and 21.414 at t-1. These three ratios evaluate the quality of earnings and show management 
efficiency in generating income from the company’s resources (Khrawish, 2011). The trend of 
minimum figures indicates that distressed financial companies incur substantial losses closer to 
the year of failure. However, interpreting net profit to total equity needs more detail to be 
precise. Increasing maximum value does not necessarily indicate management efficiency or 
reflect the good position of a company. A company can incur huge losses without maintaining any 
assets; therefore, as a numerator, a loss figure is negative while equity is a denominator. Hence, 
the total ratio is a positive figure. This can be confusing if it is not interpreted correctly. 
Therefore, an increase in net profits to total equity from 4 at t-2 to 10.850 at t-1 while minimum 
value reduces from -8.025 at t-2 to -2.890 at t-1 is not real. However, the average mean value of 
net profit to total equity and net profit to total assets is 24.00 and -21.17 respectively. These 
figures differ significantly from previous studies, particularly Ongore and Kusa’s (2013) work on 35 
Kenya commercial banks. They found mean values of 14.80 and 1.95 (Ongore and Kusa, 2013). 
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The current asset to total asset (CA_TA) ratio, with a minimum value of 0.043 at t-3, 0.026 at t-2 
and 0.036 at t-1 and a maximum value of one for each of the three years does not show any 
notable trend in the three years before failure. However, in general, the minimum values of all 
three years are very small and do not show sufficient liquidity in case of company losses. Net 
operating cash flow to total asset (OCF_TA) is another proxy for liquidity risk. This ratio ranges 
from -0.574 and 0.993 at t-3 and -42.974 and 6.576 at t-1, indicating mean values of 0.041 and -
0.516 at t-3 and t-1, respectively. The dramatic increase of -0.574 to -42.974 indicates inefficiency 
in managing operating activities, as operating expenses increase significantly, without any 
operating revenue. 
Asset size (LG.TA) which refers to company size, is in the range of $57,483.00 to 2,326,243,000.00 
at t-1. This range is between 1,038,978.00 and 2,048,568,000.00 at t-2. Minimum asset size shows 
a substantial reduction more than 981,000.00 from t-2 to t-1, which with knowledge of none of 
the company had a plan of downsizing; it explains the critical condition of the company. The loss 
of assets can be easily explained by high levels of impairment assets, doubtful debts and high 
operating expenses which are largely the results of inefficient management decisions. However, 
this study uses the natural log of asset size. 
5.5 Univariate Analysis 
This study firstly follows (Beaver, 1966) and uses univariate analysis to determine whether there 
are significant differences between key financial ratios and non-financial variables of failed and 
non-failed finance companies. The main tests compare whether there are differences between 
failed and non-failed companies in event time, where t is the year of failure (the non-failed 
company assumes the same t as the matched failed company). The objectives of this study 
include determining whether the proposed variables, analysed alone, might have an impact on 
financial institution failures before they are used in the model. As discussed earlier, financial 
variables are based on the CAMELS ratios and non-financial information based on Agency-related 
variables.  
The univariate tests used here are the t-test for the parametric variables and the Mann-Whitney 
U test for non-parametric variables. The variables are parametric (normally distributed) if the 
skewness in the descriptive analysis is in the range of -2 to +2 and the kurtosis is in the range of -4 
to +4, otherwise it is non-parametric. Additionally, the mean values are shown if the distribution 
is normal, and the median in the condition of non-normal distribution of data. Table 5.2 presents 
the results of the univariate tests. This test was run for all three time periods (t-3, t-2 and t-1) to 
provide more detail to ensure a better understanding. 
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As can be seen from the results in Table 5.2, the median value of total equity to total assets (TE-
TA) and total assets to total liability (TA-TL) in the failed companies are lower than healthy 
companies for the three years before failure. This difference is highly significant in the year prior 
to failure. Furthermore, the total liquidity to total equity (TL-TE) is higher in failed companies than 
non-failed ones. It shows high proportions of liability, which in finance companies means deposits 
are higher than the company’s equity. It is significantly high at t-2 (0.916), which is three times 
more than healthy companies (0.348) in the same year, whereas the median value of total assets 
to total liability is 1.125 and 1.192 for failed and non-failed companies, respectively. This suggests 
that the failed companies retain lower levels of capital than non-failed companies. 
The results do not show any remarkable difference in asset quality between failed and non-failed 
companies. However, the median value of impairment of assets to total assets (IMPAIR-TA) is 
slightly higher among non-failed companies, for each of the three years. The difference is 
significant between two groups at t-3 (significant at the 1% level). For finance companies, assets 
are loans made, while impairment of assets refers to written-off loans. The higher impairment of 
assets is, the lower the quality of assets is. As Grier (2007) notes that poor asset quality is one of 
the main reasons most banks fail. 
The median value of operating expenses to total assets (OE-TA) is significantly different at t-3 and 
t-2 among these two groups of companies (Table 5-2). However, it is interesting to note that the 
ratio is higher for non-failed companies in comparison with failed companies. In this case, by 
checking the net profit after tax to total equity (NPAT-TE) for t-3 and t-2, it is obvious that even if 
operating expenses are higher in healthy companies, the net profit to total equity is also higher, 
and companies could generate more profit than failed companies. In addition, operating 
expenses to operating revenue (OE-OR) is higher in failed companies than in healthy companies in 
the last two years before failure, indicating that failed companies have incurred more expenses 
and have generated less revenue compare to non-failed companies. Failed companies have 
significantly higher (NPAT-TE) than healthy companies in last year before failure. By looking at 
mean values of (TL-TE) as explained earlier, it is clear that failed companies have a very high 
proportion of liability as opposed to equity. On average, the mean value of (TL-TE) is twice for 
failed companies compared to non-failed companies. Management quality ratios presented in 
Table 5.2 show that the failed companies perform well. However, when this is viewed in 
conjunction with capital adequacy ratios, true performance is revealed.  
The ratio of net profit after tax, before abnormal to total assets (NPAT-TA) is higher in non-failed 
companies at t-2 and substantially higher at t-1 before failure. Additionally, net interest income to 
total assets (NETINT-TA) is also higher among healthy companies during each of the three years 
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separately, but it is only significant at t-3. These results show the better quality of earning among 
healthy companies. 
The liquidity ratio results included in Table 5-2 are similar between the two groups. However, 
company size is significantly different between two groups a year prior to failure. This suggests 
that failed companies have smaller asset size compared to healthy companies. This result is in line 
with the concept of ‘too big to fail.’ 
Overall, the results support the first objective and suggest that investors could have been able to 
infer from published financial information that finance companies were likely to fail up to three 
years earlier. However, as it is not clear that all of the ratios of finance companies suggest a 
higher risk, it is better to consider all of the ratios collectively. 
The board composition variable results are similar at t-2 and t-1 for both groups. However, the 
board of director changes (DIRCHG), director appointed (DIRAPNT) and director resigned 
(DIRRSG) differ in failed and non-failed companies at t-3 (significant at the 1% level).  
As shown in Table 5-2, among the Agency-related variables, the mean and median values of 
related party transaction to total assets (RELAT-TA) and related party transaction to total loans 
and advances (RELAT-GLOAN) are higher in failed companies up to three years before failure. For 
instance, the mean values of (RELAT-TA) and (RELAT-GLOAN) are 0.042 and 0.196 for failed 
companies relative to 0.003 and 0.143 for healthy ones at t-1, respectively.  
The audit big (BIGN) variable is significant during the three years, which reveals that non-failed 
companies have chosen Big 4 as their auditor more than failed companies. Meanwhile, the failed 
companies received more audit modification reports (MODIFIED) than healthy companies a year 
prior to failure. However, only one finance company received qualified reports, and 17 companies 
received unqualified reports with ‘fundamental uncertainties’ or ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraphs 
in their audit report. The audit remuneration (AUDREM) and the number of days between the 
end of the financial year and the auditor sign-off date are similar for both failed and non-failed 
groups. 
The test demonstrates the mean value of having one of the three trusts (X, Y and Z as explained in 
the Chapter Three) as the company trustee is higher among failed companies than non-failed 
companies at t-1. As no changes in trustee company has been observed in the sample test, the 
significant differences in trusteeship remain at t-2 and t-3. Hence, trusteeship can play an 
important role in trustee characteristics. In addition, failed companies had more changes in their 
trust deeds a year prior to failure than non-failed companies. The result is in line with Wilson et 
al. (2013) who claim that even though the trustee was aware of breaches in terms and conditions, 
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they agreed to amend definitions in the trust deed to match the company’s condition. 
Consequently, failed finance companies have different trustee characteristics in relation to 
healthy companies. 
Differences in firm maturity (AGE), or the years from inception to data collection, are obvious 
among failed and healthy groups. As indicated in the literature, the risk of failure is higher among 
young companies. The median value of healthy companies is nearly twice that of failed 
companies. This finding is similar to Douglas et al.’s (2014) who concluded that healthy companies 
are more mature than failed companies. As Caudill et al. (2009) and Kyereboah‐Coleman and  
Osei (2008) note, aged companies monitor their spending efficiently and concentrate on 
increasing profitability and financial sustainability (Nurmakhanova et al., 2015). 
 As the last Agency-related variable, media has similar results for failed and non-failed companies. 
The number of published reports about the finance companies, regardless of positive or negative 
news, is the same for both failed and non-failed companies. The result indicates that media in 
New Zealand have not played an effective monitoring role in relation to local finance companies.  
In summary, the univariate statistics based on the t-test and the Mann Whitney U test provide 
preliminary results which suggest that both financial and non-financial variables have 




























Table 5-3 to 5-6 present pairwise correlation matrixes of the explanatory variables through 
Spearman’s rank correlations; this appropriate for nonparametric variables. Knowledge of 
correlations is useful for model development because a high correlation between two important 
variables could be the reason why only one of the variables should be included in the model. As 
the models are tested in years t-1, t-2, t-3 and the combined three years, the correlations are 
tested separately for each time. In the case of highly correlated variables, both of them are tested 
separately in the model, and the variable with a better result is used in the models while the 
other one is excluded. 
The existence of a strong correlation between independent variables is tested using the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF). Correlation coefficients greater than 0.85 between two variables will result 
in multicollinearity problems. This is when both of the variables are entered into the regression 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2011).  
At t-1, the ratio of related party transaction to total assets is correlated with the ratio of the 
related party transactions to gross loans and advances at 0.979**. Table 5-3 shows that total 
assets to total liability and total equity to total assets are highly correlated at 1.00**and net 
operating cash flow to total assets is correlated with operating expenses to operating revenue at -
0.864**. Therefore, the ratios of related party transactions to gross loans and advances, total 
equity to total assets and operating expenses to operating revenue are eliminated from model 
development at t-1. 
Related party transactions to total assets is again correlated with related party transactions to 
gross loans and advances at 0.959** at t-2. Moreover, total assets to total liability and total 
equity to total assets are highly correlated at 0.955**. GDP and OCR variables are correlated at 
0.885** and Inflation and HPI at 0.863** (Table 5-4). Hence, related party transactions to gross 
loans and advances, total equity to total assets and OCR and HPI were removed from the t-2 
model. 
The related party transactions to gross loans and advances, total equity to total assets ratios and 
OCR were eliminated at t-3 due to high correlation with related party transactions to total assets, 
total assets to total liability and GDP at 0.981**, 0.998** and 0.888**, respectively (Table 5-5). 
Table 5-6 shows that the ratio of related party transactions to total assets is correlated at 0.972** 
with related party transactions to gross loans and advances in combined data for three years 
before failure. Likewise, total assets to total liability and total equity to total assets are highly 
correlated at 0.985**. 
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Most of the independent variables are less than 0.5 which is considered to be a low correlation 








































































































5.7 Logistic Regression Analysis 
Binary logistic regression models are the first group of models employed to investigate the 
likelihood of failure among financial companies. As required by this model, institutions classified 
as failed were assigned a value of one or zero otherwise. The models were formed based on three 
different variable groups while using three different time intervention. The first model 
incorporates only CAMELS variables, whereas the second model uses Agency-related variables. 
CAMELS and Agency-related variables were integrated to form the third model. In addition to the 
above variables, four macroeconomic indicators of; Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Inflation, 
Official Cash Rate (OCR) and House Price Interest Rate (HPI) were included in all of the models.  
Since the logistic estimates were obtained using maximum likelihood estimates, a log likelihood 
statistic was used to assess model fit. In addition, Nagelkerke R Square (also called “Psedu R2”) 
indicates the number of observations in the sample that an estimated equation classifies 
correctly. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit is also another way to measure an overall fit 
and was used to test the null hypothesis that the model fits the data. The results are discussed in 
the following sections. 
5.7.1 CAMELS Variables and Failure  
Table 5-7 presents the result estimates for the first model. It only includes financial variables at 
one (t-1), two (t-2) and three (t-3) years prior to failure. The results show that TA-TL, TL-TE, OE-TA 
and TA are statistically significant from three years prior to failure, which suggest that they are 
efficient predictors of the probability of failure in finance companies. Moreover, three more 
regressors (IMPAIR-TA, NETINT-TA and OCT-TA) are statistically significant at 1% - 5% levels at t-2, 
or two years before companies fail. The IMPAIR-TA regressor retains its statistical significance at 
10% at t-3. In addition, OE-OR, NPAT-TE and NPAT-TA are significant at t-3. The fact that most of 
the variables in Model 1 especially at t-2 and t-3 are significant suggests that the financial ratios 
possess a high degree of discriminatory power and prediction capability.  
Furthermore, as shown in Table 5-7, the TA-TL coefficient is about 0.033 for three years. Although 
this ratio is statistically significant, the small coefficient amount makes the ratio economically 
insignificant. On the contrary, the TL-TE coefficient is between 2.75 to 3.97 for three years. The 
higher the ratio, the higher the probability of failure. High levels of liability as opposed to equity 
shows low capital adequacy. The results are consistent with the univariate test results that were 




Table ‎5-7 Model 1 



























































































































MDL chi-square 45.039*** 44.969*** 55.788*** 
-2 LL 49.170 50.671 38.421 
H&L 5.767 4.159 5.373 
NagR
2







                        Number in parentheses is Wald Chi-square 
                           *Significant at the 0.10 level 
                           **Significant at the 0.05 level 
                           ***Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
In addition, the high ratio of 48.52 for IMPAIR-TA in year two and a significantly high ratio of 
101.66 for year three before failure demonstrate a high level of impairment assets relative to 
total assets. This shows the low quality of assets and the high probability of failure. The negative 
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ratio sign of OE-TA, which represents a measure of the financial institution’s management 
competency, suggests that higher levels of operating expenses relative to total assets equal lower 
management performance. This ultimately indicates a higher probability of failing. Similarly, 
NPAT-TA and NETINT-TA signs reveal that the higher the earnings of the company, the lower the 
likelihood of failure. The OCF-TA also displays an anticipated negative sign. This indicates that the 
higher the proportion of net operating cash flow to total assets results in higher liquidity and 
hence a lower probability of failure. Meanwhile, total assets (which represents the size of the 
company), with a maximum estimated coefficient of -3.611 at t-3, suggests that size has a reverse 
impact on the likelihood of failure, meaning that failed companies have lower asset sizes. 
The overall fit statistics (or log likelihood tests) are all significant. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test 
indicates that the model is a good enough fit and the model is a valid representation of the data. 
Models 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 explain 64.6%, 63.9% and 74.7% of the variation in the data, respectively. 
5.7.2 Agency-related Variables and Failure 
The resulting estimates for the second model that incorporates only Agency-related variables at 
one (t-1), two (t-2) and three (t-3) years prior to failure are depicted in Table 5-8. The negative 
sign of BIGN, which represents audit quality, or whether choosing a Big 4 auditor has an impact 
on failure or not, suggests that finance companies who select any audit company except for a Big 
4 one increase their probability of failure. In other word, large auditors (Big 4) enhance the quality 
of audit and reduce the likelihood of failure. As the regressor retains its statistical significant at 
5% during three years before failure, it is an efficient predictor of the probability of failure. Audit 
modification (MODIFIED) is significant at a 1% level at t-1. The positive sign explains that finance 
companies which received a going-concern opinion or fundamental uncertainties in their audit 
report a have a higher likelihood of failure. Furthermore, TRUSTEE, which is given a value of one if 
one of the three specified trustees supervises the finance company and zero otherwise, is 
significant at 5% at t-1. It holds the significant level at t-2 with a positive sign for both years, 
which means that having one of the three specified trustees as a supervisor increases the risk of 
failure.  
As explained earlier in section 4.3.2, four macroeconomic variables are used in the model. The 
macroeconomic variables, INFLAT, HPI and OCR are significant at 5% at t-1. The estimated 
coefficient of 2.822 for INFLAT with positive sign indicates that inflation increases costs and 
reduces finance companies’ profitability which results in a higher likelihood of failure. In addition, 
HPI indicates the increase in home loan interest rate, increase the probability of failure. In 
contrast, OCR with a negative sign shows the reverse impact of this variable on failure. When the 
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official cash rate reduces, finance companies increase risk-taking. This leads to a higher 
probability of failure.  
Table ‎5-8 Model 2 



























































































































MDL chi-square 47.849*** 24.623* 24.716* 
-2 LL 49.192 72.418 72.325 
H&L 5.425 9.998 8.749 
NagR
2
 0.660 0.395 .397 
Total class% 82.90 80.00 71.40 
                  Number in parentheses is Wald Chi-square 
                                  *Significant at the 0.10 level 
                                  **Significant at the 0.05 level 




At t-1, the model, with Chi-square significance at 1% level and a total classification of 82.90%, 
shows the best result among Agency-related models. However, based on Hosmer-Lemeshow 
tests, all of the models are a good fit for the data and they seem to be a valid demonstration of 
the data. Models 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3 explain 66%, 39.50% and 39.7% of the variation in the data, 
respectively. 
CAMELS and Agency-related Variables and Failure 
Table 5-9 reports the logistic regression of the financial fail indicator results with the integration 
of both CAMELS and Agency-related variables. Due to the high number of variables in this 
category, macroeconomic and financial variable inserted in the model and Agency-related 
information was entered using the forward stepwise method.  
TA-TL and TL-TE ratios, as measurements for capital adequacy, were significant over the three 
years of study, retaining a significance level of 5%. This shows that they have a high power of 
prediction. However, IMPAIR-TA, with a positive estimated coefficient of 40.843, is significant at 
10% at t-2. This ratio represents assets quality and shows the higher the proportion of 
impairment assets, the lower the quality of asset. As the majority of finance company assets are 
loans and advances, the lower the quality of asset, the greater the likelihood of failure.  
OE-OR and OE-TA, the management competency variables, are statistically significant at t-3. With 
a positive estimated coefficient of 8.676 at t-3, OE-OR suggests that the higher the proportion of 
operating expenses relative to operating revenue, the lower the management performance and 
the higher probability of failure. Moreover, OE-TA with an estimated coefficient of -3.648 at t-2 
and -66.148 at t-3, explains that higher levels of operating expenses relative to total assets 
increase the possibility of failure. The negative sign of NETINT-TA reveals that the higher the 
company’s interest income, the lower the likelihood of failure. Although failed companies have 
higher profitability (NPAT-TA), with an estimated coefficient of 19.347, the OCF-TA displays a 
lower cash flow which suggests accrual earnings management. OCF-TA, which denotes a measure 
of liquidity, shows a significant reverse relationship between liquidity and failure at t-2. In other 
word, the lower liquidity is, the higher the probability of failure. 
Meanwhile, NPAT-TE is statistically significant with a positive sign at t-3, but the NPAT-TA and 
NETINT-TA coefficients with -27.352 and -31.399 explain the low earnings of institutions. The 
positive sign of NPAT-TE suggests the negative sign of equity which means that equity is in debt. 
Total asset is a proxy for company size. With an estimated coefficient of -5.703 at t-3, it suggests 
that size has a reverse impact on the likelihood of failure. In short, smaller size companies have a 
higher chance of failure. 
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BIGN is statistically significant and retains its significance at 5% during the three years before 
failure. This suggests that it is an efficient predictor of the probability of failure among finance 
companies.  
Table ‎5-9 Model 3 









































    -47.163*** 
(7.274) 
 
TA   
-5.703* 
(3.698) 































MDL chi-square 53.824*** 49.536*** 69.972*** 
-2 LL 40.386 46.104 24.238 
H&L 2.408 4.235 2.461 
NagR
2
 0.729 0.683 0.857 
Total class% 85.30 87.00 89.70 
 
             Number in parentheses is Wald Chi-square 
                             *Significant at the 0.10 level 
                              **Significant at the 0.05 level 
                              ***Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
While similar to the results of the non-financial model, TRUSTEE, INFLAT and OCR are significant 
at t-1. Although INFLAT is significant with a positive sign (3.064) at t-1, which shows that high 
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inflation increases costs and reduces profit and results in a higher chance of failure, this variable 
is negatively significant with an estimated coefficient of -13.108 at t-3. Simpasa (2010) claims that 
the inflation rate has a direct impact on bank power, meaning that growth in the inflation rate 
increases loan prices which leads to higher profitability and decreases the risk of failure. 
The overall fit statistics (or log likelihood tests) are all significant. Under the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
tests, the null hypothesis is accepted. The models are a valid representation of the data. 
Meanwhile, the NagR2 and total classifications of this model is higher than both the financial and 
non-financial models. Models 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3 explain 72.9%, 68.3% and 85.7% of the variation in 
the data, respectively. 
5.8 Hazard Model  
The hazard model results are presented in Table 5-10. As the second model in this study, the 
hazard model incorporates panel data from three consecutive years before failure. The hazard 
model is similar to logistic regression reruns – it contains on three different groups of variables to 
build three models. The first model only uses CAMELS variables (Model 4). The second model 
uses only Agency-related variables (Model 5). The third model includes both CAMELS and Agency-
related variables (Model 6). In addition to the above variables, four macroeconomic indicators, 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Inflation (INFLAT), the Official Cash Rate (OCR) and House Price 
Interest Rate (HPI) are included in all of the models. The forward stepwise method (or likelihood 
ratio) is used to run Model 6 as it combines CAMELS and Agency-related variables. 
As per Model 4, TL-TE and IMPAIR-TA are statistically significant at 10%. The positive sign of TL-TE, 
which represents a finance company’s capital adequacy, suggests that higher levels of liability in 
relation to equity results in lower capital adequacy and a higher probability of failure. Meanwhile, 
IMPAIR-TA shows the high impairment loss which results in low asset quality and a higher 
likelihood of failure.  
As presented in Table 5-10, among the non-financial variables in Model 5, BIGN, MODIFIED and 
AMENDED are statistically significant at 5% and TRUSTEE is significant at 10%. The negative sign 
of BIGN confirms that having a Big 4 as an auditor reduces the probability of failure. The positive 
sign of TRUSTEE reveals that the chance of failure increases if one of the three main trustee 
companies holds a supervision role in the finance company. Audit modified, with a positive sign, 
indicates that failed companies received more modifications in their audit reports compared to 
healthy companies. Additionally, significant audit modifications reveals that even though trustees 
were aware of breaches, they agreed to amend definitions in trust deeds - like changing the 
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definition of related party transactions (Wilson et al., 2013). Therefore, the probability of a trust 
deed amendment is higher close to failure. 
As a measurement of management performance, OE-TA is statistically significant at a 5% level 
when the financial and non-financial variables are integrated into the model (Model 6). The OE-TA 
coefficient estimate displays a negative sign which indicates higher operating expenses to total 
assets. This suggests lower levels of management performance and a higher likelihood of failure. 
OCF-TA, which represents a financial company’s liquidity level, shows a significant reverse 
relationship between liquidity and failure. In other words, the lower the liquidity is, the higher the 
probability of failure. Total assets, which represents the company’s size, with an estimated 
coefficient of -0.874, suggests that size has a reverse impact on the likelihood of failure. This 
means that smaller sized companies have a higher chance of failure. 
 As for non-financial variables, BIGN and AMENDED retain their statistical significance. This 
suggests that they are efficient predictors of the probability of failure among finance companies. 
Table ‎5-10 Hazard Model 
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   1.746*** 
(9.184) 
   -1.750*** 
(6.303) 
MDL chi-square     57.262***    73.929***   78.599*** 
-2 LL 130.126 115.306 108.789 
H&L 8.958 4.535 1.871 
NagR
2
 0.407 0.500 0.532 




5.9 Model Evaluation 
Model validation is an important step to evaluate both pieces of training sample and out-of-
sample results. The results are provided in Table 5-11. The predictive power of the models was 
tested on 35 failed companies and 35 healthy companies as training samples. The study also 
included three failed companies and three healthy companies which failed after 2010, as an out-
of-sample group. The coefficients of the fitted models are used to classify the out-of-sample 
results (Hosmer Jr, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant, 2013). The validation test assesses the accuracy of 
the models to discriminate between Fail and Healthy defaults in practice. The classification 
accuracy of all the models is summarised in Table 5-11. The table reports the predictive 
performance of the training sample and the out-of-sample or test sample. This classification table 
not only provides information about the accuracy of the model in predicting failure but also 
reflects embedded uncertainties in the model by Type I and Type II error. 


















Model 1-1 18.92% 16.13% 82.40% 
 
40.00% 0.00% 66.67% 
Model 1-2 20.00% 10.34% 84.10% 
 
25.00% 0.00% 83.33% 
Model 1-3 16.67% 15.63% 83.80% 
 
33.33% 33.33% 66.67% 
   
 
    Model 2-1 18.92% 15.15% 82.90% 
 
40.00% 0.00% 66.67% 
Model 2-2 21.62% 18.18% 80.00% 
 
25.00% 0.00% 83.33% 
Model 2-3 29.73% 27.27% 71.40% 
 
40.00% 0.00% 66.67% 
   
 
    Model 3-1 14.29% 15.15% 85.30% 
 
40.00% 0.00% 66.67% 
Model 3-2 13.89% 12.12% 87.00% 
 
25.00% 0.00% 83.33% 
Model 3-3 11.11% 9.38% 89.70% 
 
33.33% 33.33% 66.67% 
        Model 4 17.65% 11.17% 88.30% 
 
25.00% 42.86% 61.11% 
Model 5 29.17% 9.68% 88.10% 
 
41.67% 33.33% 61.11% 
Model 6 17.39% 8.79% 90.20%   33.33% 16.67% 72.22% 
         
As can be seen in Table 5-11, the overall accuracy of Model 2, which included only non-financial 
variables, is between 71.40% at t-3 to 82.90% at t-1 among training sample. This accuracy level is 
lower than other logistic models for financial variables and the combination of financial and non-
financial variables. It confirms that non-financial variables are not sufficient and reliable enough 
on their own for prediction purposes. The in-sample classification of Model 1, which is based on 
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financial variables, shows enhancement in the overall accuracy performance. At t-2, this Model 
with an overall accuracy of 84.10% and the lowest type II error of 10.34%, has the best results in 
comparison with t-1 and t-3. However, the results show that Model 3, with the integration of 
financial and non-financial variables, has a significantly higher performance level, especially 
during the t-3 period, with correct classification of 89.70% and the lowest percentage of 11.11% 
and 9.38% for Type I and Type II errors respectively. Moreover, at t-2, this Model indicates better 
results with total accuracy of 87.00% and type II error of 12.12%.  
Models 4, 5, and 6 which use a hazard model, are superior in discriminating between failed and 
healthy companies. Model 4, which included only financial variables correctly classifies 88.30% of 
the training sample and is better than logistic Model 1 for financial variables during the three 
years before failure. While classifying 88.10% of failed and healthy companies correctly, Model 5 
performs better than Model 2 for non-financial variables. Model 6 has the highest accuracy of 
90.20% overall and the lowest Type II error of 8.79%. It is thus the best model for predicting 
failure among financial companies. 
Regarding out-of-sample performance, all of the logistic models at t-2 have the best performing 
results. The highest correct classification of 83.30% for Models 1, 2 and 3 at t=2, with the lowest 
percent (25%) for Type I errors and zero percentage of Type II errors are superior in discriminating 
between Failed and Healthy companies.  
At t=1, all of the models correctly classify 66.67% of the out-of-sample failures. They show a 
similar rate of misclassification (40.00% for false positive and zero percent of false negative). They 
do not show any Type II misclassifications. There is a 40% chance for Type I errors for financial, 
non-financial and a combination of both groups of variables at t-1. This is the highest error rate 
among the logistic models. At t=3, Model 1 and Model 3 have the same overall classification of 
66.67% with Type I and Type II errors equal to 33.33%. This indicates that both of these models 
are worse in terms of predicting true defaults. These models are the only models with Type II 
errors among logistic models. 
Of the hazard models, with an overall accuracy of 72.22% and Type I errors of 33.33% and 16.67% 
Type II errors, Model 6 provides the best predictor of out-of-sample failures. 
The overall results of the classification matrix indicate that Model 6 and 3-3 which were 
developed based on financial and non-financial variables are the best performing models for in-
sample data. These models perform better than the rest of the models in terms of correct 
classification. In addition, these models have the lowest Type II errors (of 8.79% and 9.38% 
respectively). In term of out-of-sample, Models 6 and 3-2 perform the best with highest overall 
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classification. Although Model 2-2 has the same level of accuracy as Model 3-2, it is not reliable to 
predict failure solely based on non-financial information. In addition, even though Model 1-2 also 
has the same level of accuracy, Model 3-2 has higher in-sample performance and thus beats 
Model 1-2. 
As explained earlier, error tables show the accuracy of the model for a single cut-off point which, 
in this study, is 0.5. AUC, Gini, KS and H measures are used to measure the discriminant power of 
the models in this study.  
The predictive accuracy based on the AUC, Gini, KS and H statistics shows different results from 
different preference. Table 5-12 displays the summary of all four measurements for all the 
models. Figure 5-1 presents the contrast more clearly. 
In the first comparison, of models in group 1 and models in group 2, the results show the overall 
classification accuracy of Model 1 (with financial variables), is better than Model 2 (with non-
financial variables). The Gini coefficients for Models 1-2 and 1-3 are 0.75 and 0.76 at t-2 and t-3 
compared to 0.66 and 0.63 in Models 2-2 and 2-3 in the same timeframe. However, the Gini and 
AUC coefficients at t-1 in Model 2 are slightly better than Model 1 which is in line with the results 
of the error table.  
The Gini increases from 0.80 to 0.88 at t-1 and from 0.76 to 0.95 at t-3 when non-financial 
variables are added to the financial variables in Model 1. In addition, KS has a larger maximum 
distance between the cumulative healthy companies’ score and fails’ score in Model 3-3 (0.85) 
which leads to larger Gini coefficients. The AUC, Gini and KS show the superior classification 
accuracy of Model 3 at t-3 in comparison to the other logistic models. 
Opposed to the accuracy of the hazard model in the error table, the discriminant power of this 
model is inferior when compared to Model 3. The Gini coefficient and KS of Model 6 is (0.95-0.74 
= 0.21) and (0.85-0.61 = 0.24) are less than Model 3-3 respectively. 
On the other hand, by assuming the same H cost distribution (cost weight), the performance of 
Model 3 at three years before failure is 0.82, while the hazard model is 0.33. Therefore, 
concerning the H measure, once again, Model 3 (which integrates financial and non-financial 






Table ‎5-12 Predictive Accuracy 
 
 
Overall, the performance of the logit model with financial variables is better than the 
performance of the logit model with only non-financial variables. However, the logit model that 
combines both the financial and non-financial variables outperforms the models which only use 
one group of variables. In general, the discriminative power of the hazard model, as opposed to 
the error table, is weaker than the logit models. 
The discriminant power of out-of-sample results is not reliable due to the small sample size. The 
study only includes three failed companies and three healthy companies.  
 
 




This chapter has provided detailed information about the process of data analysis and described 
the study’s main findings. It has included information on data mining and missing data. It has 
discussed each of the descriptive statistics and variables used in this study. The chapter has 
provided a summary of the univariate analysis, which has been used to compare the mean and 
median value through student t-test for all of the parametric variables. It has also explained the 
Mann-Whitney U test which has been used to check the non-parametric variables. This chapter 
has explained the processes of correlation analysis and Spearman’s rank correlations, which have 
been used to assess the nonparametric variables and panel data for three years. The chapter has 
provided a detailed discussion of the logistic regression and hazard model results and the specific 
variables that contribute to the successful prediction of failure. It concluded by outlining the 
methods used to test the models’ discriminative power.  
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Having explained the data analysis and finding, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the whole study. 
It begins with an overview of the study and is followed by Section 6.2, which presents a detailed 
discussion of the results. It provides a summary of the findings, which highlights conclusions 
drawn from the analysis undertaken. The chapter concludes by outlining the study’s limitations 
and suggesting avenues for future research.  
6.2 Overview of the Study 
In New Zealand, the number of finance companies, especially the number of non-bank deposit 
takers increased rapidly, between 2000 and 2007 (Commerce Committee, 2011). After 2004, 
banks extended their credit lending into the property sector. This means that finance companies’ 
coverage shifted to the riskier territory, including second-hand cars and consumer purchases. The 
lack of an efficient regulatory system and prudential supervision led to the failure of over 31 
finance companies during a four year period, between 2006 and 2009. It was a huge shock to the 
New Zealand market, with an estimated loss of more than NZ$3 billion (Commerce Committee, 
2011). These collapses affected around 150,000 and 200,000 investors (Douglas et al., 2014). 
Following the failure of these finance companies, scholars sought to determine the causes and 
attribute blame (Kabir and Laswad, 2014; Yahanpath and Cavanagh, 2011). While some scholars 
reviewed the New Zealand banking regulations (Tripe, 2012; Wilson, 2009) others focused on 
individual factors like related party transactions (Bhuiyan and Roudaki, 2018; Wu and Malthus, 
2012), impairment assets (Kabir and Laswad, 2014) or audit failures (Kabir, Su, and Rahman, 
2016). What has remained largely unexplored in these studies is how investors could have 
determined the risk of investing in these companies, prior to failure.  
The primary aim of this study was to determine the underlining variables that contributed to the 
failure of finance companies. The material was sourced for three years prior to the finance 
companies’ failures. The data has been used to determine the best model for predicting failure.  
The first group of variables used in this study are the CAMELS variables or the financial ratios used 
to measure capital adequacy, asset quality, management competency, earnings, liquidity and size. 
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Each of the six elements of financial soundness indicators plays a different role in the stability 
assessment. As the first indicator, capital adequacy is used to measure a financial institution’s 
capacity to maintain sufficient levels of capital to absorb any losses (Pilbeam, 2005). As the risk of 
failure often arises from impairment of assets, the quality of asset portfolios is measured with 
asset quality ratios (Grier, 2007). Management quality is used to evaluate management’s ability 
to ensure the efficiency and stability of the company. The next indicator is earning quality. This 
not only reflects the business’ ability to generate profit but also may influence earning 
sustainability (Dang, 2011). The bank’s capacity to fulfil its obligations is measured by liquidity. 
Size of the finance company is the last financial variable in this group. 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) explain that it is not advisable to rely just on financial information 
when predicting failure as it is vulnerable to manipulation. The introduction of non-financial 
information can offset the risk of manipulation. Therefore, this study included certain aspects of 
Agency-related information, like board characteristics, related party transaction, audit quality, 
trusteeship, firm age and media. The board of directors has two key responsibilities; advising and 
monitoring (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Previous literature has discussed the board of directors in 
terms of the relationship between board size (the number of members) and firm performance 
(Dalton and Dalton, 2005; Guest, 2009). Although Kyereboah‐Coleman and Osei (2008) argue that 
a higher number of directors provides more alternative forms of leadership and lessens the 
probability of CEO authority (Bassem, 2009), Pathan et al. (2007) state that smaller boards of 
directors are more effective in monitoring managers and increase firm profitability. Thrikawala 
(2016) contends that the optimal board size is dependent on the board’s specific responsibilities 
and the company’s strategic direction.  
The other aspect of non-financial information is related party transactions. Non-disclosure or 
incorrect disclosure of related party transactions in financial reporting can significantly misstate 
the financial position and performance of the company. Misleading investors about related party 
transactions is management fraud and is often hard to detect (Wu and Malthus, 2012). It is, 
therefore, one of the key factors identified by accounting standards and a key focus of new 
regulation.  
Another aspect of agency information is auditing, which plays a key role in protecting investors 
and ensuring the credibility of financial statements. Auditors assess the entity’s going-concern 
ability based on financial information and management plans. A modified audit report works as a 
‘red flag,’ and is associated with a higher chance of failure (Carson et al., 2013). As a proxy for 
audit quality, audit fees are also important and are considered in this study (Francis, 2004). 
Francis and Yu (2009) found that large auditors like the Big 4 are more likely to issue going-
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concern reports because larger audit firms suffer a higher reputational loss from inaccurate 
reporting. Furthermore, a longer lag between the end of the financial year and the audit sign-off 
date could suggest negotiation between the auditor and company, or indicate more work 
involved in uncovering financial irregularities (DeFond et al., 2002). Therefore, in this study, audit 
reports, audit fees, audit size and audit lags have all been considered as aspects of audit quality. 
Trustees play an important supervision role in New Zealand, as the Reserve Bank delegated the 
surveillance of NBDTs to trustee companies. They have a fiduciary duty to ensure that prudential 
requirements are included in trust deeds (Wu and Malthus, 2012). Therefore, the Reserve Bank 
relies on trustees to report any instances of non-compliance, including breaches of trust deeds’ 
terms and conditions. Thus, trust is another Agency-related variable included in this study. 
Dyck et al. (2010) state that failure prediction relies not only on corporate governance, like 
auditors and trustees as internal supervisors but also on several non-traditional, external players, 
like media. As Miller (2006) explains, the press has exposed many fraudulent schemes. This study, 
therefore, considers the press coverage of failure serves to shed lights on the underlying public’s 
view. 
Agrawal and  Gort (2002) found that mature companies have more experience and knowledge 
gained over time. Maturity creates a reputation and builds faith among investors. However, 
maturity can also lead to rigidity, inactivity and a reluctance to change (Loderer and Waelchli, 
2010) which ultimately diminish a company’s performance and may cause them to fail. Thus, this 
study also included firm maturity as an Agency-related variable. 
Macroeconomic variables (Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, the Official Cash Rate and the 
House Price Interest Rate) were also included in this study.  
The study used a sample of 35 failed financial companies (between 2006 and 2010) which were 
uniquely matched based on asset size, with the same number of healthy finance companies. Data 
were collected for three consecutive years before failure and matched with healthy companies’ 
data for the same period.  
Logit and hazard models were used to identify the most suitable model for prediction. This study 
focused on predicting the probability of failure by using as many variables as possible. In order to 
avoid the problem of overfitting, the developed models were based on three different variable 
categories. The first model incorporated only CAMELS financial variables. The second model used 
only Agency-related variables. The third model included both CAMELS and non-financial variables. 
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The study tested the accuracy of these models using out-of-sample data collected from financial 
institutions which failed after 2010 (new regulations were implemented in 2009). Error tables, 
AUC, Gini, KS and H measures were used to assess the models’ performances. 
6.3 Discussion of the Results 
The study examined three main research questions and nine sub-questions using univariate 
analysis, nine logistic models and three hazard models. Models 1-1, 1-2, 1-3 and Model 4 included 
only financial variables to test whether CAMELS-based ratios can predict failure or not. The 
second group of models (2-1, 2-2, 2-3 and Model 5) were created based solely on Agency-related 
information to test whether Agency-related information alone can predict failure. Models 3-1, 3-
2, 3-3 and Model 6 were constructed based on combined financial and non-financial information 
to test whether the integration of the two groups of variables can predict failure among New 
Zealand finance companies.  
6.3.1 CAMELS-based Ratios 
CAMELS rating ratios underpin the financial ratios in this study. As the first indicator, capital 
adequacy has four proxies in this study. Total equity to total assets (TE-TA) was highly correlated 
with total assets to total liquidity (TA-TL) and eliminated from the models. TA-TL and total liability 
to total equity (TL-TE) were found to be statistically significant and retained their significant levels 
in logistic models over the three years before failure. In addition, TL-TE was also found to be 
significant in the hazard model. The results were consistent with the outcomes from the 
univariate analysis. Although the z-score for TA-TL was only significant at t-1, the median value of 
TA-TL is always higher in healthy companies. 
Moreover, the mean value of TL-TE was nearly three times more among failed companies during 
the three years prior to failure even though the t-stat was only significant at t-2. Dang (2011) 
declares that sufficient capital levels balance credit risks and market risk exposure. It ensures that 
institutions can weather any losses during periods of crisis (Ongore and Kusa, 2013; Pilbeam, 
2005). Capital adequacy ratios suggest that failed companies have lower capital relative to 
healthy companies. This argument is in line with CAMELS theory. The outcome is also in line with 
previous research which argues that capital adequacy significantly affects commercial banks 
performance in Kenya and the United States (Ongore and Kusa, 2013; Cox et al., 2017). The result 
is similar to Douglas et al.'s (2014) findings which showed failed companies have worse capital 
adequacy than non-failed ones among New Zealand finance companies. 
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Loan and advances are a financial company’s main assets. A company’s loan portfolio quality 
determines the profitability and performance of the company. Hence, finance companies’ 
greatest risk comes from unpaid loans (Dang, 2011). The results show that impairment assets to 
total assets (IMPAIR-TA) were statistically significant at t-2 and t-3 in the logistic regression 
models and also in the hazard model. The high estimated coefficient of 101.660 at t-3 
demonstrates a high proportion of impairment assets to total assets among failed companies. 
Additionally, the univariate test shows significant z-score at t-3, indicating a significant difference 
in the median value of failed and non-failed companies. Therefore, the results show a high 
portion of nonperforming loans among failed companies, demonstrating low quality asset and 
consequently low company performance which is in line with CAMELS theory. The result is 
supported by King, Nuxoll, and Yeager (2006) who explain that asset quality is lower for failed 
banks. Moreover, Sangmi and Tabassum (2010) analysis of Indian commercial bank financial 
performance concluded that asset quality directly impacts bank performance. The outcome is 
similar to previous studies on failed New Zealand finance companies  (Douglas et al., 2014; Kabir 
and Laswad, 2014). 
Grier (2007) contends that management is the most important factor in the CAMELS rating 
system as it plays a vital role in a company’s success. Although management efficiency can be 
captured by the quality of other CAMELS elements, in this study operating expenses to operating 
revenue (OE-OR) and operating expense to total assets (OE-TA) are chosen as proxies for 
measuring management competency. OE-OR was found to be statistically significant at t-3, and 
the estimated coefficient of 4.359 reveals that failed financial companies have a higher portion of 
expenses that could not generate enough income. Also, OE-TA was negatively significant during 
the three years before failure. The negative sign presents the reverse relationship of this ratio, 
with a higher probability of failure. It is obvious that a high proportion of impairment asset 
increases operating expenses and reduces company capital and its net profit. This outcome shows 
inefficient management strategies among failed finance companies. This is in line with CAMELS 
theory. As Ongore and Kusa (2013) have previously argued, management efficiency significantly 
affects the financial performance of (Kenyan) commercial banks. In their study of Indian banks, 
Sangmi and Tabassum (2010) note that management efficiency directly impacts financial 
performance. 
Consistent earnings not only build public trust by demonstrating a business’ ability to generate 
profit but also absorbs any loan losses and influence earnings sustainability (Dang, 2011; Grier, 
2007). As shown in Table 6-1, NPAT-TE and NPAT-TA were both found to be statistically significant 
at t-3. The estimated coefficient of -23.393 for NPAT-TA at t-3 and -32.194 for NETINT-TA at t-2 
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indicating a huge loss incurred in net earnings and net interest movement by finance companies. 
This is the result of enormous impairment losses. These results are consistent with the univariate 
tests which show that the NPAT-TA and NETINT-TA of the failed companies are lower than 
healthy companies, which is in line with CAMELS theory. However, the high NPAT-TA at t-2, while 
having low net interest income (NETINT-TA) and low cash flow (OCT-TA), could be suggestive of 
accruals earnings management. When a loan is impaired and an impairment loss is recognised, 
either the receipt of interest revenue and principle from the borrower would be expected to be 
less, or the recovery would be delayed. Therefore, an impairment loss is likely to be an indicator 
of future cash flow problems and a sign of financial distress (Kabir and Laswad, 2014). Ongore and 
Kusa (2013) conclude that banks with high asset quality and low non-performing loan are more 
profitable. As Keovongvichith's work (2012) on the Laotian banking sector during 2005-2010 
shows, though the banks’ earning ability (net income/total assets) has a declining trend, they 
always managed to generate 2 or 3% on an aggregate basis and resisted failure. However, he 
notes that some international banks record a ROE of 10%. Low asset quality (IMPAIR-TA) 
decreases company profitability and increases the risk of failure. This can be concluded because 
the failed companies have inferior earnings quality than their healthy counterparts which is in line 
with CAMELS theory. 
Table ‎6-1 CAMELS Based Models 
Variable MDL 1-1 MDL 1-2 MDL 1-3 MDL 4 
TA-TL 0.036** 0.030** 0.033** 0.006 
GLOAN-TA -0.096 1.534 -0.954 -1.204 
TL-TE 3.485** 2.749** 3.978** 0.209** 
IMPAIR-TA 22.216 48.582** 101.660* 2.372** 
DOUT-GLOAN 19.342 40.333 -166.300 15.831 
OE-OR  -0.149 4.359** -0.071 
OE-TA -1.066* -3.645*** -40.985*** -0.133 
NPAT-TE 0.802 1.928 3.243* 0.245 
NPAT-TA -5.335 16.953 -23.393** -0.506 
NETINT-TA -3.947 -32.194** -1.577 -2.824 
CA-TA 0.925 -0.030 -1.303 1.451 
OCF-TA 0.648 -40.858*** 11.771 -1.672 
TA -1.495** -1.370* -3.611*** -0.604 
 
A lack of liquidity can seriously affect profitability and confidence, and increase the probability of 
failure (Keovongvichith, 2012). Liquidity reflects the bank ability to meet its financial 
commitments in a period of crisis without incurring undesirable losses. Therefore, maintaining a 
balance between short term assets and short term liabilities is vital for finance companies 
(Douglas et al., 2014). However, as presented in Table 6-1 the OCF-TA is negatively significant at t-
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2. In short, the lower the ratio, the lower liquidity is, which ultimately means a higher chance of 
failure. This result is contrary to Ongore and Kusa's (2013) finding that liquidity has no significant 
effect on bank performance in Kenya, particularly when the strong management strategies 
generate more income and boost bank performance by investing in liquid assets. Keovongvichith 
(2012) notes that the Laotian banking sector keeps more than 50% of their total assets in liquid 
form. Hence, it proves the operation of the bank will be stable in future. The results of this study 
are in line with the CAMELS theory and prove that failed finance companies have low liquidity 
levels compared to healthy companies. It is also reinforced by earlier studies which found that 
failed companies have lower cash flows than healthy companies (see Douglas et al., 2014). 
Size of a finance company is the last financial variable in the CAMELS-based ratio. Table 6-1 
demonstrates that SIZE is negatively significant during the three years before failure; this finding 
is in line with CAMELS theory. It is also consistent with the univariate tests which show the mean 
value of size is higher among healthy companies than failed companies, even though it was only 
significant at t-1. This result is consistent with earlier studies (Lanine and Vennet, 2006), which 
found that size is negatively related to failure and associated with the concept of ‘too big to fail.’ 
The failed New Zealand finance companies were smaller than the healthy ones. However, as Van 
Peursem and Wells (2001) note, ‘large’ New Zealand companies are comparatively small 
internationally, due to the country’s size. As this study focuses only on New Zealand companies, 
this does not present a problem. 
Overall, the results support the first research question and indicate that financial information 
(CAMELS-based ratios) can predict failure among finance companies. Importantly, it also indicates 
investors may have been able to infer from published information which finance companies were 
likely to fail three years in advance. 
6.3.2 Agency-related Information 
Corporate governance is associated with an organisation’s internal performance and includes a 
set of regulated principles between the institution’s board of director, managers, its shareholders 
and stakeholders (OECD, 2004) to ensure the organisation achieves its goals (BBVA Microfinance 
Foundation, 2011). Aspects of Agency-related information are used as non-financial information 
in this study. The results included in Table 6-2 are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
There are four proxies for board composition in this study, NUMDIR, DIRCHANGE, DIRAPPOINT 
and DIRRESIG. The results, summarised in Table 6-2, show an insignificant relation between board 
composition and failure. It is consistent with univariate tests which show no difference in 
variables’ mean values between failed and non-failed companies at t-1 and t-2. However, the 
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table shows significant differences in mean values and median values of DIRCHANGE, 
DIRAPPOINT and DIRRESIG at t-3. These results are due solely to one failed company that 
appointed seven directors and had six directors resign at t-3. In general, these variables were not 
statistically significant. The results are consistent with prior literature that suggests managers 
tend to stay and manage important financial metrics to conceal financial difficulties from 
investors (Schilit and Perler, 2010). Although Thrikawala (2016) suggests that large boards 
improve the performance and reduce the failure possibility of finance companies in Sri Lanka and 
India, the results are similar to Jaikengkit (2004) who suggests that board size and the probability 
of financial distress are not linked in Thailand’s financial institutions. It is also consistent with Chin 
et al.’s study on 426 annual observations of New Zealand firms, which found no significant 
relationship between board size and firm performance. The results for DIRCHANGE, DIRAPPOINT 
and DIRRESIG also find support in Douglas et al.'s (2014) work. They note an insignificant 
relationship between director turnover and failure. Therefore, there is no significant difference in 
the board composition of failed and non-failed finance companies. This finding contradicts agency 
theory. 
RELAT-TA and RELAT-GLOAN included in Table 6-2 are proxies used to measure the rate of related 
party lending. RELAT-GLOAN was eliminated from the model because of high correlation with 
RELAT-TA. Although RELAT-TA was statistically insignificant, meaning there was no relationship 
found between related party lending and failure, the univariate tests show that mean and median 
values of RELAT-TA and RELAT-GLOAN are higher among failed companies than non-failed 
companies in the three years prior to failure. The outcome is not in line with stewardship theory. 
The reason could be due to not disclosing or incorrect disclosure of related party information in 
financial statements. This was notable by checking the comparative figures during data collection 
which was also supported by Wu and Malthus (2012). For instance, company X shows a value for 
related party lending at t-2 with a comparative figure for t-3, however, fails to disclose related 
party lending in t-3 financial statements. In another scenario, the comparative figures in the 
annual report of company Y may not be matched with the original figures in the annual report for 
the previous year. The insignificant result is supported by Douglas et al. (2014) who studied failed 
New Zealand finance companies and found no relationship between related party lending and 
failure. However, as  Barker and Javier (2010) have noted, New Zealand finance companies have 
the highest level of related party transactions in the NBDT sector; this is especially true when 
firms have interlocking directors on the board (Bhuiyan and Roudaki, 2018). Wu and Malthus 
(2012) who studied the role of related party transactions in the failed New Zealand finance 
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companies found that related party transactions were higher in such companies and significantly 
related to their failure.  
This study also evaluated audit quality. As shown in Table 6-1, Audit Big was found to be 
statistically significant and retained its significant levels over the three years in both the logistic 
regression and hazard models. The negative sign of the variable explains that failed companies 
have a lower likelihood of nominating a Big 4 auditor compared to healthy companies. This 
finding is consistent with the univariate test, which shows that the mean value for electing Big 4 is 
higher among healthy companies. The result is similar to Francis (2004) who argued that audit 
quality is dependent on audit firm size. Prior literature proves that in the event of company 
failure, auditors are one of the first groups to be questioned. As the Big 4 all have reputations to 
protect, they are providing high quality audits. Chiang and Prescott (2010) reveals a pattern 
between audit firms and failed finance companies and suggest that either finance companies may 
have purposely decided not to engage the services of a large audit firm, or whether the auditor 
declined to be associated with the finance company. 
Moreover, modification report (MODIFIED) was found to be significant at t-1, meaning failed 
companies received more modified reports at t-1 rather than non-failed companies. However, it 
is important to note that only one finance company received a qualified report and 17 companies 
received unqualified reports with ‘fundamental uncertainties’ or ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraphs 
in their audit reports. This shows that the audits of these failed companies were not thorough and 
lacked in-depth analysis. Vaughan (2009) believes that if auditors had issued qualified opinions, 
this would have provided trustees with a red flag and encouraged them to intervene at an earlier 
stage AUDLAG and AUDREM are not significantly related to the failure of the finance companies. 
The insignificant result of AUDREM is consistent with Li (2009) who suggests that there is no 
statistically significant association between audit fee and audit quality. AUDLAG also does not 
show a significant relationship with failure which that can be related to different aspects of the 
audit firm and audit committees of such companies. For instant, Sultana, Singh, and Van der 
Zahan (2015) indicate that audit lag is influenced by audit committee experience and prior audit 
firm. Expert audit committees with great knowledge and assurance in negotiations with the 
external auditors and mediating auditor disagreements can reduce overall audit lags (Sultana et 
al., 2015). However, if an auditor has worked with a client for a couple of years, they have enough 
knowledge about their business and they are familiar with the company position; this ultimately 
reduces the audit lags. Therefore, more information is needed to evaluate the impact of audit lag 
on finance company failure. The significant relationship between BIGN and MODIFIED indicates 
that failed companies have inferior audit quality, an argument supported by agency theory. 
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Trustee companies play an important fiduciary role as the Reserve Bank delegated the 
supervision of NBDTs to them. The TRUSTEE variable focuses on three main trustee companies, 
which account for the majority of the sample. As shown in Table 6-2, failed companies are more 
likely to have one of the three main trustee companies, rather than the non-failed companies. 
This finding is consistent with Douglas et al.'s (2014) work. It also echoes concerns raised by both 
the International Monetary Fund (2014) who stated that trustees were not performing their role 
adequately and the Commerce Committee (2011) who argued that trustee companies need to 
have expert and qualified staff to understand the nature of the finance sector and specific 
industry risks. Although AMENDED was not significant in the logit model, it was found to be 
significant in the hazard model. Univariate tests show significantly different mean values on Trust 
deed amendments between failed and non-failed companies. Most of the amendments are minor 
and do not focus on the debt covenant restrictions (Douglas et al., 2014). Wilson et al. (2013) 
note that even if the trustee were aware of the breaches, they agreed to amend the definitions in 
the trust deeds like change the definition of related party transaction. In short, failed finance 
companies have lower trustee characteristics than healthy companies; this finding is in line with 
agency theory. 
Table ‎6-2: Agency-related Models 
Variable MDL 2-1 MDL 2-2 MDL 2-3 MDL 5 
NUMDIR 0.168 0.031 0.050 -0.232 
DIRCHANGE 0.540 -0.854 -1.250 0.714 
DIRAPPOINT 0.437 0.089 0.631 0.098 
DIRRESIG -0.108 0.555 -0.275 -0.180 
RELAT-TA -2.318 0.162 0.417 0.354 
BIGN -2.798** -1.636** -1.715** -1.707*** 
MODIFIED 5.730*** 19.087 21.539 3.111*** 
AUDITLAG 0.011 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 
AUDREM -0.405 0.150 -0.048 -0.070 
TRUSTEE 1.571** 0.665** 0.591 0.588* 
AMDENDED 0.980 0.154 -0.278 1.746*** 
AGE -0.046 -0.029 -0.031 -0.024 
MEDIA 0.102 0.381 0.043 0.090 
 
AGE is considered as the years between when a firm began operations and the year of data 
submission (Microfinance Information Exchange, 2007) or the data collection year. Although the 
result (Table 6-2) shows a statistically insignificant relationship between firm maturity and failure 
in the models, the univariate tests display a high difference in mean values of failed and non-
failed companies in the prior three years before failure. The outcome suggests that healthy 
companies have served in the market nearly two times more than failed companies; this finding is 
in line with agency theory. The results are similar to Nurmakhanova et al. (2015) who concluded 
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that finance company maturity positively affects financial sustainability. As Caudill et al. (2009) 
note, mature firms generally control costs more efficiently which leads to higher profitability. 
Media is an extra-legal institution that plays a critical role in forming public thoughts (Cohen et 
al., 2017). As presented in Table 6-2, MEDIA is statistically insignificant in the three years prior to 
failure. The univariate tests do not indicate a considerable difference in mean values of failed and 
healthy companies. Although Miller (2006) believes that the media, especially the business press, 
plays a key role in regulating financial institutions, this study has found no results to support this 
argument. In this study, media only reported on failed finance companies just before they 
announced that they were going into receivership. Most of the reporting was about related party 
transactions, interpreting companies’ financial situations and assigning blame. Although it is not 
compulsory for finance companies to publish their financial reports, annual information and 
financial reports are accessible through the companies’ office. In addition, media could act as a 
whistle blower who discloses misconduct carried out by the managers on individuals in the 
finance company. Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) announced the positive contribution of the 
whistle blowers and highlighted more than 36% of economic crimes are detected by whistle 
blowers (Rachagan and Kuppusamy, 2013). However, the media performed very weak and kept 
quiet till close to the event. Even though (Dyck et al., 2010) explains that we cannot expect the 
media to act as a monitor for small companies, the loss of more than NZ$3 billion dollars in New 
Zealand in a total share market of only NZ$75 billion is not negligible. In conclusion, there is no 
difference in media citations between failed and healthy companies. This finding contradicts 
Agenda-setting theory. 
Overall, the outcomes support the second research question and suggest that non-financial 
information (Agency-related information) can be used to predict the risk of failure among finance 
companies. However, a reduction in the degree of freedom from having too many variables in 
models with a small sample size may be the reason that other variables are not significant 
(Douglas et al., 2014). 
6.3.3 CAMELS-based Ratio and Agency-related Information 
Financial and non-financial variables were integrated to develop the third group of models to 
determine whether the combination of both groups of variables can enhance predictive abilities. 
 Table 6-3 shows the results for the combined models for logistic regression for the three years 
prior to failure and also for the hazard model. It is clear that TA-TL, TL-TE, which were significant 
in Models 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3, retain their significant levels in the combined variables models during 
the three years before failure. The comparison proves that these ratios are efficient predictors of 
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the probability of failure. It is also similar for BIGN which holds the significant level for all three 
years, the same as Models 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 and 5. 
Similar to Model 1-2, Models 3-2 and 6 show that low quality assets (IMPAIR-TA) increase 
operating expenses (OE-TA). This results in low earnings (NETINT-TA) and poor cash flows (OCF-
TA). NPAT-TA is significant in Model 3-2 opposed to Model 1-2. The high NPAT-TA of 19.347, in 
the condition of high operating expenses, low net interest income and low cash flow indicates 
accrual earnings management. In addition, by knowledge of high impairment loss at t-3, which is 
significant in Model 1-3 but not in Model 3-3, it leads to high operating expenses and results in 
high OE-OR and OE-TA. OE-OR, with a positive sign, shows a direct relationship with failure and 
OE-TA displays a negative relationship with failure. Model 1-3 shows NPAT-TA of -23.393 which is 
due to a huge company loss while TL-TE of 7.068 in Model 3-3 indicates low levels of equity; 
hence the ratio of net profit (NPAT) to total equity (TE) results in a high positive coefficient. 
Moreover, TA is negatively significant in Model 3-3 and Model 6, and TRUSTEE is just positive and 
significant in Model 3-1.  
Table ‎6-3 Combined Variables Models 
Variable MDL 3-1 MDL 3-2 MDL 3-3 MDL 6 
TA-TL 0.043** 0.034** 0.070**  
TL-TE 3.392** 3.035** 7.068**  
IMPAIR-TA  40.843*  11.965* 
OE-OR   8.676*  
OE-TA  -3.648** -66.148*** -0.465** 
NPAT-TE   6.390*  
NPAT-TA  19.347*   
NETINT-TA  -29.983**   
OCF-TA  -47.163***  -3.702* 
TA   -5.703* -0.874** 
BIGN -2.354** -2.028** -6.863** -1.750*** 
TRUSTEE 1.263*    
             AMENDED                                                                                                                2.230*** 
 
Tables 5-11 (classification accuracy) and 5-12 (discriminative power) present the findings for the 
third research question. The overall accuracy of in-sample is higher in Model 6. Model 3-3 has the 
best result, indicating that the combination of financial and non-financial variables produces a 
better in-sample prediction. However, as per discriminative power table, Model 3-3 has higher 
AUC, Gini, KS and H measures and thus outperforms Model 6. Therefore, due to higher in-sample 
accuracy and lower Type I and II errors, one can conclude that Agency-related information can 
improve the ability of failure prediction than CAMELS ratios alone.  
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However, the out-of-sample accuracy percentages do not suggest any differences between 
Models in group 1 (Model 1-1, Model 1-2, Model 1-3), group 2 (Model 2-1, Model 2-2, Model 2-3) 
and group 3 (Model 3-1, Model 3-2 and Model 3-3). The overall accuracy of the models for the 
three groups has similar percentages of 66.67%, 83.33% and 66.67% at t-1, t-2 and t-3 
respectively. Furthermore, Type I error is 40.00%, 25.00%, and 33.00% in one, two and three 
years before failure correspondingly. However, type II errors are 0% at year one and year two in 
advance and also at t=3 in Model 2-3. Whereas, Model 1-3 and Model 3-3 have 33.33% Type II 
errors at three years before failure. The R project could not calculate the AUC, Gini, KS and H 
measures due to the small size of the out-of-sample cases. Therefore, any discussion of out-of-
sample results is deemed to be unreliable. 
6.4 Summary of Findings 
The overall results indicate that there is sufficient evidence to support all three study objectives. 
The first objective focused on the CAMELS-based ratios and the ability of financial ratios in 
predicting finance company failure. The results have confirmed that financial soundness 
indicators are inferior among failed finance companies from three years before failure. The stable 
level of significance for some of the ratios, like total assets to total liquidity (TA-TL), total liability 
to total equity (TL-TE), operating expenses to total assets (OE-TA) and total size (TA) for the three 
years prior to failure confirm that failed finance companies have inferior financial based ratios 
than healthy companies. Significantly, most of the variables are statistically significant at three 
and two years before failure. Therefore, the predictive power of the model is higher at t-3 and t-
2. This finding is supported by substantial differences in asset quality ratios, like impairment 
assets to total assets (IMPAIR-TA) and operating expenses to total assets (OE-TA) as management 
competency at t-3 and t-2. The main reason is that the majority of related party loans and 
advances were written off in the two years prior to failure. This practice directly affected earnings 
quality related ratios, like net profit after tax to total assets (NPAT-TA) and net profit after tax to 
total equity (NPAT-TE). Although previous literature has found significant differences between 
failed and non-failed companies one year before failure, this study has shown that significant 
differences are noticeable even earlier; two and even three years before failure. 
The second objective was dedicated to Agency-related variables and the ability of non-financial 
variables in predicting financial company failure. Auditor characteristics and trusteeship are 
significant variables in this category for both the logit model and the hazard model. Audit big 
(BIGN) was found to be statistically significant and retained its significant level over the three year 
period. The audit modification report (MODIFIED) was significant at one year before failure in the 
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logit model. Furthermore, the variable related to the three designated trustee companies 
(TRUSTEE) holds its significant level at t-2 and t-1 in the logit model. The Big 4 (BIGN) and audit 
modification (MODIFIED) as audit characteristics and TRUSTEE were significant in the hazard 
model. The overall results of Agency-related information confirmed the differences between 
failed and non-failed companies and the importance of audit and trustee characteristics in 
increasing the likelihood of failure. While non-financial variables can be used to predict failure, 
they are not sufficient and reliable enough on their own. 
The last objective was examined the integration of both sets of variables. The integration of both 
groups of variables increases the model’s predictive ability, both in the logit model and the hazard 
model. In short, the combined model performs better than the models built solely on financial or 
non-financial variables.  
The overall accuracy of combined Models (3-1, 3-2 and 3-3) is more than 85%, with the highest 
accuracy of 89.70% at three years before failure in the logit model. Model 6 also provides the 
highest accuracy rate among the three hazard models. Furthermore, the lowest level of false 
negative and false positive proves the best performance of Model 3-3 and Model 6 in comparison 
with the other models in failure prediction. However, the AUC, Gini, KS and H statistics which 
measure the discriminant power of the models shows that Model 3-3 (which integrates both 
financial and non-financial variables), has the best discriminative power.  
Overall, the results confirm that financial and non-financial information presented in the annual 
reports can be used to provide insight into the stability of individual finance companies and can 
be used to predict the risk of failure. 
6.5 Limitations of the Study   
As with all research projects, this study also suffers from a number of limitations. The first 
limitation of this study relates to the relatively small sample size. Data was limited to 35 failed 
financial companies over three consecutive years. Additionally, there were limited numbers of 
failed finance companies with available data for the test sample. Therefore, the results of 
classification accuracy and especially the discriminant power of out-of-sample cannot generate 
any significantly valid influence. 
Secondly, this study focused only on failed New Zealand financial institutions. Therefore 
comparison with other jurisdictions should consider necessary justifications, taking into 
consideration the socio-economic environment. 
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6.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
The findings of this study, together with the limitations, provide opportunities for future research. 
First and foremost, there is a need for more studies on the nature and structure of trusts, 
specifically the characteristics of the professional trustee and possible gaps in legislation related 
to the establishment of trusts, their responsibilities and activities. Additionally, it is recommended 
that future studies include other proxies for Agency-related variables and examine their impact 
on failure prediction. Furthermore, future research could examine the new regulation around 
NBDT prudential requirements for the potential gaps to prevent future related failure risks. Lastly, 
scholars should examine different machine learning models and compare their accuracy with 
other prediction models to test the robustness of the results. These findings will be beneficial in 
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A.1 Summary of NBDT Prudential Requirements Currently in Force 
Requirements Summary Timing of 
Requirements 
Credit ratings NBDTs are required to have a local currency (New Zealand 
dollar), long-term, issuer ratings, given by: 
- Standard and Poor’s Rating Services; 
- Moody’s Investors Service; or 
- Fitch Ratings. 
In force since 1 
March 2010. 
Governance NBDTs that are companies or building societies must have 
a chairperson who is not an employee of either the NBDT 
or a related party and must have at least two independent 
directors. 
NBDTs that are subsidiaries are prohibited from including 
provisions in their constitutions that would allow directors 
to act otherwise than in the best interests of the NBDT. 
In force since 1 
December 2010. 
Risk Management NBDTs are required to have a risk management programme 
that outlines how the NBDT identifies and manages its key 
risks. This programme is to be submitted to, and approved 
by, the NBDT’s trustee. 
In force since 1 
September 
2009. 
Capital A minimum capital ratio is required to be included in the 
NBDTs’ trust deeds. This ratio must be at least 8% for 
NBDTs with a credit rating from an approved credit rating 
agency. For those without a credit rating from an approved 
rating agency, the minimum capital ratio specified in the 
trust deed must be at least 10%. 




Related party restrictions place a limit on the aggregate 
credit exposures of an NBDT or the borrowing group; all 
related parties must be specified in NBDTs' trust deeds. The 
related party exposures should not exceed a maximum 
limit of 15% of tier one capital. 
The definition of "related parties" is expanded under the 
regulations. 
In force since 1 
December 2010. 
Liquidity Liquidity regulations require every NBDT and its trustee to 
ensure that the NBDT’s trust deed include one or more 
quantitative liquidity requirements that are appropriate to 
the characteristics of the NBDT’s business, and that take 
into account the liquidity of the NBDT and the liquidity of 
any borrowing group. 
The Reserve Bank has published guidelines for NBDTs and 
trustees to assist with the development of the quantitative 
liquidity requirements. 




NBDTs must notify the Reserve Bank when a director or 
senior officer of the NBDT (or a person who it is proposed 





and Senior Officers 
to appoint as a director or senior officer of that NBDT) 
raises one or more prescribed “suitability concerns”. The 
Reserve Bank will then carry out a suitability assessment of 
that person. The person must cease to act in the role (or 
not be appointed to the role) where the Reserve Bank has 




An application must be made to the Reserve Bank to 
approve a transaction that will result in a person: 1) having 
the direct or indirect ability to appoint 25% or more of an 
NBDT’s governing body; or 2) having a qualifying interest in 
20% or more of the voting securities issued by the NBDT. A 
transaction having this affect can only proceed with the 
Reserve Bank’s approval. 





























A.2 Codes in R to Calculate H, AUC, Gini, and KS 
 
inp <- read.table(file.choose(), header = TRUE, sep = ";"); 
#   DAVID J. HAND, DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, IMPERIAL COLLEGE, LONDON #   
d.j.hand@imperial.ac.uk  
# This is R code for H, AUC, AUCH, GINI, and KS statistic  
# In addition to these statistics, the output includes  
# - the kernel smoothed score distributions of the two classes  
# - the ROC curve and convex hull  
#  - a plot of the minimum loss produced for each value of c  
#  - the weight function implicitly used by the AUC, as a function of score  
# - the weight function implicitly used by the AUC, as a function of c d 
 
 
# data is in a matrix called �inp� with two columns  
# column 1: classes, labelled 0 or 1  
# column 2: classifier scores  
n0n1 <- nrow(inp); 
x <- t(inp); 
 
# alpha and betad are the parameters in the beta  # cost distribution ~ c^alpha * 
(1-c)^betad  
alpha <- 2; 
betad <- 2; 
par(mfrow = c(3, 2)); 
 
# Smoothed histograms  
class0 <- x[, x[1,] == 0]; 
class1 <- x[, x[1,] == 1]; 
xmin <- min(x[2,]); 
xmax <- max(x[2,]); 
plot(density(class0[2,]), xlim = c(xmin, xmax), main = "Kernel smoothed score 
distributions ", xlab = "Score "); 
lines(density(class1[2,]), lty = 4); 
 
# order data into increasing scores  
zord <- order(x[2,]); 
sc <- x[, zord]; 
n1 <- sum(sc[1,]); 
n0 <- n0n1 - n1; 
pi0 <- n0 / n0n1; 
pi1 <- n1 / n0n1; 
 
# Calculate the raw ROC, replacing any tied # sequences by a �diagonal� in the ROC 
curve.  
# The raw ROC starts at F0[1]=0, F1[1]=0, and ends at # F0[K1]=n0, F1[K1]=n1.  
F0 <- c(0:n0n1); 
F1 <- c(0:n0n1); 
sc <- cbind(sc, sc[, n0n1]); 
K1 <- 1; 
k <- 2; 
for (i in 1:n0n1) { 
    F0[k] <- F0[K1] + (1 - sc[1, i]); 
    F1[k] <- F1[K1] + sc[1, i]; 
    K1 <- k; 
    k <- if (sc[2, i + 1] == sc[2, i]) (k) 
    else (k + 1); 
    } 
F0 <- F0[1:K1]; 




# Plot the ROC plot(F1/n1,F0/n0, xlab= "F1 ",ylab= "F0 ",type= "l", main= "ROC 
curve and convex hull ") lines(c(0,1),c(0,1),type= "l")  
# Compute KS statistic  
KS <- max((F0 / n0) - (F1 / n1)); 
# Find the upper concave hull  
G0 <- c(0:(K1 - 1)); 
G1 <- c(0:(K1 - 1)); 
 
i <- 1; 
hc <- 1; 
while (i < K1) { 
    c1 <- c((i + 1):K1); 
    for (j in (i + 1):K1) { 
        u1 <- (F1[j] - F1[i]); 
        u0 <- (F0[j] - F0[i]); 
        c1[j] <- u1 / (u1 + u0); 
    } 
    argmin <- i + 1; 
    c1min <- c1[i + 1]; 
    for (k in (i + 1):K1) { 
        argmin <- if (c1[k] <= c1min)(k) else (argmin); 
        c1min <- c1[argmin]; 
    } 
    hc <- hc + 1; 
    G0[hc] <- F0[argmin]; 
    G1[hc] <- F1[argmin]; 
    i <- argmin; 
} 
 
G0 <- G0[1:hc] / n0; 
G1 <- G1[1:hc] / n1; 
 
# Draw hull lines(G1,G0,type= "l",lty=2)  
# Calculate the LHalpha value  
cost <- c(1:(hc + 1)); 
b0 <- c(1:hc + 1); 
b1 <- c(1:hc + 1); 
 
cost[1] <- 0; 
cost[hc + 1] <- 1; 
 
b0[1] <- pbeta(cost[1], shape1 = (1 + alpha), shape2 = betad) * beta((1 + alpha), 
betad) / beta(alpha, betad); 
b1[1] <- pbeta(cost[1], shape1 = alpha, shape2 = (1 + betad)) * beta(alpha, (1 + 
betad)) / beta(alpha, betad); 
b0[hc + 1] <- pbeta(cost[hc + 1], shape1 = (1 + alpha), shape2 = betad) * beta((1 + 
alpha), betad) / beta(alpha, betad); 
b1[hc + 1] <- pbeta(cost[hc + 1], shape1 = alpha, shape2 = (1 + betad)) * 
beta(alpha, (1 + betad)) / beta(alpha, betad); 
for (i in 2:hc) { 
    cost[i] <- pi1 * (G1[i] - G1[i - 1]) / (pi0 * (G0[i] - G0[i - 1]) + pi1 * 
(G1[i] - G1[i - 1])); 
    b0[i] <- pbeta(cost[i], shape1 = (1 + alpha), shape2 = betad) * beta((1 + 
alpha), betad) / beta(alpha, betad); 
    b1[i] <- pbeta(cost[i], shape1 = alpha, shape2 = (1 + betad)) * beta(alpha, (1 




LHalpha <- 0; 
for (i in 1:hc) { 
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    LHalpha <- LHalpha + pi0 * (1 - G0[i]) * (b0[(i + 1)] - b0[i]) + pi1 * G1[i] * 
(b1[(i + 1)] - b1[i]); 
} 
 
B0 <- pbeta(pi1, shape1 = (1 + alpha), shape2 = betad) * beta((1 + alpha), betad) / 
beta(alpha, betad); 
B1 <- pbeta(1, shape1 = alpha, shape2 = (1 + betad)) * beta(alpha, (1 + betad)) / 
beta(alpha, betad) - 
    pbeta(pi1, shape1 = alpha, shape2 = (1 + betad)) * beta(alpha, (1 + betad)) / 
beta(alpha, betad); 
H <- 1 - LHalpha / (pi0 * B0 + pi1 * B1); 
 
 
# Calculate the area under the ROC curve, AUC  
K11 <- K1 + 1; 
F0[K11] <- n0; 
F1[K11] <- n1; 
F0 <- F0[1:K11]; 
F1 <- F1[1:K11]; 
F0A <- F0[2:K11]; 
F0B <- F0[1:K1]; 
F1A <- F1[2:K11]; 
F1B <- F1[1:K1]; 
AUC <- sum((F0A - F0B) * (n1 - (F1A + F1B) / 2)) / (n0 * n1); 
Gini <- 2 * AUC - 1; 
 
# CALCULATE THE AREA UNDER THE CONVEX HULL, AUCH  
AUCH <- 0; 
for (i in 1:(hc - 1)) { 
    AUCH <- AUCH + G0[i] * (G1[i + 1] - G1[i]) + 0.5 * (G0[i + 1] - G0[i]) * (G1[i 
+ 1] - G1[i]); 
} 
 
# CALCULATE THE MINIMUM LOSS VS c CURVE  
Q <- c(1:(hc + 1)); 
for (i in 1:hc) { 
    Q[i] <- cost[i] * pi0 * (1 - G0[i]) + (1 - cost[i]) * pi1 * G1[i]; 
} 
Q[(hc + 1)] <- 0; 
plot(cost, Q, type = "l", main = "Minimum loss by cost ", xlab = "cost ", ylab = 
"Minimum achievable loss "); 
 
# PLOT THE AUC MIXTURE WEIGHT FUNCTION IN TERMS # OF THE SCORE  
plot(density(x[2,]), lty = 1, xlab = "Score ", main = " AUC measure weight function 
of T", ylab = "W(t)"); 
# PLOT THE AUC MIXTURE WEIGHT FUNCTION IN TERMS # OF THE COST  
aucd <- c((n0 * G0 + n1 * G1), 1);  
aucd2 <- c(1, (n0 * G0 + n1 * G1)); 
aucf <- (aucd - aucd2) / n0n1; 
plot(cost[2:hc], aucf[2:hc], type = "h", xlim = c(0, 1), ylim = c(0, 1), main = 
"AUC measure weight function of c", xlab = "Cost", ylab = "w(c)"); 
# PLOT THE BETA WEIGHT FUNCTION IN TERMS OF THE COST  
b <- c(1:100) / 100; 
y <- dbeta(b, alpha, betad); 
plot(b, y, type = "l", xlab = "Cost ", main = "H measure weight function of c", 
ylab = "w(c) "); 
 
H; 
AUC; 
Gini; 
AUCH; 
KS; 
